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Abstract 
 
ART AND BECOMING-ANIMAL: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ANIMAL IMAGERY IN 
DOROTHEA TANNING’S POST-1955 PAINTINGS 
 
By Samantha Karam, MA  
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at 
Virginia Commonwealth University.  
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013 
 
Director: Kathleen Chapman, Ph.D., Art History  
 
 
 
In 1955, American artist Dorothea Tanning abandoned her figurative Surrealist 
renderings of dream-like scenarios in favor of a complexly abstract and fragmented style of 
painting. With few exceptions, the ways in which Tanning’s later works function independently 
of her earlier paintings tends to be downplayed in the scholarship on her oeuvre. Equally sparse 
is the scholarship on Tanning’s dog imagery, which pervades her oeuvre but becomes most 
apparent in her later phase. This thesis seeks to shift attention toward Tanning’s later abstract 
paintings; it also seeks to fill the gap in scholarship on Tanning’s dogs. Specifically, through the 
study of five Tanning paintings from the late 1950s and 1960s, with the theoretical aid of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the becoming-animal, this thesis will investigate how 
Tanning’s post-1955 paintings create and promote new ways for viewers to think about the 
relations between humans and animals in the human-dominated modern world.  
 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Fragmented, dynamic, and vibrantly colored, Le Mal oublié (The Ill Forgotten), painted 
in 1955, marks a significant turning point in the career of American-born artist Dorothea 
Tanning (1910-2012). With her debut of The Ill Forgotten, Tanning abandoned her more clearly 
delineated, figurative renderings of dream-like scenarios, as seen in her well-known 1943 
painting Eine kleine Nachtmusik (A Little Nightmusic), in favor of a more abstract and elusive 
style of imagery.1 While her earlier paintings, dating from the 1940s through the mid-1950s, 
earned Tanning the Surrealist label and in many ways paralleled the works of René Magritte, 
Salvador Dalí, and Leonor Fini, Tanning’s later paintings broke away from the Surrealist idiom. 
However, today Tanning remains most known as a Surrealist artist. With the exception of 
Insomnies (Insomnias), completed in 1957, Tanning’s later works tend to be overlooked in the 
scholarship on her oeuvre.2 At most, they are interpreted largely within the context of Tanning’s 
                                                
1 This thesis provides illustrations for a selection of Tanning’s paintings examined most 
closely in the present study. These paintings are indicated in the text by a corresponding figure 
number. For an illustration of Eine kleine Nachtmusik and other paintings which are less 
important to this thesis’s argument, readers may consult the online catalogue of Tanning’s 
works, provided by the Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive, at 
http://www.dorotheatanning.org/.  
 
2 A small handful of published studies about Tanning’s later works include Catriona 
McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes: Cytherean Voyages in the Post-Surrealist Practice of Dorothea 
Tanning,” in Dorothea Tanning: Unknown but Knowable States (San Francisco: Gallery Wendi 
Norris, 2013); Martin Sundberg, “The Metamorphosis of Dorothea Tanning: On the Painting 
Insomnias: Between Facets and Details,” trans. Frank Perry, Konsthistorisk Tidskrift/Journal of 
Art History 79 (March 2010): 18-32; and Charles Stuckey and Richard Howard, Dorothea 
Tanning: Insomnias: Paintings from 1954-1965 (New York: Kent Gallery, 2005). Additionally, 
 2 
earlier Surrealist paintings—all the easier for scholars to prolong and adhere to labeling Tanning 
a Surrealist artist. This thesis, however, will shift the attention away from Tanning’s initial 
involvement with Surrealism, focusing instead on her later abstract paintings and the ways they 
can function uniquely as politicizing and radicalizing works of art. This research will also 
examine the largely neglected animal motifs in Tanning’s paintings. Specifically, through a close 
study of five of Tanning’s paintings from the 1950s and 1960s, this thesis investigates how 
works from the post-1955 phase of Tanning’s career create and promote new ways for viewers to 
think about the relations between humans and animals as the world becomes more controlled by 
humans than ever before.   
Tanning first became interested in the Surrealist movement, headed by André Breton, 
after viewing the “Fantastic Art, Dada and Surrealism” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art 
in 1936. She became actively involved with the movement three years later, when the European 
Surrealists fled to the United States at the onset of World War Two and settled in New York City 
where Tanning resided. After 1942, she began regularly showing her paintings in the Surrealists’ 
exhibitions and participating in their group meetings. Her connection to the Surrealists, which 
will be discussed in chapter one, was fostered by the most basic goal shared by Tanning and the 
rest of the movement—that of overcoming the conventions, engrained values, and such binaries 
as right/wrong, true/false, human/animal, and male/female, at the core of bourgeois society.  The 
fundamental goal of Surrealism—which, according to Breton, was “to shake up…settled ways of 
                                                
readers may want to consult Mary Ann Caws and Jean Christophe Bailly, who both provide 
illuminating discussions of Tanning’s later works, though only in larger studies of her entire 
oeuvre. See Mary Ann Caws, “Person: Tanning’s Self-Portraiture,” in The Surrealist Look: An 
Erotics of Encounter (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999); and Jean Christophe Bailly, 
“Image Redux: The Art of Dorothea Tanning,” trans. Richard Howard, in Dorothea Tanning, by 
Dorothea Tanning, Jean Christophe Bailly, and Robert C. Morgan (New York: George Braziller, 
Inc., 1995).  
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thinking”3—was well suited to Tanning’s own desire to subvert middle-class norms and question 
conventional notions of truth and reality.4  
However, Surrealism fell short of providing Tanning with an artistic means for actually 
promoting change and presenting her viewers with an actively politicizing type of art. By the 
time Tanning became a mature practicing artist, Surrealism had already developed into a 
primarily artistic movement with a recognizable style of painting. This style was largely 
characterized by precise, illusionistic renderings of unfamiliar and illogical scenarios, often 
incorporating the irrational juxtaposition of dissimilar objects. Tanning once described this 
iconic style of Surrealist painting as the “reliance on precisely painted elements of the natural 
world in order to present an incongruity.”5 In other words, it was a figurative style of painting 
intended to subvert norms by emphasizing irrational relationships between humans and their 
surroundings in the external world.  
Surrealism inspired Tanning’s meticulously rendered, figurative paintings at the 
beginning of her career; but after about a decade, Tanning began to experiment with new ways of 
reaching her audiences through art. Hence, in 1955, she broke away from her iconic “Surrealist” 
imagery to explore an altogether new and more radical way of painting and envisioning the 
world. As this thesis will argue, the abstract, kaleidoscopic paintings that characterize Tanning’s 
                                                
3 André Breton, Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 152.  
 
4 Tanning made many statements throughout the course of her career about her tendency 
to use art to question accepted notions of truth and reality; these statements will be examined 
mostly in chapter two of this thesis. Interested readers may also want to consult Tanning’s poem 
titled “Artspeak,” in which she comments on art’s ability to sweep up comfortable certainties “as 
meaningless as dust under the rug.” See Dorothea Tanning, “Artspeak,” in Coming to That: 
Poems, by Dorothea Tanning (Minneapolis: Graywolf Press, 2011), 44.  
 
5 Dorothea Tanning, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2004), 213.  
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oeuvre from that point onward—especially during the 1950s and 1960s—demonstrate Tanning’s 
investigation of a new, more politicizing way of promoting thought and challenging conventional 
values and attitudes in modern western society. 
Despite the fact that Tanning spent more years painting abstract and nearly 
nonrepresentational paintings than figurative ones, she has mostly been recognized in art 
historical scholarship for her early Surrealist figurations of irrational and unusual scenarios. 
Thus, Tanning remains widely classified as a Surrealist artist—and, more specifically, a “woman 
Surrealist.”6 The label, “woman Surrealist,” indicates two prevalent and often overlapping 
interpretive contexts that dominate the art historical scholarship on Tanning’s art: the context of 
her gender and the context of Surrealism. On the one hand, numerous scholars have interpreted 
Tanning’s art in terms of the artist’s gender, arguing (1) that Tanning’s experience as a woman 
prompted her to paint images that shed light on female inequality in bourgeois society, and (2) 
that the paintings subvert gender norms and expectations. Alternatively, many art historians have 
looked toward Tanning’s initial involvement with Surrealism, and have focused on the 
movement’s debt to Freudian psychoanalysis as the basis for their interpretations by arguing that 
Tanning’s paintings reveal her innermost unconscious desires. In the following discussion, this 
                                                
6 Discussions of “woman artists” or “woman Surrealists” abound in Surrealist 
scholarship, and Tanning is often included—much against her own wishes. See Whitney 
Chadwick, Women Artists and the Surrealist Movement (Thames and Hudson, 1985); Mary Ann 
Caws, Rudolf E. Kuenzli, and Gwen Raaberg, eds., Surrealism and Women (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991); Patricia Allmer, ed., Angels of Anarchy: Women Artists and Surrealism 
(Munich: Prestel, 2009); and Penelope Rosemont, ed., Surrealist Women: An International 
Anthology (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998). As the titles of these sources indicate, 
discussions of gender and Surrealism are often intertwined, due to the strained relationship 
between women and the Surrealist movement. Chadwick’s Women Artists and the Surrealist 
Movement remains one of the most important texts for examining that relationship. It may also 
interest readers that Tanning often wrote letters to these authors expressing her strong objection 
to being included in exhibitions and surveys of “women artists.” For Tanning’s explanation of 
why, see for example Tanning, Between Lives, 334-335.  
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thesis will provide an overview of some of the common gender-based and Surrealist-based 
readings of Tanning’s art. As will become apparent, all of these interpretations of Tanning’s 
oeuvre center on her early figurative depictions of childhood adventures and dreamlike 
narratives, as well as her exploration of apparently “erotic” fantasies.  
Relating Tanning’s art to her gender, feminist art historian Whitney Chadwick interprets 
many of Tanning’s paintings, such as Birthday (1942) and Maternity (1946-47), as self-portraits 
in disguise. She argues that self-representation was a way for Tanning and many other “women 
Surrealists” to “confront her own reality” as a woman, as well as the social ideologies of gender 
roles and expectations that go along with it.7 In a similar manner, Renée Riese Hubert posits that 
Tanning employed self-representation as a means to assert herself in the shadow of her more 
famous husband, the artist Max Ernst.8 Hubert writes, “To be the spouse of Max Ernst, a genius, 
and to function at the same time as a painter in her own right would tax anybody’s strength, so 
concessions had to be made.”9 For both Chadwick and Hubert, self-portraiture was a means for 
Tanning to gain self-awareness, to explore her own desires, anxieties, and fears, and to assert her 
position within a patriarchal society—both in terms of the male-dominated Surrealist movement 
and the phallocentric western world in general.10  
                                                
7 Chadwick, Women Artists and the Surrealist Movement, 95.  
 
8 Renée Riese Hubert, Magnifying Mirrors: Women, Surrealism, & Partnership (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 23.  
 
9 Ibid., 25.  
 
10 The same is generally said for all “woman Surrealists” in most feminist Surrealist 
scholarship. See for example Ilene Susan Fort and Tere Arcq, introduction to In Wonderland: 
The Surrealist Adventures of Women Artists in Mexico and the United States, ed. Ilene Susan 
Fort and Tere Arcq (Munich: DelMonico Books; Prestel, 2012).   
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Other scholars who have used Tanning’s gender as the basis for their interpretations of 
her art include Ilene Susan Fort, Katharine Conley, and Soo Y. Kang. For these art historians, 
Tanning’s paintings reveal overt attempts to subvert and undermine gender roles and conventions 
in bourgeois society. For example, in the catalogue for the 2012 exhibition, “In Wonderland: The 
Surrealist Adventures of Women Artists in Mexico and the United States,” Fort interprets the 
seemingly endless doors in Tanning’s self-portrait Birthday as representative of the many doors 
through which Tanning fled in order to become a successful painter in New York, despite 
growing up “in a patriarchal society [where] marriage and family remained the goal for which 
[women] were meant to strive.”11 Similarly, Fort concludes that Maternity—depicting a young, 
tired mother in a desolate landscape, holding a child in her arms while a dog with a baby’s face 
lies at her feet—also undermines traditional women’s roles of marriage and child rearing. In 
Fort’s analysis, this painting portrays motherhood as isolating and alienating—perhaps a protest 
against such an unwanted distraction from the artist’s more urgent need to focus on her career.12  
Like Fort, Conley also views Tanning’s art as subversive of the domestic responsibilities 
assigned to women in bourgeois society. According to Conley, the “representations of women in 
houses…allowed women artists to question a woman’s relation to a house as a safe haven and 
the inevitability of a woman’s confinement to it.”13 Conley analyzes Tanning’s Eine kleine 
                                                
11 Ilene Susan Fort, “In the Land of Reinvention: The United States,” in In Wonderland: 
The Surrealist Adventures of Women Artists in Mexico and the United States, ed. Ilene Susan 
Fort and Tere Arcq (Munich: DelMonico Books; Prestel, 2012), 44.  
 
12 Ibid., 47. Her interpretation of Tanning’s Maternity echoes earlier interpretations by 
Chadwick and Hubert. See Chadwick, Women Artists and the Surrealist Movement, 131; and 
Hubert, Magnifying Mirrors, 23.  
 
13 Katharine Conley, “Safe as Houses: Anamorphic Bodies in Ordinary Spaces: Miller, 
Varo, Tanning, Woodman,” in Angels of Anarchy: Women Artists and Surrealism, ed. Patricia 
Allmer (Munich: Prestel, 2009), 46.  
 7 
Nachtmusik—in which two partially nude young girls wander through a dark hallway, which is 
vacant aside from the inexplicable presence of a menacing oversized sunflower—to illustrate her 
argument. Conley asserts that in Eine kleine Nachtmusik, Tanning questions the confinement of 
females to the home by representing “domestic space for young women as claustrophobic, 
haunted by malevolent spirits,” and by portraying the home as a place from which a young 
woman “desires to escape.”14 Likewise, in Fort’s reading of the same painting, she writes, 
“Tanning focused on adolescent girls, often naked or swathed in flying and twisted 
drapery…The traumatic character of this and other images by Tanning that concern women on 
the threshold of sexuality questions the exact nature of the stifling atmosphere of the artist’s 
childhood home.”15 In other words, the apparent theme of sexuality in Tanning’s art is linked, in 
Fort’s analysis, to the stifling oppression of female sexuality in traditional bourgeois homes, not 
unlike Tanning’s own childhood home. In this view, Tanning’s depiction of adolescent girls “in 
mysterious, often sexually charged emotional states” is thought to subvert bourgeois notions of 
morality and conventions of female decency and propriety.16  
Kang, too, is primarily interested in the young girls in Tanning’s paintings. In her article, 
“Tanning’s Pictograph: Repossessing Women’s Fantasy,” Kang asserts that the girls in 
Tanning’s works “evidence a woman’s voice” and “seem to speak of woman’s space and 
                                                
14 Conley, “Safe as Houses,” 50.  
 
15 Fort, “In the Land of Reinvention,” 50.  
 
16 Terri Geis, “Artists’ Biographies,” in In Wonderland: The Surrealist Adventures of 
Women Artists in Mexico and the United States, ed. Ilene Susan Fort and Tere Arcq (Munich: 
DelMonico Books; Prestel, 2012), 238.  
 
 8 
desire.”17 In Kang’s view, Tanning, like other “women artists…utilized female qualities and 
issues,” for the purpose of “[producing] aberrant images and [undermining] conventional values 
and standards.”18 Further, Kang’s article moves beyond a purely gender-based analysis of 
Tanning’s works. In her view, Tanning’s paintings not only investigate female issues in order to 
undermine conventionally masculine standards, but they also “express the voice of a woman” by 
representing the artist’s inner unconscious desires.19 Indeed, the artistic exploration of the 
unconscious mind lay at the heart of the Surrealist movement; thus, Kang’s interpretive approach 
to Tanning’s paintings pivots between the context of the artist’s gender on the one hand and the 
context of the Surrealist movement, from which the artist emerged, on the other.  
  Chapter one will discuss Surrealism’s interest in the unconscious—and the importance of 
Freudian psychoanalysis for the Surrealists’ artistic practice—in further detail. Here, it is mainly 
important to note that for the Bretonian Surrealists, the unconscious was understood as the key to 
irrational, imaginative discoveries—inner desires, anxieties, and unfiltered thoughts that oppose 
and subvert western logic and reason. There were two major paths, according to Breton, by 
which a Surrealist artist could tap into his or her unconscious mind.20 The first was through 
automatism—the practice of writing or drawing the random words, images, or directions of the 
                                                
17 Soo Y. Kang, “Tanning’s Pictograph: Repossessing Women’s Fantasy,” Aurora 3 
(2009): 90.  
 
18 Ibid.  
 
19 Ibid., 103.  
 
20 André Breton, “Artistic Genesis and Perspective of Surrealism” (1941), in Surrealism 
and Painting, by André Breton, trans. Simon Watson Taylor (Boston, MA: MFA Publications, 
2002), 68. 
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pen that immediately came to mind without conscious premeditation or articulation.21 The 
second major way was through “the stabilizing of dream images in the kind of still-life deception 
known as trompe-l’oeil.”22 This second method—the irrational juxtaposition of meticulously 
rendered objects in dream-inspired settings—dominated Surrealist painting, particularly in the 
1930s and 1940s, and it was born out of the Surrealists’ interest in Freudian dream analysis, in 
which dreams are interpreted as expressions of unconscious thoughts and desires.23  
Hence, for many Surrealists, dream-inspired “trompe-l’oeil” paintings could be interpreted like 
dreams, decoded and deciphered psychoanalytically, to uncover the artist’s inner 
unconsciousness.  
  Due to Tanning’s early affiliation with Surrealism, many art historians have 
psychoanalyzed her paintings as images derived from her own unconscious dreams, supposedly 
revealing her innermost fantasies and desires. Kang, for her part, asserts that Tanning “genuinely 
focuses on her own dream images and discloses the unconscious mind” in order to express the 
“fantasies of women.”24 In Kang’s view, Tanning herself is the “ultimate desiring subject” in all 
of her paintings, employing the young girls in many of her earlier works to represent her “inner 
                                                
21 Automatism was Breton’s preferred method. In his first Manifesto of Surrealism, he 
defines Surrealism as “Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—
verbally, by means of the written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of 
thought. Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any 
aesthetic or moral concern.” See Breton, Manifestoes of Surrealism, 26.  
 
22 Breton, “Artistic Genesis and Perspective of Surrealism,” 70.  
 
23 See Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. Joyce Crick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999).  
 
24 Kang, “Tanning’s Pictograph,” 103.  
 
 10 
world” of erotic desires.25 Kang’s article somewhat echoes an earlier essay by art critic John 
Russell, titled “The Several Selves of Dorothea Tanning.” In his essay, Russell posits that 
underlying each of Tanning’s paintings is the confrontation and reclamation of her oppressed 
childhood, her unfulfilled desires.26 Russell writes, “Somewhere behind every one of [Tanning’s 
works] is that notion of the unlived life which has haunted Dorothea Tanning since her days as 
an infant…and it is for us to tell her that, on the contrary, she has lived her life to the full in her 
art.”27 Hence, like Kang, Russell views Tanning’s paintings as representations of her own 
repressed feelings and desires, which are supposedly released from her unconscious mind and 
projected onto her canvases.   
 The above psychoanalytic and feminist interpretations are all centered on the figuration 
of human bodies in Tanning’s early works, identifying the exploration of human—and 
particularly female—anxieties, fears, and desires as a recurring theme throughout Tanning’s 
oeuvre.28 There is, however, one art historian whose feminist contextualization of Tanning’s art 
                                                
25 Kang, “Tanning’s Pictograph,” 103.  
 
26 Russell bases his interpretation of Tanning’s paintings on her relatively uneventful 
childhood and her family’s strict Lutheran observances, and also on the fact that Tanning 
practiced elocution as a child—per her mother’s demands—rather than socializing with friends. 
A more detailed biography of Tanning will be provided in chapter two.    
 
27 John Russell, “The Several Selves of Dorothea Tanning,” in Dorothea Tanning, by 
Sune Nordgren, John Russell, Dorothea Tanning, Alain Jouffroy, Jean-Christophe Bailly, and 
Lasse Söderberg (Malmö, Sweden: Malmö Konsthall, 1993), 29.  
 
28 It should be noted that in describing certain analyses of Tanning’s art as “feminist,” I 
mean that they are based on Tanning’s sex. These interpretations have their roots in essentialist 
feminist art history, which presupposes that the meaning or significance of a work of art can be 
linked to the artist’s biological sex. Thus, art historians taking this particular feminist approach to 
Tanning’s art excavate her works for certain elements that may be traced specifically to her 
experiences as a woman—suggesting, for example, that her art addresses certain issues (such as 
socially constructed gender roles) because she is a woman and is therefore concerned with these 
issues, even if she does not immediately realize it.  
 11 
aptly focuses on the later abstract paintings and the ways that they function independently of the 
earlier figurative ones. In “The Metamorphosis of Dorothea Tanning: On the Painting Insomnias: 
Between Facets and Details,” Martin Sundberg provides a reading of Tanning’s 1957 painting 
Insomnias that is similar to Conley and Fort’s assertion that Tanning’s Surrealist art is about 
women’s liberation; but he also examines how the later Insomnias more actively confronts issues 
of female oppression. He writes,  
Since most of the Feminist interpretations of Tanning focus on her early Surrealist 
phase, they tend to neglect the later evolution of her work and the abandonment of 
early Surrealism…Tanning is not very fond of feminist art history, but this does 
not mean that one can neglect the links to theories concerning the gaze or work 
explicitly devoted to strategies…aimed at investigating the position of women in 
art and society.29  
 
For Sundberg, the fragmented and elusive composition in Insomnias depicts “a moment 
when a transformation takes place,” portraying an “active gaze that also demands activity from 
the viewer.”30 Hence, in his analysis, Sundberg proposes that Tanning’s prismatic paintings, 
exemplified by Insomnias, liberate Tanning’s female forms from the male gaze because the 
bodies are “mocking, elusive,” and “there is no longer any place from which to observe a 
woman, for making her into an object.”31 Sundberg’s article is important for the light that it 
sheds on Tanning’s post-1955 paintings and the significance of their stylistic distinction from the 
earlier phase of her career. As will become apparent, this thesis, too, shares Sundberg’s view that 
the dynamic, fragmented imagery solicits viewers to actively engage with Tanning’s later 
paintings rather than passively gazing at them. However, the focus on women’s liberation fails to 
                                                
29 Sundberg, “The Metamorphosis of Dorothea Tanning,” 26 
 
30 Ibid., 29.   
 
31 Ibid.  
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address the complexity of Tanning’s work, and this study will add a new dimension to these 
paintings that Sundberg overlooks.  
With the exception of Sundberg’s analysis, interpretations of the female bodies in 
Tanning’s Surrealist paintings are largely echoed in the sparse scholarship on Tanning’s later 
works. In contrast to Sundberg, other scholars have interpreted the bodies in Tanning’s later 
paintings as being less about the liberation of women from the oppressive male gaze, and more 
about the celebration of human sexuality which allegedly stems from Tanning’s early days as a 
Surrealist. For example, in his essay for the “Dorothea Tanning: Insomnias: Paintings from 1954 
to 1965” exhibition catalogue, Charles Stuckey describes Tanning’s painting Insomnias as the 
conjuration of “supernatural concupiscence,” a “cloudscape of heavenly love,” which carries the 
theme of human sexuality into Tanning’s later paintings from her “sexually charged” works of 
the 1940s.32 Similarly, in a recent essay in the “Dorothea Tanning: Unknown but Knowable 
States” exhibition catalogue, Catriona McAra declares that, in Tanning’s post-1955 
“kaleidoscopic” paintings, a major theme that recurs from her earlier Surrealist works is 
eroticism, culminating in the “swirling eroticization of amorphous nudes in… tumbling visual 
orgies.”33 Hence, even in the two essays by Stuckey and McAra, each of which is solely about 
Tanning’s post-1955 paintings, the two scholars interpret the works by alluding to Tanning’s 
earlier “sexually charged” or “eroticized” imagery of nude children and women. However, this 
thesis contends—and Tanning herself asserts in numerous texts—that there is still much more to 
be said about her later prismatic paintings that has little to do with eroticism.  
                                                
32 Charles Stuckey “Insomnias,” in Dorothea Tanning: Insomnias: Paintings from 1954-
1965, by Charles Stuckey and Richard Howard (New York: Kent Gallery, 2005), 9-11.  
 
33 McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes,” 15.  
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Tanning often challenged the heavily eroticized readings of her work. In a published 
interview with Carlo McCormick, for example, she asserts, 
My work is generally perceived as erotic, period… It’s an obsession of the whole, 
not so cultural, establishment, that almost everything we do which is inexplicable 
must be reduced to sexuality, and that’s absurd. It’s certainly very strong—I 
would never say it wasn’t—but, after all, there are other yearnings, with names 
like glory, incandescence and love and knowledge. I like to think that you feel 
some of this when you look at my pictures.34  
 
Similarly, in her autobiography, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World, Tanning 
facetiously rejects “Eros, the companion invariably assigned to me by the experts who are 
always ready with explanation, a kindness in a way, to tell me what I am painting, what is 
leaking out from under my fingers, all unconsciously.”35 She continues, 
The sad little procession of analyzers, trudging toward the altar of libido… For 
example, some paintings of mine that I had believed to be a testimony to the 
premise that we are waging a desperate battle with unknown forces are in reality 
dainty feminine fantasies bristling with sex symbols. Elsewhere, two rows of 
terrible teeth on one of my sculptures become, under these beady eyes, incredibly, 
a vulva. A statue that I thought was a moment of grace is the male member, this 
doubtless because it is standing up instead of lying down (O vanity). Death’s face, 
which I fear, looks out at me from many of my pictures. But it is often mistaken 
by these hot-blooded writers for the face of lubricity. Though they can spot Eros 
every time, they see no one else.36 
 
In this statement, Tanning attempts to dissuade her interpreters from viewing her works 
as overtly erotic and sexual. She would like her viewers to take more from her paintings than 
mere libidinal insight; she wants, in fact, her works to spur contemplation about other emotions 
and issues of everyday life. In fact, in an undated entry in one of her unpublished journals, 
Tanning writes, “What of the human enigma, the magic of hallucination, powers of the eye, 
                                                
34 Carlo McCormick and Dorothea Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” BOMB 
33 (Fall 1990): 37.  
 
35 Tanning, Between Lives, 335. 
 
36 Ibid., 336.  
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man’s baffling consciousness, the relations between human beings, animals and all living things, 
including stones? … When I paint I try to represent my feelings about some of these things.”37 
As this journal entry indicates, one of Tanning’s major concerns was the relation between 
humans and animals “and all living things.”38 This thesis will, consequently, examine how 
Tanning’s paintings address those relations.  
There is an undeniable persistence of animal motifs, particularly dogs, throughout 
Tanning’s oeuvre that tends to be overlooked in the art historical scholarship on her work. When 
the dogs are acknowledged, they are primarily associated, once again, with eroticism. For 
example, in his article, Sundberg suggests that the dog often appears in Tanning’s works as 
“representative…of her male partner.”39 In a similar vein, both McAra and Georgiana M. M. 
Colvile assert that the dogs in Tanning’s paintings have erotic connotations, though neither of 
these scholars develops these assertions further.40  
To this author’s knowledge, no critical examination of Tanning’s animal imagery 
currently exists, although Annette Shandler Levitt comes close in her book The Genres and 
Genders of Surrealism. In a chapter of her book titled “Women’s Work: The Transformations of 
Leonor Fini and Dorothea Tanning,” Levitt reads the animal motifs in Tanning and Fini’s 
Surrealist paintings as indicative of the artists’ urge to subvert boundaries in the western world. 
She declares that both artists are fascinated with “the breaking of boundaries, with 
                                                
37 Dorothea Tanning, unpublished journal (#2), Dorothea Tanning Collection and 
Archive, New York, NY, p. 81.  
 
38 Ibid.  
 
39 Sundberg, “The Metamorphosis of Dorothea Tanning,” 26.  
 
40 See McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes,” 15; and Georgiana M. M. Colvile, “Women Artists, 
Surrealism and Animal Representation,” in Angels of Anarchy: Women Artists and Surrealism, 
ed. Patricia Allmer (Munich: Prestel, 2009), 66.  
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transformations and metamorphoses…In their art, these women reveal that they have accepted, 
have returned to the ancient wisdom that humans, animals, and the earth are all linked, indeed 
are at times interchangeable.”41 Levitt’s interpretation of animals in Tanning’s paintings—
particularly those depicted in proximity with humans—as motifs capable of subverting 
boundaries and bringing the two closer together is illuminating, for it acknowledges Tanning’s 
concern for human/animal relationships in the western world. However, Levitt does not 
understand Tanning’s incorporation of animal imagery as polemical or intentional, and this is 
where her analysis falls short. For Levitt, Tanning’s use of animal imagery to subvert 
human/animal boundaries was largely “unselfconscious,” since Tanning, as a woman, has 
“merely done what came naturally…unselfconsciously pushing the envelope, testing 
limits…living, thinking, believing, and creating without reference to norms.”42 In Levitt’s 
essentializing analysis, Tanning’s use of animal imagery is one tool among many for doing what 
all “women artists” do: disrupting norms and being rebellious. 
Though they each provide thoughtful analyses in their own ways, Levitt and the other 
aforementioned scholars fail to grasp the specifically radicalizing and politicizing function of 
Tanning’s animal imagery. In conjunction with the prevalence of animal motifs in her paintings 
from the very beginning of her career onward, Tanning often expresses in her writings a genuine 
concern for the displacement and oppression of animals in modern western society.43 Taking this 
                                                
41 Annett Shandler Levitt, “Women’s Work: The Transformations of Leonor Fini and 
Dorothea Tanning,” in The Genres and Genders of Surrealism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999), 89; 94.  
  
42 Ibid., 110.  
 
43 Tanning’s personal view of human/animal relationships will be discussed in chapter 
two.  
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into consideration, this thesis will argue that an exploration of the immanent bonds between 
humans and animals—and a desire to overturn the sense of superiority of animals felt by humans 
in the West—is at the very core of Tanning’s artistic project. Moreover, Tanning’s new style of 
painting in the 1950s marks a strategic move toward creating art that is capable of actively 
engaging viewers in contemplation; it corresponds to Tanning’s increasing urge to overturn 
conventional values and worldviews in order to subvert the western privileging of humans over 
their animal counterparts.44  
It should be noted, however, that a number of scholars have indeed argued that Surrealist 
women utilized animal imagery in order to subvert fixed notions of identity. For example, 
Patricia Allmer asserts that Surrealist women used certain artistic strategies to “disrupt binaries, 
hierarchies, the linear, the fixed and the motionless” for the sake of subverting “generic and 
gender categories.”45 For both Allmer and for Chadwick, one of the major ways in which women 
                                                
44 This thesis incorporates as evidence a great deal of Tanning’s own autobiographical 
texts, in which she repeatedly discloses her urge to entrap her viewers with her paintings and to 
encourage new perceptions and new modes of thought. These ideas will be discussed extensively 
in the chapters to come. Here, it is important to note that the artist’s perspective is one among a 
number of valuable sources in the study of any given body of works, and should not be regarded 
as the ultimate authority in determining meaning. However, as Michel Foucault proposes in his 
essay, “What is an Author?,” an author or artist is a product of, or “described” by, his or her 
works. Thus, Tanning, as an artist, is a product of her paintings, writings, and statements. 
Although her words are not the ultimate authority, they are part of the equation for understanding 
the body of works examined in this thesis and why the question of the animal is essential to it. 
Further, because Tanning was an artist and a writer, both her paintings and writings warrant 
close investigation; her words help contextualize the images and corroborate this thesis’s 
assertion of the centrality of animals in her oeuvre. Taken in conjunction with each other, both 
her paintings and texts help open this body of works to a Deleuze and Guattari-based analysis. 
See Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James 
D. Faubion, and trans. Robert Hurley and others, vol. 2 of Essential Works of Foucault 1954-
1984 (New York: The New York Press, 1998). 
  
45 Patricia Allmer, “Of Fallen Angels and Angels of Anarchy,” in Angels of Anarchy: 
Women Artists and Surrealism, ed. Patricia Allmer (Munich: Prestel, 2009), 15.  
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subverted binaries was by “projecting aspects of the self as animal surrogates”46 in order to 
emphasize hybridity and transformation over the “stasis of being.”47 In this view, women 
Surrealists employed images of animals and human/animal hybrids in order to disrupt traditional 
notions of boundaries and gender-based binaries, which enabled them—at least theoretically—to 
stake out their own position in the male-dominated art world.  
This thesis’s aim is not to dispute the validity or possibility of disrupting gender binaries 
by way of subverting the equally reductive human/animal opposition. Indeed, numerous scholars 
have identified the oppression of women and animals alike as a common symptom of the 
patriarchal and anthropocentric western standard; thus, the subversion of both binaries goes hand 
in hand. As Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams write in their influential text, Animals and 
Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations, feminism has the potential to be more than a 
“narrowly construed liberal feminism that pursues rights and opportunities only for women.”48 
Donovan and Adams advocate  
a radical cultural feminism…incorporating within it other life-forms besides 
human beings… We believe that all oppressions are interconnected: no one 
creature will be free until all are free—from abuse, degradation, exploitation, 
pollution, and commercialization. Women and animals have shared these 
                                                
 
46 Whitney Chadwick, “An Infinite Play of Empty Mirrors: Women, Surrealism, and Self 
Representation,” in Mirror Images: Women, Surrealism, and Self-Representation, ed. Whitney 
Chadwick (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 12.  
 
47 Allmer, “Of Fallen Angels and Angels of Anarchy,” 25.  
 
48 Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams, eds. Animals and Women: Feminist 
Theoretical Explorations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 2-3. Other helpful sources on 
the topic of the connections between feminism and animal activism include Carol J. Adams, 
Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (New York: Continuum, 1994); 
Emily Gaarder, Women and the Animal Rights Movement (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2011); and Lynda Birke and Luciana Parisi, “Animals, Becoming,” in Animal 
Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1999).   
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oppressions historically, and until the mentality of domination is ended in all its 
forms, these afflictions will continue.49  
 
Thus, “feminist” readings of Tanning’s art can potentially say a great deal about the 
implications that her paintings hold for the disruption of all binaries and the advocacy of equality 
for all of the earth’s inhabitants. And yet, they have not done so. Scholars interpreting Tanning’s 
paintings in the context of her gender have focused on how she allegedly expressed her own 
female desires—through the representation of nude female bodies and “eroticized” dogs—for the 
sake of confronting the oppression of women in a masculine society; it appears that none has 
taken this idea further to examine how Tanning confronted the equally problematic and 
pervasive oppression of animal beings. However, Tanning’s work indicates a deep concern with 
exploring and thinking critically about the dire state of relations between humans and animals in 
the western world. In fact, Tanning’s paintings are decades ahead of their time in asking 
questions that have only recently begun to be investigated in a relatively new field known as 
“animal studies.”50 
Animal studies, sometimes called “human-animal studies,” is defined by posthumanist 
theorist Cary Wolfe as a multidisciplinary field of inquiry, developed in the 1990s, with the 
primary aim of “exposing how [animals] have been misunderstood and exploited” in western 
culture.51 To this definition, Matthew Calarco adds two major patterns of questioning in the 
                                                
 
49 Donovan and Adams, introduction to Animals and Women, 3. 
 
50 It should be acknowledged that various experimentations and field-studies have been 
conducted in the past two centuries, and especially throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century, to help raise awareness of animals’ intelligence and abilities that are usually denied 
them by humans. However, as this thesis maintains, animal studies, as a widespread humanities-
based discipline, is a relatively recent accomplishment in the betterment and advocacy of animal 
welfare.  
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diverse practice of animal studies: one concerns the ontology of animals, or “animality,” and the 
other focuses on the supposed distinctions between humans and animals.52 These two 
overlapping areas of investigation initiate a debate about whether there is, as has traditionally 
been assumed in the West, some “shared essence” that characterizes nonhuman animals and 
justifies their demarcation from—and subordination to—humans. Thus, animal studies places 
under attack the “traditional human-animal distinctions, which posit a radical discontinuity 
between animals and human beings.”53 The longstanding ontological distinction between humans 
and animals in the West has been predicated on the widespread assumption that all humans have 
the capacity for language, logic, and feeling emotions, which all animals supposedly lack; hence, 
animals have been perceived as unequivocally “other” and inferior to human beings. However, 
for various reasons, which will be addressed in chapter two, humans are beginning to realize the 
negative consequences of their mistreatment and belittlement of animals; this has prompted 
some—though certainly not yet enough—critical reevaluation of western anthropocentric 
attitudes and behaviors. It is becoming more apparent, at least among animal studies scholars, 
that these creatures are indeed capable of much more than was previously assumed, and that 
humans and animals are not so distinct from each other after all. Thus, the strict human/animal 
binary of western thought is becoming increasingly challenged in an effort to bring humans and 
animals closer together—at least mentally, if not physically—and to halt the destruction wrought 
on the natural environment by human hands and machines. 
                                                
51 Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009), 134.  
 
52 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to 
Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 2.  
 
53 Ibid., 3.  
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The cultivation of new, more bioegalitarian relationships between humans and animals 
begins with a fundamentally new way of thinking about animals and their place in humans’ lives. 
Wolfe posits that the multidisciplinary nature of animal studies enables this burgeoning field of 
inquiry and thought to be investigated in productively diverse ways, noting, “it is only in and 
through our disciplinary specificity that we have something specific and irreplaceable to 
contribute to this ‘question of the animal.’”54 For example, countless literary studies devoted to 
the cause have examined the ways in which certain novels and other literary texts represent 
animals and human/animal relationships in order to tease out the implications of those 
representations for coming to a new understanding about animals in western culture.55 Equally 
numerous philosophical projects have been devoted to theorizing human/animal relationships in 
new ways; Donna Haraway’s When Species Meet, Jacques Derrida’s The Animal that Therefore I 
Am, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia constitute but a few of them.56 Disciplines within the sciences have also 
                                                
54 Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism?, 150.  
 
55 A few examples of these literary studies include Wendy Woodward, The Animal Gaze: 
Animal Subjectivities in Southern African Narratives (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits 
University Press, 2012); Kari Weil, Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now? (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012); and Marianne Dekoven, “Guest Column: Why Animals 
Now?” PMLA 124 (March 2009): 361-369.   
 
56 See Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet, vol. 3 of Posthumanities, ed. Cary Wolfe 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Jacques Derrida, The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008); and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).  
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contributed to questions of animal studies by investigating animal behavior and subjectivity and 
also by shedding light on the consequences of human actions on the environment.57  
This thesis aims to make an art historical contribution to animal studies through an 
analysis of dog motifs in Tanning’s post-1955 paintings in order to investigate how works of art 
can create and promote new ways for viewers to think about animals. It will rely in large part on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s radical concept of “becoming-animal,” which they outline in their 
collaborative book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
Chapter one of this thesis will provide a brief biography of Tanning and an explanation of 
her relationship with the Surrealist émigrés in New York. It will, moreover, examine her shifting 
goals as an artist in the mid-1950s, which resulted in the prismatic, abstract paintings at the core 
of this study. The second chapter will discuss the emergence of animal studies in recent decades. 
It will also investigate some of the major problems facing animals in the modern era, as well as 
Tanning’s own concern for the welfare of nonhuman beings. Chapter three will discuss 
extensively the becoming-animal, which is a process in which one entity, such as a human, 
“becomes” or forms a “molecular” alliance, with an animal.58 The idea of becoming-animal is 
predicated on Deleuze and Guattari’s belief that humans, animals, and all other entities exist in a 
constantly shifting “web of life” (to borrow a term from Deleuzian scholar Tamsin Lorraine).59 
All beings are molecularly connected to one another in this free-floating world in which identity 
                                                
57 For example, readers may want to consult Francoise Wemelsfelder, “The Problem of 
Animal Subjectivity and its Consequences for the Scientific Measurement of Animal Suffering,” 
in Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare, ed. Francine L. Dolins (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 37-53.  
 
58 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 238; 275.  
 
59 Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), 119.  
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is no longer conceived as fixed and stable, but is instead viewed as fluid and malleable.60 As 
chapter three will explain, becoming-animal is a type of incorporeal “event” in which humans 
become open to their molecular connections with animal subjects. Here, the term “event” is 
based on Deleuze’s use of the word in his book The Logic of Sense, in which it is viewed as 
something incorporeal and conceptual, a turning point in perception that creates radically new 
forms of thought and new modes of relating to the world.61 Chapter four will demonstrate how 
Tanning’s post-1955 paintings are capable of functioning as such incorporeal, politicizing 
events; in other words, how they evoke becomings-animal in which viewers are prompted to 
consider new ways of thinking about and relating to animals. In so doing, this thesis will 
illuminate the “specific and irreplaceable” contributions the study of art can make to the 
development of harmonious, non-hierarchical relationships between human and nonhuman 
animals in the increasingly human-dominated western world.  
 
 
 
                                                
60 This notion that all entities are in a state of perpetual transformation pervades Deleuze 
and Guattari’s oeuvre. It is perhaps best summed up in Deleuze’s book Difference and 
Repetition, in which he promotes a “categorical reversal according to which being is said of 
becoming.” In other words, for Deleuze as for Guattari, a human no longer is a static entity, but 
constantly becomes something new. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul 
Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 40.   
 
61 These ideas will be explored throughout chapter three. It should be noted that Deleuze 
tends to nuance his theories and redevelop many of his ideas from text to text. For example, his 
explanation of the “event,” varies slightly from his earlier book The Logic of Sense (1990) to his 
later The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993), and is also discussed in different contexts in his 
later collaborative books with Guattari. In this thesis, I will be using the term “event” as Deleuze 
considers it in The Logic of Sense. Interested readers should consult: Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993); and Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, and ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press).  
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Chapter I 
 
From Tiny Surrealist to Changing the World 
 
 
 
Dorothea Tanning always doubted the notion of “destinies.” It was not that she did not 
believe in destinies, but she doubted whether anyone could truly know what his or her destiny is 
or what it means to “fulfill” it. In a published interview with French artist and writer Alain 
Jouffroy, Tanning confesses, “I tell myself that I am ‘fulfilling my destiny’. But how do I 
know…? It may be my counter-destiny, or my antidestiny. I may be crushing my destiny.”1 
Nevertheless, Tanning had always known, since the age of seven, that she would become an 
artist. In her quiet hometown of Galesburg, Illinois—“a place where you sat on the davenport 
and waited to grow up”—the young Tanning immersed herself in her drawings.2 She made a 
secret haven of the tin box she kept hidden in the high branches of the cherry tree in her family’s 
backyard; concealed within it were her art supplies, her “sly collaborators,” with which she 
concocted her “secret messages” to the world.3  
                                                
1 Alain Jouffroy and Dorothea Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” in Dorothea 
Tanning, by Sune Nordgren, John Russell, Dorothea Tanning, Alain Jouffroy, Jean-Christophe 
Bailly, and Lasse Söderberg (Malmö, Sweden: Malmö Konsthall, 1993), 51. 
 
2 Dorothea Tanning, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2004), 16.  
 
3 Dorothea Tanning, afterword to Dorothea Tanning, by Dorothea Tanning, Jean 
Christophe Bailly, and Robert C. Morgan, trans. Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 
Inc., 1995), 341-342.  
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In her second autobiography, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World, Tanning recalls, 
“When I was seven I drew a figure with leaves for hair. Was I a tiny surrealist?”4 In another 
instance, much to her family’s dismay, Tanning drew a naked angel, “a lady angel with round 
breasts and a sweet smile.”5 Such were the images that isolated Tanning from the rest of her 
family. Of course, all children draw. For many, it is a creative pastime; however, for Tanning, it 
was an urgent escape. Her parents, both Swedish immigrants, pushed a lifestyle of conformity on 
their American-born daughters. The single picture hanging in the Tannings’ dining room, 
Heiliger Hain, spoke of Sunday morning piety.6 The young Dorothea loathed this picture, with 
its “veiled figures gliding towards an altar,” almost as much as she did going to church, and she 
did not share her family’s strong Lutheran faith.7 Tanning found her calm, bourgeois 
upbringing—with its predictable weekly sermons and mundane suburban communities 
“punctuated by neat boxy houses each locked in its rectangular islands of grass”—to be largely 
unbearable.8 Hence, her means of escape was to look inside of herself, transferring the aberrant 
images of her imagination onto paper.  
At sixteen, Tanning graduated from high school two years early, took a job at the 
Galesburg Pubic Library, and enrolled in college courses at the local Knox College. Her 
employment at the library armed her with an invaluable access to books; she particularly favored 
                                                
4 Tanning, Between Lives, 16.  
 
5 Dorothea Tanning, Dorothea Tanning: 10 Recent Paintings and a Biography, ed. 
Dorothea Tanning (New York: Gimpel-Weitzenhoffer Gallery, 1979), n.p.  
 
6 Ibid., n.p. 
 
7 Ibid., n.p. 
 
8 Ibid., n.p.  
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the restricted ones, labeled “immoral” by the head librarian.9 Tanning spent her hours musing 
over gothic novels and other writings by the likes of Ann Radcliffe, Edgar Allen Poe, and 
Samuel Coleridge; writings which would later serve as references for many of her early 
paintings.10 Tanning also found her literature courses at Knox College particularly engaging and 
enjoyed writing. (She would later recall her shared love for both literature and art: “My 
balancing act—writer? artist?—obviously never quite came to an end.”11) Yet at the time, 
Tanning yearned for an applied arts program, which her liberal arts college did not offer.12 
In hindsight, Tanning suspects that college must have been her parents’ effort to quell her 
bohemian ways—“to straighten the lines of the portrait, to calm the iridescent colors, to bring the 
delinquent clay into some acceptable shape.”13 Tanning, however, had other plans. She chafed at 
the thought of conforming to her family’s (and indeed, to society’s) plan for young women: to 
attend college, get married, and settle down with children. Thus, in 1930, after two full years at 
Knox College and three years of employment at the library, Tanning fled her provincial 
hometown and began anew in Chicago, her eyes set on the Chicago Academy of Art.  
The following decade was a whirlwind of events for Tanning. To begin with, she quickly 
realized art school was not for her. Rather than finding the excitement of artistic conversation 
and creative freedom for which she had yearned, Tanning was confronted with imitative 
                                                
9 Tanning, Between Lives, 27.  
 
10 For a recent analysis of how Tanning’s early exploration of gothic novels influenced 
her paintings, see Victoria Carruthers, “Dorothea Tanning and her Gothic Imagination,” Journal 
of Surrealism and the Americas 5 (2011): 134-158.  
 
11 Tanning, Between Lives, 333.  
 
12 Tanning, afterword to Dorothea Tanning, 343-344. 
 
13 Tanning, Dorothea Tanning: 10 Recent Paintings and a Biography, n.p.  
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commercial art and a teacher who urged his students to emulate strictly what Tanning described 
as the shortened, stocky figures of Picasso’s Rose Period.14 Three weeks later, Tanning dropped 
out of the program. Thereafter, everything that she learned about painting would come from 
intense observation of other artists’ works.15   
After Chicago, Tanning found herself briefly in New Orleans, followed by a short stay in 
San Francisco. Finally, in 1936, she purchased a one-way train ticket to New York City and 
rented the first vacant room that she could find. New York’s array of museums and galleries 
became her art academies. Most importantly, the Museum of Modern Art’s exhibition “Fantastic 
Art, Dada and Surrealism” (1936) became Tanning’s first official introduction to Surrealism. She 
describes her reaction to the exhibition in her autobiography:   
Here in the museum…is the infinitely faceted world I must have been waiting for. 
Here is the limitless expanse of POSSIBILITY, a perspective having only 
incidentally to do with painting on surfaces. Here, gathered inside an innocent 
concrete building, are signposts so imperious, so laden, so seductive, and, yes, so 
perverse that, like the insidious revelations of the Galesburg Public Library, they 
would possess me utterly.16  
 
For Tanning, “Fantastic Art, Dada and Surrealism” was “THE revelation.”17 To be sure, 
even prior to her exposure to the French Surrealists, Tanning’s drawings seem to have been of a 
very surrealist nature. As explained in the introduction, Tanning’s early works shared many 
similarities with Surrealist paintings in that they depicted possibilities beyond what was 
immediately apparent: they challenged the laws of reason and rationality, and they dove into the 
                                                
14 Tanning, afterword to Dorothea Tanning, 345. For an example of Picasso’s Rose 
Period, see his Two Nudes (1906). 
 
15 Ibid., 345.  
 
16 Tanning, Between Lives, 49.  
 
17 Jouffroy and Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” 49. 
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enigmatic world of Tanning’s imagination. “I was drawing otherworldly things right from the 
beginning,” she explains, identifying Surrealism, in part, as an interest in the otherworldly and 
unseen behaviors and thoughts that haunt daily life.18 Thus, “Fantastic Art, Dada and Surrealism” 
only confirmed an urge that Tanning had been harboring for years.  
Three years after the exhibition was installed, World War Two prompted many of the 
European Surrealists to flee to America, and their congregation in New York brought Tanning “a 
kind of relief to see my aberrant pictures find not only tolerance but enthusiasm among these 
seminal exotics whom I had admired for so many reasons.”19 Through a series of lucky events, 
Tanning met Julien Levy, who, at the time, owned New York’s leading gallery of Surrealist art. 
Levy invited Tanning to join his gallery and, months later, he introduced her to André Breton, 
Yves Tanguy, and other Surrealist émigrés who “saw in [Tanning’s] work preoccupations and 
affinities that matched their own.”20 Tanning’s involvement with the Surrealists was further 
strengthened in 1942 when she met and later married the Surrealist luminary Max Ernst, with 
whom she would share a long and adventurous life in New York, Arizona, and, for nearly three 
decades, France.  
For many years after her initial introduction to the Surrealists, Tanning showed her work 
with them, shared their ideas, and participated in many of their group meetings and games, such 
as the cadavres exquis.21 Frequent visitors to her New York apartment included the Surrealists 
                                                
18 Dorothea Tanning in an interview with John Gruen: John Gruen, “Among the Sacred 
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19 Tanning, Between Lives, 75.  
 
20 Tanning, afterword to Dorothea Tanning, 348.  
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proclaimed Surrealist leader, André Breton. It involved the creation of a composite sentence or 
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Breton, Marcel Duchamp, André Masson, Roberto Matta, Kay Sage, and Tanguy.22 At this stage 
of her career, Tanning’s Surrealist paintings, such as Birthday and Children’s Games, both 
completed in 1942, presented clearly delineated, figurative renderings of fantastic, dream-like, 
and sometimes disturbing scenarios. Common motifs in her paintings of this time included doors 
(often symbolizing the barriers between the seen and the unseen), animals, young children, and 
phantom hybrids of unrecognizable species. These early paintings, which are comparable to 
works by other Surrealist artists like René Magritte and Leonor Fini, explored multiple realities 
and questioned the boundaries between what is and what could be—a goal Tanning kept 
throughout her career.  
For better or worse, Tanning’s early involvement with Surrealism left an indelible impact 
on her art. To be sure, she had initially been drawn to the movement for many reasons, not least 
of which was its principle of enriching life and confronting all of life’s possibilities—both 
rational and irrational—by respecting and exploring the unconscious.23 Spearheaded by Breton, 
Surrealism sought, at its core, to battle the inhibitions and restraints placed on individuals by 
various social institutions and oppressive systems of thought. Breton and other Surrealists stood 
strongly against conservative, restrictive values and fixed notions of morality, which were upheld 
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22 Dorothea Tanning, “Souvenirs,” trans. Harry Mathews, in Dorothea Tanning, by Sune 
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by the dominant middle class and imposed on society through what Breton referred to as the 
“abject trinity: family, country, and religion.”24  
From the very beginning, Breton’s goal was to replace the bourgeois habits and customs 
based on a western emphasis on practicality and expediency with his view of the true catalyst for 
intellectual and moral advancement: the unconscious. In his Manifesto of Surrealism Breton 
declared:  
We are still living under the reign of logic… Under the pretense of civilization 
and progress…forbidden is any kind of search for truth which is not in 
conformance with accepted practices. It was, apparently, by pure chance that a 
part of our mental world which we pretended not to be concerned with any 
longer—and, in my opinion by far the most important part—has been brought 
back to light. For this we must give thanks to the discoveries of Sigmund Freud. 
On the basis of these discoveries…the human explorer will be able to carry his 
investigations much further, authorized as he will henceforth be not to confine 
himself solely to the most summary realities. The imagination is perhaps on the 
point of reasserting itself, of reclaiming its rights.25  
 
Indeed, Freud was foundational for the Surrealists, since his conception of psychoanalysis 
offered them a means of not only exploring the depths of their unconsciousness but also 
decoding and making meaning of their discoveries. Moreover, Freud’s text on dream analysis, 
The Interpretation of Dreams (1899), provided the Surrealists with a way of interpreting 
dreams—and dream-inspired paintings—as expressions of repressed, unconscious thoughts and 
libidinal desires.26 Hence, the most general, underlying tenet of Surrealism was that by tapping 
into the unconscious and adopting practices of psycho- and dream analysis, artists could give 
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free reign to inner fears, anxieties, and sexual desires; and in so doing, they could—or, at least, 
they had hoped they could—overthrow the bourgeois suppression of the irrational forces 
underlying human behavior, thereby revealing the true, raw mechanisms of thought.27  
Tanning shared Surrealism’s fundamental goal of overcoming the boundaries, 
conventions, and binaries—such as male/female, proper/improper, and animal/human—
pervasive in western bourgeois thinking. To subvert bourgeois norms meant to subvert the very 
notion of ideologically ensconced views of reality; and for this, Surrealism was, for many years, 
Tanning’s “vehicle.”28 Nevertheless, as New York art critic John Gruen recalls from his 1988 
interview with Tanning, there were certain tenets of Surrealism that Tanning found “suspect,” 
namely their “emphasis on sexual symbolism, and… their overreliance on Freudian 
psychoanalysis as an inspiration for subject matter.”29 These were aspects of the movement that 
Tanning wanted neither to embrace nor to perpetuate. As Gruen declares, “[Tanning’s] imagery 
may have suggested these preoccupations, but her intent lay elsewhere.”30 Above all, Tanning’s 
early work was not about dredging up her own unconscious desires, as prescribed by Surrealism 
                                                
27 For Breton, the major catalyst for reaching the unconscious was through automatism. 
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and its reliance on psychoanalysis; rather, it was about acknowledging the unconscious as a 
constitutive part of life and “leaving the door open to the imagination.”31  
Tanning further distanced herself from Surrealism when it became apparent that her view 
of it as a philosophical movement was being eclipsed by its conversion into an artistic 
movement. Recalling Breton’s definition of Surrealism, Tanning explains, “Surrealism… was 
pure psychic automatism by which we propose to reveal by speech, by writing, by any and all 
other means the real working of thought. What happened was that the ‘all other means’ jumped 
in, the artists.”32 While Tanning was indeed one of the Surrealist artists, she maintained a firm 
belief that Surrealism was a way of life rather than a way of painting.  
For Tanning, Surrealism became problematic when other artists embraced the movement 
as nothing more than a formula for making pictures: “I was deeply impressed by surrealism for 
about 15 years… But, by 1955, it was becoming forced: all kinds of wrong and tired 
interpretations were taking over.”33 She believed that art was not meant to be static; it should 
constantly be reinvented and reformulated to sustain the audience’s attention and the work’s 
viability. In one of her unpublished and undated journals, Tanning wrote, “Art is a steadily 
evolving procedure… It doesn’t necessarily advance, it simply and inexorably changes like the 
colored lights, like the weather, like the northern lights.”34 Thus, although her general creative 
goals of capturing and painting “unknown but knowable states” remained the same over the 
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years, Tanning never intended to maintain a single stylistic approach to that goal or to remain a 
“Surrealist painter” throughout her career.35 By the mid-1950s she found it necessary to separate 
herself definitively from the Surrealist idiom and explore new ways to communicate through her 
paintings.  
In Between Lives, Tanning recalls how she first began to put space between herself and 
her Surrealist beginnings as a painter: “I began to chafe just a little at the reliance on precisely 
painted elements of the natural world in order to present an incongruity.”36 Further, she explains, 
“Beginning, roughly, in 1955, after a period of painting direct, simple images as statement… my 
painted compositions began to shift and merge in an ever intensifying complexity of planes.”37 
Indeed, in 1955, Tanning fulfilled her increasing desire to break away from Surrealism with her 
debut of The Ill Forgotten—a hazy canvas splashed with bold patches of color, shifting planes, 
and minimal figuration (fig. 1). In the prismatic, iridescent paintings that followed the lead of 
The Ill Forgotten, Tanning created nebulous labyrinths of intertwining lines, colors, and 
fragmented figures. From 1955 onward, gone are the vivid, precise renderings of static figures 
that characterized Tanning’s early career; they gave way to intense, dynamic images of 
intermingling bodies, swirling together, suspended in space.  
By splintering her canvases and merging her figures into one another and across multiple 
planes, Tanning encouraged an active rather than passive experience of her art. That is to say, by 
painting her figures and biomorphic shapes in a state of constant flux, shifting through space 
with no comprehensible beginning or end, Tanning demanded from her audience a more 
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concentrated participation in order to comprehend and discern the amalgamation of motifs in 
each painting. Her maze-like images continually prod viewers into an intense concentration in 
order to work their way through the visual puzzles. Thus, beginning with The Ill Forgotten, and 
especially in the five paintings that will be discussed extensively in chapter four, Tanning 
abandoned her Surrealist narratives and figurative scenes that represent otherworldly possibilities 
to her viewers, and instead began to create images that summon her viewers and lead them 
directly into new possibilities as they unfold on the canvas. From 1955 onward, Tanning 
effectively and consciously assumed a more clearly defined artistic role: “Working for change. 
To overturn values. The whirling thought: change the world. It directs the artist’s daily act.”38    
Overturning values had always been one of Tanning’s main objectives. Both in her 
approach to art and to life, she maintained “a firm nonacceptance of what is there and the will to 
impose what is not there,”39 and she remained committed to showing her audience that there is 
always more than what meets the eye. Tanning painted from what Marina Warner terms the 
inner eye: the underlying “desire to make unperceived objects of fear and fantasy stand before 
one’s eyes as if they were real.”40 Throughout her oeuvre, Tanning’s enigmatic, 
phantasmagorical imagery challenges the values that modern western societies place on 
comfortable, familiar, and recognizable phenomena. Further, skeptical of Enlightenment-based 
beliefs that true knowledge is attainable through conscious rationalism and sound reasoning, 
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Tanning, like the other Surrealists, maintained that irrational thoughts and behaviors are equally 
as significant to the production of knowledge as rational ones. This is not to say, however, that 
Tanning’s art rejects Enlightenment ideals altogether. In fact, many of her paintings critically 
question societal norms that are based on faith, tradition, and widespread preconceptions; a 
similar emphasis on challenging conventions and encouraging individuals to think for 
themselves lay at the heart of the Enlightenment.41 However, while the western reliance on 
rational thinking stressed—and continues to emphasize—the knowability of an objective reality 
based on science and reason, as well as the human “quest for dominion over…the forces of 
nature,”42 Tanning remained convinced that “there are so many realities,” and that logic and 
rationalism only account for a fraction of them.43  
Tanning used art in different ways throughout her career to offer alternative versions of 
reality. In the early phase of her career, Tanning did so by creating paintings that present 
blatantly illogical and implausible scenes full of phantoms, human/animal hybrids, gravity-
defying motion, and ominous interiors. These works, such as Eine kleine Nachtmusik, Maternity, 
and Interior with Sudden Joy, address the everyday issues that straight-laced bourgeois norms 
attempted to repress, including the pains and anxieties of growing up, the dull tedium of 
suburbia, impulsive behaviors, and irrational fears. Tanning’s later paintings, by contrast, no 
longer depict scenes of illogical incongruities; instead, they disrupt familiar perceptions of reality 
by presenting turbulent maelstroms of bodies suspended in fragmented spaces. As the problems 
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associated with modern western culture became more pressing and urgent, Tanning’s paintings 
became more tumultuous. Indeed, the uncertainties of life confronted in her paintings did not 
merely concern Tanning; they haunted her. She once confessed that “feverish thoughts of 
warheads, ethnic strife, mass media, megalomaniac avant-agardistes with their shipwreck 
philosophies, chemical conflicts, the population explosion and the progressive desecration of the 
earth” kept her awake at night.44  
There was, significantly, one additional concern that increasingly surfaced in Tanning’s 
paintings over the years: the wavering relationship between human beings and the rest of the 
animal kingdom. While many of Tanning’s motifs are centered primarily on the problems of 
human life—such as maternal anxieties and the stifling moral conventions of the bourgeoisie—
there is also a remarkable presence of animal motifs throughout her oeuvre which suggests that 
nonhuman creatures faced urgent problems of their own. In Tanning’s animal paintings, which 
typically involve the close interaction and/or intertwinement of animal and human entities, one 
can detect her deeply rooted conviction that humans and animals are immanently bound to each 
other and that the concerns of one species are inseparable from the affairs of the other. Thus it is 
clear: Tanning did not merely want to “change the world” for her human audience; rather, her 
most pressing objective was to change the world for both its human and animal inhabitants.  
As Tanning recalls in Between Lives, her politicizing urge to overturn conventional 
values and to change minds had possessed her from her early years onward: “All too sure of my 
own convictions, I would write, when away from home, preachy letters to the family…telling 
them how to think, to change their false values for real ones, to live more meaningful lives, to 
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extend their horizons, and so on.”45 This polemical attitude reverberates throughout her oeuvre, 
but becomes expressed in a markedly different way in her fragmented, multifaceted paintings 
from the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, given the almost ironic way in which Tanning describes her 
“preachy letters” and sure convictions, it seems as if her shift in painting may correspond to her 
own abandonment, or at least reevaluation, of her earlier didactic impulse. Significantly, it was 
not enough for Tanning to continue illustrating the problems of the world and presenting them to 
viewers through precise, direct—almost “preachy”—figuration. It became increasingly necessary 
for Tanning to more actively confront her concerns, and, more importantly, to incite her viewers 
to act with her—to engage with her ideas in a conversation rather than viewing the paintings as a 
one-way representation of Tanning’s own vision. It was precisely through her obscure, almost 
cryptic post-1955 paintings that this incitement might be accomplished.  
The following chapter will examine various instances in which Tanning expressed—
sometimes explicitly, and sometimes surreptitiously—an unrelenting belief that animals and 
humans are immanently connected in the world. It will also consider the problems plaguing 
animal life that may have prompted Tanning’s investigation of human/animal relationships in the 
first place. Subsequent chapters will then attempt to theorize Tanning’s politicizing approach to 
art, ultimately demonstrating how her post-1955 paintings function as events, actively leading 
their viewers into a visual world of perpetual, inter-species becomings, which in turn subvert the 
western tendency of humans to claim supremacy over the rest of the natural world.   
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Chapter II 
 
Supremacy: Humanity’s Problem Drug 
 
 
 
Traditional western philosophy has largely been predicated on the anthropocentric tenets 
of humanism. Generally speaking, western attitudes throughout history have posited that human 
beings—capable of logic, reason, and self-awareness—are ontologically superior to the rest of 
the natural world, which is presumed to lack the capacity for rationality and subjectivity. 
Historically, humans have separated themselves from animals, objectifying them as the 
nonhuman, unthinking “other” in order to dominate and exploit them. As Wendy Woodward 
asserts in The Animal Gaze: Animal Subjectivities in Southern African Narratives, the “dualistic 
bedrock tenets of western humanism… objectif[y] animals as ‘absolute others’ and hence as 
beings over whom humans may legitimately claim mastery.”1  
Indeed, anthropocentrism looms large throughout western history. According to animal 
studies scholar Kari Weil, the western oppression of animals—and, more particularly, the denial 
of animals’ interconnectedness with human beings—harks back to Aristotelian philosophy: 
“Since Aristotle, man (as used in most texts) has been defined as the ‘rational animal,’ 
distinguished from other animals by his (and, more recently, her) ability to think and to reason.”2 
This distinction between the rational human and the irrational animal-other is based largely on 
                                                
1 Wendy Woodward, The Animal Gaze: Animal Subjectivities in Southern African 
Narratives (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press, 2012), 51.  
 
2 Kari Weil, Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now? (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), xv. 
 38 
what animal studies scholar Akira Lippit refers to as the “common anthropological myth”—a 
myth which “seeks to explain the development of animals and human beings as distinct 
entities.”3 This myth, underlying western anthropocentrism, presupposes nonhuman animals to 
be incapable of language, and therefore unable to express logical and reasonable thought 
processes—an assumption that has come under intense scrutiny in recent years.4  
In addition to the denial of language and reason to animals, another major contributing 
factor to the prevailing anthropocentric attitude in the West is the emphasis of western religions 
on creationism. Christianity and Judaism posit that God created humans as unique beings. The 
widespread belief in monotheism has tinged western philosophy with the proud notion that 
humans were created as a unique and exalted species, immanently distinct from the animal 
world. As posthumanist scholar Cary Wolfe explains, “the place of the animal as the repressed 
Other of the subject, identity, logos, and the concept [of humans] reaches back in Western 
culture at least to the Old Testament.”5 Indeed, the presumption that humans possess the unique 
and unmatched ability to express rationalized thought perpetuates a deep-seated, western 
anthropocentric tradition initiated by longstanding theological beliefs.   
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Over the years, numerous philosophers have debated the position of humans and animals 
in relation to each other; the supposedly limited cognitive abilities of animals (as opposed to the 
“advanced” abilities of their human counterparts) have been equally deliberated upon, with little 
consensus. However, an emphasis on those qualities that distinguish humans from other 
animals—namely their ability to reason—has remained foremost in western human/animal 
debates.6 As the twentieth-century French philosopher Jacques Derrida argues, “logocentrism is 
first of all a thesis regarding the animal, the animal deprived of the logos, deprived of the can-
have-the-logos: this is the thesis, position, or presupposition maintained from Aristotle to 
Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant, Levinas, and Lacan.”7 In other words, humans and animals 
have persistently been defined as two distinct and opposing categories, based on notions of what 
“advanced,” rational humans can do versus what “primitive” animals cannot do. Until only 
recently, much less scholarly and philosophic attention has been given to the shared qualities that 
bond humans and animals.  
New light began to be shed on the connections between humans and animals in the 
nineteenth century, when Charles Darwin posited that all animals—human and nonhuman—
came to existence through a process of evolution rather than divine creation. Outlined in his two 
major publications—On the Origin of Species (1859) and Descent of Man (1871)—Darwin’s 
studies made a groundbreaking impact on western philosophy by maintaining that humans are 
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inextricably related to other animal species, and that all animals—human and nonhuman—have 
evolved from a common origin of biological descent rather than divine origin. In Descent of 
Man, he proclaims,  
Even if it be granted that the difference between man and his nearest allies is as 
great in corporeal structure as some naturalists maintain…[h]is body is 
constructed on the same homological plan as that of other mammals. He passes 
through the same phases of embryological development. He retains many 
rudimentary and useless structures…which we have reason to believe were 
possessed by his early progenitors.8 
 
Thus, Darwin finds no justification in “placing man in a distinct kingdom” from 
nonhuman animals.9 Darwin’s writings on nature and evolution inaugurated the “shock” of 
“deanthropocentrism—man toppled from the pinnacle of creation or displaced from the center of 
the universe.”10 According to Lippit in Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife, 
“Darwin’s work profoundly altered the terms of philosophical, psychological, scientific, and 
sociological theory, causing a veritable reorganization of the epistemological order.”11 Lippit 
continues, 
Not only did Darwin challenge the foundations of religious orthodoxy (among 
many controversial extrapolations, Darwin’s findings pointed toward the 
historical inaccuracy of Biblical creation, the essential relationship between 
human beings and primates, and the dynamism of species), they also assailed 
many of the tenets of metaphysics, not least of which insisted upon a rigid 
distinction between humanity and animal.12  
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Indeed, as Lippit indicates, Darwin’s investigations of fossils, plants, insects, and other 
traces of wildlife and the ways in which they are connected fundamentally challenged the 
creationism-fuelled, exalted position of humans. Darwin effectively placed Homo sapiens in a 
web of other animals and living organisms, “all trying to make an earthly living and so evolving 
in relation to one another without the sureties of directional signposts that culminate in Man.”13 
By proposing that humans originally descended from animal beings (most directly apes), and are 
therefore animals themselves, and by arguing that both humans and other nonhuman animals 
share the ability to communicate with each other, Darwin undermined the belief that only 
humans possess logic and the means to express logical thought.14 In doing so, he also overturned 
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment emphasis on reason and rationalism, which situated 
humans at the center and head of the natural world based on their capacity for reason.  
Darwin’s writings prompted a widespread critical questioning of western humanity’s 
ongoing attempt to dominate, tame, and exploit nonhuman beings. Above all, by looking at “the 
term species as one arbitrarily given, for the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely 
resembling each other,” Darwin problematized the categories and binaries that have been 
fallaciously elevated in western thought as necessary and predetermined.15 Thus, he initiated the 
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serious study of the relations, rather than the distinctions, between humans and animals. His 
consideration of the shared abilities and biological characteristics common to both human and 
nonhuman animals has led many scholars to assume responsibility for rethinking the 
human/animal binary opposition.  
 
The Rise of Animal Studies 
 
The critical examination of human/animal relationships, prompted by Darwin, reached an 
apex toward the end of the twentieth century. The anthropocentric “othering” of animals in 
western culture has stimulated, over time, the widespread mistreatment, exploitation, and 
marginalization of animals. In recent decades, however, humans have become more aware of the 
negative consequences and crises—which this thesis will address in the following pages—
resulting from their unjust collective behavior toward animals; this awareness has both prompted 
and been enlarged by scholarship in the field of animal studies. Wolfe explains, “What began in 
the early to mid-1990s as a smattering of work in various fields on human-animal relations and 
their representation in various endeavors…[has] galvanized into a vibrant emergent field of 
interdisciplinary inquiry called animal studies or sometimes human-animal studies.”16 In his 
book, Lippit offers a possible reason for why the field of animal studies has gained so much 
attention in recent years. He writes,  
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No longer a sign of nature’s abundance, animals now inspire a sense of panic for 
the earth’s dwindling resources. Spectral animals recede into the shadows of 
human consumption and environmental destruction. With the prosperity of human 
civilization and global colonization, ecospheres are vanishing, species are moving 
toward extinction, and the environment is sinking, one is told, into a state of 
uninhabitability.17  
 
To be sure, the rapidly increasing human domination and exploitation of animals and the 
natural world is beginning to backfire as the environment progressively deteriorates. It has 
become apparent that the need for reflection and change is urgent; humans must revise their 
treatment of the natural world as something to be conquered and utilized. The purpose of animal 
studies is to prompt and foster this necessary revision; the burgeoning multidisciplinary field of 
animal studies scholars and activists shares the fundamental aim of reconfiguring traditional 
modes of thought and cultivating new, more mutual relationships between humans and animals.  
Notably, the purpose of animal studies is not merely to humanize animals, raising them to 
the status of “human-like” and subsuming them into the artificial, conceptual world constructed 
by human beings. Rather, the main purpose of animal studies, as it is examined in this thesis, is 
to deconstruct that artificial world, to “place the presupposition of the human into question,” 
therefore destabilizing the very prejudices and assumptions that have guided humans in their 
domination of the natural world.18 By calling into question the widespread western perception of 
animals as the inferior nonhuman-other, the ultimate goal of animal studies is to put an end to the 
harsh and unjust realities that animals face in the modern world. 
                                                
 
17 Lippit, Electric Animal, 1.  
 
18 Nicholas Gane, “When We Have Never Been Human, What Is to Be Done?: Interview 
with Donna Haraway,” Theory Culture Society 23 (2006): 140.  
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As cultural and animal studies scholar Randy Malamud writes in his introduction to A 
Cultural History of Animals in the Modern Age, “When a person and a nonhuman animal 
encounter each other, the animal generally ends up somehow the worse for this meeting.”19 Such 
is the fate of animals in modernity, which will be defined in this thesis as a period of time in the 
West, beginning roughly with the Industrial Revolution and culminating in the present. Malamud 
asserts, “human culture has become more powerful—and thus, more dangerous to nonhuman 
animals—than ever before.”20 Rapid technological advancements since the industrial age have 
increasingly led to “global warming, habitat destruction, oil tanker spills, and radioactive and 
other toxic emissions.”21 And as cities grow at increasing rates, the outlying residential suburbs 
result in further displacement of wild field animals. Equally pervasive and no less destructive is 
the human exploitation of animals for food, experimentation, and entertainment. Rather than 
living on farms, cattle and hogs are most often bred and fed in feedlot-like factories and 
“processed like manufactured commodities.”22 They live in harsh, unnatural, and unsuitable 
conditions, only to be killed—often by machines—and neatly packaged and distributed as food. 
Moreover, as art critic and writer John Berger asserts in “Why Look at Animals?,” “Nearly all 
modern techniques of social conditioning were first established with animal experiments.”23 
Animals are artificially tested in laboratories for the effects of pharmaceutical drugs, chemicals, 
                                                
19 Randy Malamud, introduction to A Cultural History of Animals in the Modern Age, ed. 
Randy Malamud (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2007), 3.  
 
20 Ibid., 1.  
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?: For Gilles Aillaud,” in About Looking, by John 
Berger (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 11.  
 
23 Ibid.  
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pesticides, and cosmetics, and they are also frequently subjected to behavioral and cognitive 
experimentation.24  
Clearly, human interaction with animals in the West is largely based on utility. Because 
humans use animals as food and as experimental specimens, animals play a fundamental role in 
human life; yet most humans experience little, if any, natural interaction with nonhuman 
animals, as most human/animal encounters are artificially mediated by human inventions. The 
predominant presence of animals in circuses and their great function as domesticated pets only 
increases the artificiality of human/animal relationships in the modern world, and it certainly 
results in the problematic displacement of animals from their natural environments.25 The 
construction of public zoos, which began in the late nineteenth century, further contributes to the 
marginalization of animals; animals are uprooted from their natural habitats and regions, and 
transported around the globe to be held captive in controlled and contained artificial 
environments.26 Moreover, Berger argues that in zoos, as in aquariums and even in animal 
picture books and magazines, animals become exploited and presented to viewers as visual 
spectacles—mysterious and fascinating nonhuman others turned into mere representations, 
existing in mediated spaces that “will never be entered by the spectator. All animals appear like 
fish seen through the plate glass of an aquarium.”27  
                                                
24 For an excellent overview of the effects of animal experimentation in modernity, see 
Haraway, When Species Meet, 3-132.  
 
25 For a broader discussion of the commodification of animals in Western society, see 
Berger, “Why Look at Animals?: For Gilles Aillaud,” 1-26. See also Malamud, ed., A Cultural 
History of Animals in the Modern Age.  
 
26 An examination of the negative effects that public zoos have had on animals can be 
found in Berger, “Why Look at Animals?: For Gilles Aillaud,”19-26.   
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As this discussion has demonstrated, the sober reality confronting animals today is rooted 
in the unbridgeable fissure that traditional western philosophy has placed between human and 
nonhuman animals. Insofar as humans continue to assert their own supremacy and high 
distinction, objectifying animals and denying them the ability to communicate intelligibly and 
live purposeful lives beyond their service to humans, animals will always continue to be 
marginalized, instrumentalized, and exploited.  
 
Dorothea Tanning’s Perspective on Animals 
 
By and large, efforts made in the direction of atonement—to make right all of the 
problems that human inventions and careless behaviors have caused for animals and the 
environment—are still in the stage of infancy. It was only in the 1990s, by Wolfe’s estimation, 
that the serious, multidisciplinary inquiry and investigation of human/animal interactions began 
to take shape. For this reason, Tanning was decades ahead of her time. As explained in the 
introduction, Tanning expressed, both in her art and in her writings, a deep concern for animals 
and the nature of their existence in the modern world decades before the field of animal studies 
was born. Now that more scholars from a variety of disciplines are becoming aware of the 
urgency of animal inquiry, it is possible to revisit Tanning’s paintings and to understand how 
they can contribute to this new effort toward coexistence with nonhuman animals.  
Living in America and Europe throughout almost the entire twentieth century, Dorothea 
Tanning witnessed the human domination over animals and the natural environment at its apex. 
                                                
27 Berger, “Why Look at Animals?: For Gilles Aillaud,” 14. Here, Berger is engaging 
with the “spectacle” as representation detached from reality. His assertion may be informed by 
the Situationist International founder Guy Debord’s well-known text, The Society of the 
Spectacle. See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1994).  
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The rapid rise of factories, cities, scientific and technological advancements, as well as the 
catastrophic environmental destruction resulting from two World Wars, all contributed to the 
unprecedented strain on animals in an increasingly human-made world. Indeed, all of this arose 
from a growing sense of imperialism in the West—an increasing belief that humans are 
exceptional and superior, and that the rest of the world is theirs for the taking.  
This thesis will posit and discuss the idea that the growing divide between humans and 
animals in the modern age was a major source of inspiration for Tanning’s oeuvre. As the last 
chapter explained, Tanning used her art to address—and often critique—many aspects of 
bourgeois society, such as gender roles, strict behavioral standards for children, and religious 
conformity. Her critical examination of these bourgeois customs has been extensively mulled 
over by her interpreters, as demonstrated in the introduction. Significantly, most of these issues 
of daily life are traced back to Tanning’s depictions of human (and mostly female) bodies. 
However, the constant presence of animal bodies in Tanning’s paintings cannot be ignored, for 
they indicate her unwavering concern for the marginalization and mistreatment of animals in the 
modern world.  
As an animal lover, an alternative thinker, and a skeptic of the human reliance on logic 
and rationalism, which is inextricably bound to the human quest for supremacy over the natural 
world, Tanning was far from oblivious to the problems that animals faced (and continue to face); 
neither was she silent about her disapproval. In her first autobiography, Birthday, Tanning 
recalled an experience of intense contemplation that she had at a John Cage concert: 
I found myself rolling on a sea of strong feeling, shamelessly involved with my 
planet: sorry for every rent in every fabric, for tormentor and tormented, for lost 
dogs, for all dogs… Elegant broken legs of horses, elephants that die 
assassinated in the savannah [sic], swarmed by flies. For fish out of water, 
flopping. Ah, don’t look. For bulls made fools of by strutting morons. As much 
distress suffuses me about a clubbed snake as about a fallen bird, a maimed toad 
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and the seals. Bears in traps, steel jaws biting through their mangled arms… 
Most terrible of all, our own human pain, compounded as it is by hopeless pride 
and prideful hope, ingredients in the nepenthean formula, Supremacy: a problem 
drug, widespread, habit-forming, unchecked, planetary poison shared by all but 
poet and madman, artists both. Outraged and outwitted, they see no way to 
help.28 
 
Consistently refuting western society’s attempt to master nonhuman beings, Tanning, in this 
moving passage from her autobiography, holds strongly to the belief that human and nonhuman 
animals are connected—that they are part of the same world and that their actions affect each 
other, suggesting that the exalted human pride and quest for superiority not only harms animals 
but also plagues humanity, like a problem drug. For Tanning, human notions of supremacy need 
to be eradicated, and here again, she considered it artists’ duty to try to change the situation. In 
fact, in a 1974 interview with Tanning, Alain Jouffroy noted that in many of her works there 
appears to be a confrontation with some undisclosed enemy. When asked who or what that 
enemy was, Tanning replied, “Civilization, you might say…the forces of so-called 
civilization.”29 Indeed, as this chapter has demonstrated, the growth of civilization in the West—
the organization and development of advanced human societies—comes at the animals’ expense, 
and Tanning was apprehensive about the impending consequences.   
Undermining the anthropocentrism of western civilization, Tanning seemed to believe 
that while humans are indeed their own species of animals, they are animals nonetheless, and 
therefore have no reason to deny their bonds with nonhuman animals or lay claim to any kind of 
superiority. This notion echoes throughout Tanning’s oeuvre, especially in her paintings of 
                                                
28 Dorothea Tanning, Birthday (Santa Monica and San Francisco: The Lapis Press, 1986), 
169-170.  
 
29 Alain Jouffroy and Dorothea Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” in 
Dorothea Tanning, by Sune Nordgren, John Russell, Dorothea Tanning, Alain Jouffroy, Jean-
Christophe Bailly, and Lasse Söderberg (Malmö, Sweden: Malmö Konsthall, 1993), 57.  
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dogs30—most of which were based on Tanning and Ernst’s dog, Katchina.31 In the 1992 
exhibition catalogue, Dorothea Tanning: Hail, Delirium!, Tanning asserts: “A dog (my dog)… 
over the years, shows up in many avatars, as constant as a talisman.”32 In her early paintings, 
such as Interior With Sudden Joy (1951) and Portrait de Famille (Family Portrait, 1954), 
Katchina frequently appears, often in the presence of a human, to remind viewers that animals 
still exist in their world and must not be ignored. Further, in many paintings, including Tableau 
Vivant (Living Picture, 1954), Le Soir à Salonique (Evening in Salonika, 1965) and To the 
Rescue (1965), the dog is the only figure in the image that makes direct eye contact with the 
viewer; thus, the dogs engage not only with the human figures accompanying them in the 
                                                
30 In 1989, Tanning also completed a series of fourteen drawings under the title 
Messages, which juxtaposed simians (most often a gorilla) and bicycles. In these drawings, 
Tanning proposes a dialogue between organic, primitive life (hence, the primate), and the 
mechanical human inventions. In an artist’s statement in the Messages exhibition catalogue 
(1990), Tanning wrote: “The gorilla remembers too, back to the eye of time, when somehow he 
was left behind, Man jumped on a bicycle and sped away and does not now remember. But the 
bicycle is full of dreams, fast and slow, and the gorilla is full of silence, and here I am an artist 
who has promised to bring them together.” See Dorothea Tanning and Robert C. Morgan, 
Dorothea Tanning: Messages: March 2-31 (New York: Nahan Contemporary, 1990), 21. In 
these drawings, as with her dog paintings, Tanning demonstrates empathy for—and complicity 
with—animals in her efforts to bridge the ever-widening gap between human and nonhuman 
beings.  
 
31 The name “Katchina,” given by Ernst, is based on the “kachina dolls” carved and 
utilized by the Hopi Indians in Arizona. Traditionally, kachina dolls are believed to embody the 
spirit of the being it depicts, such as a deity, an animal, or a deceased ancestor. See Helga 
Teiwes, Kachina Dolls: The Art of Hopi Carvers (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1991). In addition to Katchina, Tanning and Ernst later had another dog called Groucho, who 
also appears in some of Tanning’s paintings. However, there is no evidence that all of the dogs 
in Tanning’s oeuvre were based on actual, individual dogs. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Tanning was at all interested in the kachina dolls; thus, although her representations of Kachina 
and other dogs could possibly be interpreted in terms of the kachina dolls of the Southwestern 
Hopi tribe, this thesis takes a different approach.  
 
32 A statement provided by Dorothea Tanning in Roberta Waddell and Louisa Wood 
Ruby, eds., Dorothea Tanning: Hail Delirium! (New York: New York Public Library, 1992), 89. 
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images, but also with the human viewers outside the picture. The dogs’ gaze, as depicted in 
Tanning’s works, is akin to what Woodward calls the “animal gaze;” that is, “a gaze, initiated by 
the animal, meditative in its quietness and stillness and which compels a response on the part of 
the human, as it contradicts any assumed superiority of the human over the nonhuman animal.”33 
For Woodward, the animal gaze challenges the binary distinction between humans and animals: 
“In acknowledging the [animal] as a subject capable of looking… the [human]…challenges the 
human-self and animal-other divide, by responding to the [animal] as a fellow being, rather than 
as an inferior one.”34 In effect, the animal gaze, possessed by so many of Tanning’s dogs, which 
make direct eye contact with the viewer, provides the animals with agency and intentionality by 
directly addressing and appealing to viewers on the other side of the picture plane. Woodward 
notes, “The central issues here are whether the human acknowledges subjective kinship with 
animals and what potential emerges.”35 In other words, one can conclude that the dogs in 
Tanning’s paintings play key roles by addressing audiences and making themselves seen, their 
                                                
33 Woodward, The Animal Gaze, 1. In this book, Woodward discusses the notion of the 
animal gaze in relation to various representations of animals in African literature; however, her 
concept of the animal gaze is equally applicable to the study of the visual arts. It should be 
acknowledged, though, that a number of theories of the gaze exist beyond Woodward’s notion of 
the animal gaze. One often-cited and widely investigated example is Jacques Lacan’s conception 
of the gaze in a book from his published seminars entitled The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. Here, the notion of the gaze is based on the idea that any given subject may 
become uneasily aware of the fact that he or she is being looked at and has, in effect, become the 
object of a gaze. Although an investigation of Lacan’s ideas is beyond the scope and aim of this 
thesis, readers interested in his discussion of the gaze should consult Jacques Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
book XI of The Seminar of Jacques Lacan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978). 
Conceptualizations of the gaze are also central to feminist film theory. For a useful historical 
overview of key essays about the gaze and its implications for feminist film theory, see E. Ann 
Kaplan, Feminism and Film (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 
34 Woodward, The Animal Gaze, 1. 
 
35 Ibid., 3. 
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relationship to humans known, and their awareness of their own marginalization part of the 
paintings’ subject.  
 While it is, of course, impossible to truly know what animals are thinking, much less how 
they feel about their current subservient position in the human-dominated western world, this 
lack of certainty does not mean that the animals’ awareness of their own condition was not a 
concern for Tanning. In another of her autobiographies, a passage provides a telling glimpse of 
her personal understanding of the dog’s role in art as well as in life. Written as a scenario in 
which a dog at a drink-stand on a beach speaks to a journalist, the dog in Tanning’s passage says:  
In my opinion, the dog’s role in painting is preponderant. His image, in close 
relation with that of the human being, is indispensable to the existence of a work 
of art. Without his ineffable presence a picture is but a somber spot without light, 
without mystery, without evidence, without memory, without fire, without 
destiny. Alas! The disappearance of the dog signals the collapse of that edifice 
known as modern art. Up to us to resuscitate it! (He is almost overexcited.) Up to 
us to paint him in all his glory! Masterpiece, disasterpiece—that’s the shape of the 
future! (He hits the counter with his little fist.) Revolt, yes! Revolution, no! Us 
dogs are bled white! The tactile has replaced the cerebral. All is meaningless 
trepidation. And it’s not over. We will grow weaker and weaker until the final 
breakdown… (He covers his eyes with his paw.)… My life is so full of tragic 
figures. Nevermore is my home… You can laugh at the past. You cannot laugh at 
the future. We must, at any cost, save the lives of our younger plants and 
planets.36  
 
The above passage is similar to a poem Tanning later published in Coming to That in 2011, 
entitled “At the Seaside,” in which the dog, once again speaking to journalists in a similar 
scenario, declares:  
In my view…the dog’s role in survival is preeminent. Its presence is 
indispensable to man—and woman. A dogless beach is but a somber waste, 
without shadow, without substance, without even sand… That’s how the world 
                                                
36 Dorothea Tanning, Dorothea Tanning: 10 Recent Paintings and a Biography: October 
16-November 15, 1979 (New York: Gimpel-Weitzenhoffer Gallery, 1979), n.p.  
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crumbles. The tactile has replaced the cerebral, all is meaningless trepidation. And 
it’s not over. Smoking ashes will be the sum of man’s supremacy.37  
 
In both of these scenarios, Tanning provides the dog with a voice. She asserts the dog’s 
capacity for self-awareness; the dog recognizes his own struggle in the modern world and calls 
upon his listeners to join him in his revolt against the “disappearance of the dog,” or, indeed, the 
disappearance of all animals. In the second scenario, Tanning stresses the necessity for humans 
to reincorporate animals back into their world, asserting that the dog’s (or all animals’) presence 
is indispensable to the survival of humans. Here, she strives to debunk the “common 
anthropological myth,” which was explained at the beginning of this chapter as a myth capable 
of positing and perpetuating the ontological discontinuity between humans and animals. 
According to Lippit, “by displacing animals from the phenomenal world, humanity disrupts the 
delicate balance between human beings and animals... a balance that had, in fact, constituted the 
very humanness of the human world.”38 Following Jean-Francois Lyotard, Lippit continues, 
“dehumanized beings, human beings that [sic] have broken their primordial link to nature, are an 
ironic legacy of humanism.”39 In other words, by denying the animality inherent within 
humanity, humans lose part of their humanness.  
There are two ways in which severing the link between humans and animals might result 
in the “dehumanization” of the human world. On the one hand, western philosophy has 
traditionally defined humans in terms of a dialectical relationship to animals. Thus, by denying 
altogether any link between humans and animals, humans lose the very quality which has 
                                                
37 Dorothea Tanning, “At the Seaside,” in Coming to That (Minneapolis, MN: Graywolf 
Press, 2011), 34-35. 
 
38 Lippit, Electric Animal, 19-20.  
 
39 Ibid., 20.  
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traditionally given them their sense of self: being the most advanced, intellectually superior 
species in relation to all others. On the other hand, for those who agree, as Tanning did, that 
humans and animals are immanently connected and inextricably intertwined—and who agree 
that humans are not superior to animals but are their equals, their fellows in the animal 
kingdom—the abandonment of the human/animal bond signals the collapse of humanity just as it 
signals the collapse of animality. Because humans are themselves animals, by “othering” 
nonhuman creatures, they are, in effect, “othering” parts of themselves. Humans not only lose the 
external, animal “other” upon which they have traditionally defined themselves, but they also 
eliminate the “otherness” within, that is, the animal aspect of their own composition. Humans 
diminish their own selves when they deny their relation to animals; they impoverish their 
existence, as well as their potential for survival, for the destruction of one species brings the 
destruction of the other. “That’s how the world crumbles.”  
In both of Tanning’s dog scenarios cited above, the artist warns her readers of the fragile 
circumstances if humans do not stop the marginalization and oppression of animals, with such 
statements as, “You cannot laugh at the future.” “Smoking ashes will be the sum of man’s 
supremacy.” In her writings as in her art, Tanning explores bonds between human and nonhuman 
animals, in the belief that it is only through the acceptance of these bonds that the fragile plight 
of animals in the modern world may cease and both human and nonhuman animals may survive.  
Tanning was certainly not the only Surrealist to address through art the relations between 
humans and animals. Because animals have traditionally been perceived in the West as irrational 
beings incapable of conscious, logical thought, some Surrealists, such as Georges Bataille and 
Wilfredo Lam, viewed them as conduits for tapping into the unconscious. For them, the 
confrontation of the supposedly irrational, “primitive” animal with the “civilized” and rational 
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human carried the transgressive potential “to destroy the validity of all such bounded concepts” 
of human reason and propriety.40 Hence, these Surrealists were interested in animals not for the 
sake of understanding them as humans’ equals—as did Tanning—but for the purpose of 
exposing the “disturbing, violent, primitive, animal-like aspects of humankind.”41 Nevertheless, 
there were other Surrealist artists who shared Tanning’s interest in exploring the more positive, 
mutual bonds between human and nonhuman animals.  
One Surrealist in particular with whom Tanning and her art have been compared in terms 
of animal paintings is Argentine-born Leonor Fini. In “Women’s Work: The Transformations of 
Leonor Fini and Dorothea Tanning,” Annette Levitt proposes that both Tanning and Fini were 
fascinated with “the breaking of boundaries, with transformations and metamorphoses.”42 
Examining such works as Fini’s Petit Guardian Sphinx (Little Sphinx Gardien, 1946) and L’oeil 
du poisson (Fish Eye, 1978), and Tanning’s La Truite au bleu (Poached Trout, 1952) and 
Birthday (1942), Levitt insists, “In their art, these women reveal that they have accepted, have 
returned to the ancient wisdom that humans, animals, and the earth are all linked, indeed are at 
times interchangeable.”43 In their paintings, humans and animals interact with each other; in 
some cases, they share bodies, creating a human/animal hybrid. Refusing to be bound by “the 
                                                
40 Louise Tythacott, “Georges Bataille: An Anthropology of Otherness,” in Surrealism 
and the Exotic (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 229.  
 
41 Ibid., 216.  
 
42 Annette Shandler Levitt, “Women’s Work: The Transformations of Leonor Fini and 
Dorothea Tanning,” in The Genres and Genders of Surrealism, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999), 89.  
 
43 Ibid., 94.  
 
 55 
restraints of Western rationalism,” Tanning and Fini’s paintings celebrate the interconnectedness 
of all living beings.44  
As noted in the introduction, it has been argued that the artists’ gender and their interest 
in human/animal relationships are not coincidental. Levitt claims,  
As women…[Tanning and Fini] have merely done what came naturally, as have 
other female artists associated with the Surrealists…unselfconsciously pushing 
the envelope, testing limits (both personal and aesthetic), living, thinking, 
believing, and creating without reference to norms. Transformation for them is 
part of life; defiance of physical laws is as natural as defying one’s parents or 
other authority figures.45  
 
Levitt’s notion that it is “natural” for women to undermine conventions, and that they do 
so unselfconsciously, is problematic. Not only does it perpetuate the longstanding, sexist western 
assumption aligning men with culture, rationality, and intellect, while women are reduced to 
nature, irrationality, and instinct, but it also denies artists like Tanning and Fini agency. It 
suggests they were only naïve and unaware of the subversive, political, and anti-western ideas 
underlying their works, and that they were, moreover, “merely” doing what they do best: being 
defiant.  
In her text, Levitt goes on to assert that while male Surrealists utilized the idea of the 
female, “attuned to nature or to madness, who thus functioned as intermediaries for the men and 
their closed psyches, the women [artists] needed no translators of nature or the unconscious.”46 
Of course, Levitt is not alone in her presumption that it was merely natural for women to defy 
western rationalist ideals; as her text indicates, it was a widely held belief among the male 
                                                
44 Levitt, “Women’s Work,” 94.  
 
45 Ibid., 110.  
 
46 Ibid. 
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Surrealists at the time. However, notwithstanding the historically common acceptance of the 
ideologically based culture-versus-nature binary between men and women, it is necessary to 
divorce the subversive content of Tanning’s work from her gender; in other words, she did not 
paint human/animal encounters merely because she was a naturally defiant woman. Rather, as an 
intellectual, she was painfully aware of the negative consequences of the western marginalization 
and mistreatment of animals, and she recognized the fallacy of anthropocentrism. As an artist, 
she embraced the goal of making other people aware of the problems that arise—for both human 
and nonhuman animals—from anthropological myths of human superiority.  
Apart from Tanning and Fini, another Surrealist painter, similarly interested in the theme 
of interdependency between animals and humans, was Remedios Varo. Her exploration of 
human/animal relationships is particularly evident in her cat paintings, such as Sympathy (1955), 
in which a woman patiently strokes the back of a cat who has just spilled a glass of milk. In this 
painting, the physical contact between human and animal creates a transfer of energy, suggested 
by the electrical sparks surrounding the woman and her cat. According to cultural and feminist 
theorist Nancy Vosburg, “Here, Varo has turned a quotidian incident (the spark of static 
electricity) into a reflection on the interconnectedness between humans and animals.”47 Indeed, 
one can locate many similarities between the themes in Tanning’s figurative depictions of 
animals and those of Varo and Fini, namely their shared interest in exploring the bonds between 
human and nonhuman beings. Moreover, Tanning’s mythical creatures, such as the winged 
lemur confronting her in her self-portrait Birthday (1942), could be compared to other Surrealist 
                                                
47 Nancy Vosburg, “Strange Yet ‘Familiar’: Cats and Birds in Remedios Varo’s Artistic 
Universe,” in Figuring Animals: Essays on Animal Images in Art, Literature, Philosophy, and 
Popular Culture, eds. Mary Sanders Pollock and Catherine Rainwater (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 87.  
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trends, such as Max Ernst’s frequent representation of “Loplop, Bird Superior,” his alter ego.48 
As artist and historian Paula Lumbard writes in “Dorothea Tanning: On the Threshold to a 
Darker Place,” this artist’s animal motifs indicate a “questioning of human spiritual and 
intellectual superiority” that “led many Surrealists to adopt ‘alter ego’ animal images.”49 
According to this view, the adoption of animals as alter egos constitutes a pictorial metaphor or 
personal totem in which an artist grants him- or herself the “superior” qualities of a particular 
animal through association. For example, as French writer Jacques Viot notes, “According to 
Max Ernst, even men might fly if only they stopped letting themselves be tamed,”50 thus 
implying that, through Loplop, his alter ego, Ernst might be able to emulate the bird’s untamed 
freedom.51  
                                                
 48 For more information on Ernst’s Loplop, as well as numerous examples of his art, see 
Werner Spies, Max Ernst: Loplop: The Artist’s Other Self (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983).  
 
49 Paula Lumbard, “Dorothea Tanning: On the Threshold to a Darker Place,” Women’s 
Art Journal 2 (Spring – Summer, 1981): 51. 
 
50 Jacques Viot, Cahiers d’Art (Paris), Special Max Ernst Number, 1937, 68-69, quoted in 
Werner Spies, Max Ernst: Loplop: The Artist’s Other Self (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983), 
10.  
 
51 Another view of the metaphorical relationship between humans and animals is 
proposed by James Fernandez in “The Mission of Metaphor in Expressive Culture.” Fernandez 
argues that humans, particularly in their youth, gain their identity by “predicating some sign-
image, some metaphor upon themselves.” In this way, humans first become “objects to 
themselves, by taking the point of view of ‘the other,’ before they can become subjects to 
themselves… This taking the other, this predication upon the pronoun, is a process that has for 
millennia turned to the animal world.” Significantly, for Fernandez, this initial predication of 
identity leads ultimately to the mastery of these predications. There is a “movement from the 
sense of similarity between animals and men to the sense of difference,” as humans find new 
sign-images other than animals upon which to predicate the subject. Fernandez’s article may be 
helpful for understanding the alter-ego trend in Surrealism, although he is not interested in alter-
egos per se. See: James Fernandez et al., “The Mission of Metaphor in Expressive Culture [and 
Comments and Reply],” Current Anthropology 15 (June, 1974): 122. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, the relationship between humans and animals at hand in 
Tanning’s art does not conform to this notion of metaphorical predication.  
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Due to Tanning’s relationship with Ernst and her early association with the Surrealists, it 
might be tempting to interpret Tanning’s dog imagery as the adoption of an alter ego. In that 
case, her dogs would possess some sort of quality or attribute that Tanning longed to embody, 
and which she could have emulated through representing herself as a dog. However, the 
possibility that Tanning painted dogs because she wanted to be like them suggests that she 
viewed them as some “other” to which she could only relate through metaphorical 
representation. On the contrary, this thesis, in the following chapters, will stress that Tanning 
viewed dogs (and, indeed, all animals) as allies. Hence, she painted not only animals but, more 
importantly, the bonds and connections that humans have—or can have—with fellow animals, 
rather than the links that they wish they could or “might” have, if only humans and animals were 
not so different.  
In addition to the notion of the alter ego, Tanning’s dog motifs could also be interpreted 
in terms of traditional canine symbolism. According to Hans Biedermann’s Dictionary of 
Symbolism, dogs are “symbolically associated primarily with loyalty and vigilance,” as well as 
protection and guardianship.52 To be sure, many of Tanning’s paintings represent the loyal 
relationship between humans and their animal companions. As this thesis argues, Tanning felt a 
kinship with nonhuman animals—a bond of interdependence between species of the same animal 
kingdom. Indeed, the loyalty with which dogs have generally been associated throughout history 
adds an additional layer of meaning to Tanning’s paintings; the loyalty that dogs symbolize 
relates to the loyalty and the kinship that binds human and nonhuman animals together.  
                                                
 
52 Hans Biedermann, Dictionary of Symbolism, translated by James Hulbert (New York 
and Oxford: Facts On File, Inc., 1992), 97.  
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However, the purpose of this project is to go beyond the figurative dimension of 
Tanning’s work. The dogs in Tanning’s paintings do not function merely as symbols; they are 
more powerful than that. They are granted agency and “their own contributions to the plot.”53 
They intermingle with the human figures, who share their space, and they address, through direct 
eye contact, their external audience. As Woodward declares through her research on animal 
intentionality and subjectivity in literature, the granting of agency to animals underscores the 
“potential” of a “shared world,” rather than the “absent animals who haunt the texts [or 
images]… through being deployed symbolically, characterized as cardboard cut-outs.”54 In other 
words, Tanning’s painted dogs are not mere motifs or readymade symbols that she pastes into the 
human world; rather, they are collaborators who actively work with their human counterparts to 
show their viewers the possibilities that can come of new human/animal relationships. Through 
Tanning’s post-1955 paintings, the nature of this collaboration becomes most effective.  
While it is clear that Tanning’s early figurative paintings display numerous similarities to 
the work of other Surrealist artists, the main focus in this thesis is on the works Tanning 
completed after 1955, which break from her earlier conventional figuration and transform into a 
much more fluid and abstract imagery. This shift distinguishes Tanning’s animal paintings from 
those of her fellow Surrealists, such as Fini and Varo, and it enables her art to function in a more 
operative, effective way, since she was able to move her paintings beyond the realm of 
figuration, and place them in the domain of events, thereby strategically beckoning her audience 
to become more interactively engaged in experiencing and contemplating her paintings’ 
messages.  
                                                
53 Woodward, The Animal Gaze, 16.  
 
54 Ibid. 
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Rather than representing things (in the figurative or mimetic sense), Tanning attempted to 
represent or encode feelings. She wrote, “What of the human enigma, the magic of hallucination, 
powers of the eye, man’s baffling consciousness, the relations between human beings, animals, 
and all living things, including stones?…When I paint I try to represent my feelings about some 
of these things… Representation is separate from description.”55 Indeed, in her post-1955 works, 
Tanning does not represent or imitate figures and objects in narrative settings as she had in the 
earlier phase of her career. In her later work, her mode of representation evolves into a matter of 
expression; her paintings become more connotative, rather than denotative. And, as will be 
explained further in chapter four, rather than merely painting “things” as they are in the world, 
she also paints the all-important relationships between things.  
Tanning once wrote, “I want to seduce by means of imperceptible passages from one 
reality to another. The spectator is caught (oops!) in a net from which he can extricate himself 
only by going through the whole picture till he comes to the exit. My dearest wish: to make a 
picture without any exit at all, either for me or for him.”56 This quotation is applicable to almost 
all of Tanning’s post-1955 paintings. The purpose of her abstract, enigmatic style of painting was 
to invite her viewers’ rapt involvement with the works, leading them into an array of possibilities 
no longer limited to such conventional binaries as artist versus viewer or speaker versus 
audience. In effect, the audience becomes part of the art, entangled in the work and urged, by the 
maze-like composition, to actively find the solution or the way out. While working their way 
through the image, viewers also confront an additional binary, the human/animal binary, which is 
challenged by Tanning’s compelling conflation of human and nonhuman bodies.   
                                                
55 Dorothea Tanning, unpublished journal (#2), Dorothea Tanning Collection and 
Archive, New York, NY, p. 81.  
 
56 Tanning, Dorothea Tanning: 10 Recent Paintings and a Biography, n.p. 
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After 1955, Tanning begins to ask more of her audience than mere looking. She seeks to 
transcend her viewers’ detached status from the work of art so that they become part of the 
performance of making meaning. Her paintings begin to ask more questions than they answer, 
particularly of humans’ relationship to nonhumans, and their resolution relies as much on the 
viewers’ imagination as on Tanning’s own artistic vision. To fulfill their polemical purpose, the 
works depend on active viewer engagement. As Tanning asserted, she wanted to trap her 
audience in her kaleidoscopic images; and, as the following chapters will posit, she sought her 
viewers’ compliance ultimately in order to destabilize and reconfigure their preconceptions—
namely, the erroneous western assumption that humans are somehow entirely independent of and 
superior to nonhuman animals—through first reconfiguring their interactions with her paintings. 
The following chapter will discuss what it means for Tanning’s paintings to function in 
the domain of event; that is, how “representation” can operate as a dynamic experience rather 
than as a static image or pronouncement. Moreover, in order to ground these ideas of event and 
experience in Tanning’s concern for the human/animal relationship, the concept of the 
“becoming-animal,” as theorized by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, will be introduced, 
arguing that the “becoming-animal”—a dynamic disruption of boundaries between humans and 
animals—takes shape in Tanning’s post-1955 abstract paintings. 
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Chapter III 
 
From Seeing to Becoming 
 
 
 
 As chapter one proposed, beginning in the mid-1950s, Dorothea Tanning demonstrated 
an increasing urge to utilize her art as a politicizing mechanism, to engage viewer participation, 
and to incite action through her paintings. No longer content with producing static and figurative 
images—which presented fantastical and imaginary scenarios while employing recognizable 
modes of representation—Tanning began to paint enigmatic and largely nonfigurative, abstract 
compositions. These dynamic compositions necessitate an active, rather than passive, 
engagement on behalf of the viewer. They are not to be merely seen by the viewer, but 
experienced. As such, Tanning’s post-1955 paintings function in the domain of events. That is to 
say, they function primarily as expressive, experiential occurrences, rather than as purely 
representational images. However, as the following chapters will demonstrate, this distinction 
does not mean that what is represented, i.e., the content and subject matter, is insignificant in 
comparison to the painting style or mode of expression. Rather, subject matter and style work 
collaboratively in Tanning’s paintings to produce the resulting outcome: the artwork-as-event, as 
opposed to the artwork-as-object.  
To clarify the notion of the event and the way it relates to Tanning’s oeuvre, this thesis 
employs the theoretical insight of the twentieth-century French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari. In particular, it is in Deleuze’s solo work that the concept of “event” is most 
clearly elucidated; and it is in the collaborative books A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
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Schizophrenia and What is Philosophy? that Deleuze and Guattari most fully develop the 
concept of a very specific type of event, the becoming-animal. As this chapter will argue, the 
concepts of becoming and the event provide important clues for understanding Tanning’s post-
1955 paintings and what this author has identified as their politicizing function. The following 
pages will explain Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the becoming-animal, as well as the many 
complex ideas upon which it is built, in order to then demonstrate how Tanning’s paintings 
function as becomings-animal.   
First, however, it should be noted that this chapter is not intended as a complete and 
thorough analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. As many scholars have noted, the works 
of Deleuze and Guattari—both collaborative and independent—are very complex and often 
intentionally confounding. Deleuzian scholar Joe Hughes writes, “Deleuze is a philosopher who 
never uses a word without transforming and often reinventing its sense.”1 Similarly, Ronald 
Bogue asserts, “[Deleuze] is an inveterate neologizer and inventor of concepts… His arguments 
are often dense, and they always entail a thought that proceeds by means of paradox. Although 
carefully structured and gracefully crafted, his chapters frequently challenge readers’ abilities to 
follow the arabesques of the general line of reasoning.”2 To be sure, a comprehensive analysis 
that would do justice to Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas is beyond the scope of this project. Nor is it 
the intention here to apply their theories to Tanning’s oeuvre in any formulaic or systematic way. 
Rather, this thesis will use a selection of their ideas as a point of departure for elucidating 
                                                
1 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2009), 1.  
 
2 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
7.  
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Tanning’s paintings, while also nuancing the applicability and relevancy of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theories to the study of art in general.  
 
An Introduction to Deleuze and Guattari 
 
 This chapter will provide a basic and necessarily simplified summation of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophical project in order to arrive at their conception of a unique event called the 
becoming-animal. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “We believe in the existence of very special becomings-animal traversing human beings 
and sweeping them away, affecting the animal no less than the human.”3 Elsewhere, they 
describe becoming-animal as “absolute deterritorialization,” explaining that, “to become animal 
is to participate in movement…to cross a threshold…to find a world of pure intensities where all 
forms come undone, as do all the significations, signifiers, and signifieds, to the benefit of an 
unformed matter of deterritorialized flux.”4 Within this definition, Deleuze and Guattari 
introduce a specific vocabulary of becoming, which is intrinsic to their entire philosophical 
project. To begin with, deterritorialization is a kind of transformation.5 It means, essentially, to 
be broken of one’s habits—to be broken of one’s habitual and customary thoughts, modes of 
                                                
3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 237.  
 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 13.  
 
5 In more complex terms, Deleuze and Guattari define deterritorialization in chapter 
seven of A Thousand Plateaus through a series of theorems. On page 172, they describe 
deterritorialization as a “movement” in which organism is “removed” from its “stratum” and 
reconnected to other strata. Later in the chapter, on pages 190-191, deterritorialization is 
associated with a line of “creative flight…forming strange new becomings.” See Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 167-191. 
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perceiving, thinking, feeling, and relating to other beings. To be deterritorialized means to be 
destabilized, and to abandon one’s ordinary way of being in the world. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
use of the term “threshold” in this definition is also significant; for them, the concept of the 
threshold is opposed to limits. The threshold “lies beyond the limit.”6 It is the liminal space 
between two beings. Unlike limits, a threshold between beings—such as between humans and 
animals—is not reached; rather, in becoming, it is crossed. Crossing the threshold invites 
deterritorialization, and thus brings change. As we will see, the kind of change that Deleuze and 
Guattari seek is the kind that enables a “world of pure intensities where all forms come undone.” 
The term “intensities” is also crucial for understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical 
project. However, in order to fully grasp their use of the term and its significance for the 
becoming-animal, it is helpful first to examine Deleuze’s conception of difference, which he 
most thoroughly elucidated in his book, Difference and Repetition.  
 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze posits a theory of difference-in-itself; that is, he 
outlines a theory of difference that moves beyond the traditional conception of difference as an 
empirical relation between two terms, each with a prior identity of its own. For Deleuze, 
“identity persists, but is now a something produced by a prior relation between differentials.”7 
He writes, “We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it… We also have a 
tendency to subordinate it to resemblance…to opposition…and to analogy… In other words, we 
                                                
6 Leonard Lawlor, “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari,” 
SubStance 37 (2008): 172.  
 
7 Daniel Smith and John Protevi, “Gilles Deleuze,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013), ed. Edward N. Zalta: n.p., accessed March 11, 2013, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/deleuze/. Though an online encyclopedia entry, 
this source provides a wealth of credible information, as both authors have published extensively 
on Deleuze’s writings.  
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do not think difference in itself.”8 In Deleuze’s view, in order to think difference properly in and 
of itself, it cannot be preceded by identity. Identity may “exist as a principle, but as a second 
principle, as a principle become,” which would “revolve around the Different.”9 In other words, 
identity is conditioned by difference and, moreover, it is not a form of static being but, rather, it 
is a product of dynamic becoming. In his theory of difference, Deleuze subverts all notions of 
fixity and stability in identity. He places difference at the heart of all creation; it is precisely 
through intrinsic difference and differential relations that all molar objects, subjects, and 
institutions come to be.10 Difference is fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
becoming because it demonstrates that all things and beings become; that is, they are constructed, 
assembled, conditioned, and contingent upon their environment, and upon the other things and 
beings that they encounter. Thus it becomes evident, in this conception of difference in itself, 
how Deleuze and Guattari are able to provide significant insights into a new way of thinking 
about the relationship between human and nonhuman animals that combats the western tenets of 
humanism and anthropocentrism: if identities are based on differential relations, rather than 
being pre-given and static, then it is possible to abandon notions of humans as being intrinsically, 
fundamentally, and unequivocally different—in the traditional use of the word—from animals.  
 Related to Deleuze’s theory of difference is his conception of repetition. Like difference, 
Deleuze wants to think of repetition not as a resemblance or repetition of an “original self-
                                                
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), xv.  
 
9 Ibid., 40.  
 
10 As this chapter will later explain, the term “molar” means the recognizable, extensive 
form of an entity when it is assigned a “fixed” identity. 
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identical thing,” but as repetition-in-itself.11 Repetition, for Deleuze, is repetition of difference. 
With his theory of repetition, Deleuze borrows Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return. He writes, 
“Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back ‘the 
same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes.”12 What this means is that 
repetition is the “returning” or repetition of becoming, which is a concept of identity based on 
difference. Hence, it is the repetition of difference, not the repetition of the same. Ultimately, 
what the interrelated theories of difference and repetition demonstrate is that identity is 
contingent upon differential relations (difference), and that the creation of identity is an ongoing 
process (repetition), which continually yields new identities or modes of being in the world.  
 Now that the concepts of difference and repetition have been established, it is possible to 
return to Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term intensity and to understand its importance for 
their conception of becoming. Deleuze explains that intensity is to be “understood as pure 
difference in itself.”13 Intensity is the quality of difference that determines extensive 
(quantitative) identities. The distinction between intensity and extensity is not merely a 
distinction between internal and external properties; rather, it is a question of divisibility. 
Intensities refer to properties that cannot be divided, added to, or subtracted from, without 
changing in nature and kind. Examples of “difference of intensity” include: “differences of level, 
temperature, pressure, tension, potential,” and color.14 A qualitative change—a change in 
                                                
11 Smith and Protevi, “Gilles Deleuze,” n.p. 
 
12 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 41.  
 
13 Ibid., 144.  
 
14 Ibid., 222.  
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intensities—results in a “change in kind.”15 For Deleuze, intensities are the pure differences that 
combine within a body to form a particular identity. Moreover, because all beings are comprised 
of intensities, it is possible to think of them as multiplicities. This means that rather than 
constituting a unity or totality, or a fixed identity, beings are composed of multiple intensities 
(differences), which condition their extensive properties (their form and appearance) at any given 
moment. A becoming—which, as described in the definition given above, opens up into a world 
of pure intensities—takes place when one being’s intensities come into contact with another 
being’s intensities, and in so doing, they both become reconfigured. This reconfiguration of 
intensities results in a change in the nature of being; that is, it results in a becoming.   
 The idea of becoming (specifically, the becoming-animal) will be more closely examined 
later in this chapter; first, however, it will be helpful to turn to the notion of event in order to 
situate becoming as a type of event. The term “event” is used in various ways throughout 
Deleuze’s personal work and in the collaborative projects between Deleuze and Guattari. This 
thesis, however, is concerned with the event as it is conceived in Deleuze’s book The Logic of 
Sense. In this book, Deleuze distinguishes between ideal, incorporeal events, and actual spatio-
temporal states of affairs (actual occurrences that take place in ordered time and space).16 His 
primary concern is with ideal events. He defines the ideal event as “a singularity—or rather a set 
of singularities,” which are “turning points and points of inflection.”17 Thus, as Philip Goodchild 
explains in his book Gilles Deleuze and the Question of Philosophy, events are turning points in 
                                                
15 Smith and Protevi, “Gilles Deleuze,” n.p.  
 
16 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and ed. by Constantin V. 
Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 53.  
 
17 Ibid., 52.  
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which “we pass from one state to another.”18 These singular points are “events of rupture,” of 
transformation.19  
To reiterate, the events that interest Deleuze are not chronological states of affairs that 
take place in the ordered time and space of the present. Rather, they take place in the “floating, 
nonpulsed time proper to Aeon, in other words, the time of the pure event or of becoming, which 
articulates relative speeds and slownesses independently of the chronometric or chronological 
values that time assumes” in the ordered, spatio-temporal world.20 While Deleuze acknowledges 
that, “with every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization”21 (its existence in 
time and space), there is also an aspect of the event that exists only in the past and in the future, 
in free-floating time, because it is purely virtual; it is real, but incorporeal. This is the pure event 
that remains immaterial, in “pure reserve.”22 
An event remains in “reserve” as a concept, which can be recalled again and again, and 
actualized or acted upon differently each time it is experienced. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze 
and Guattari state, “Concepts are events;” a concept “speaks the pure Event.”23 The significance 
of the pure event—and its incorporeal, conceptual existence—is that it creates a problematic. In 
                                                
18 Philip Goodchild, Gilles Deleuze and the Question of Philosophy (Madison: Farleigh 
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19 Ibid. 
 
20 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 263. As will be explained in the following 
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21 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 151.  
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The Logic of Sense, Deleuze writes, “The mode of the event is the problematic. One must not say 
that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon problems and define their 
conditions.”24 In other words, an event affects thought and offers up a problem for 
contemplation. Goodchild explains that events—particularly events that seem unfamiliar or 
unrecognizable—“form a problem for thought, and they force us to think.”25 Indeed, this notion 
of being “forced to think” was important for Deleuze and for Deleuze and Guattari’s project as a 
whole. However, to understand the implications of a “forced” thought, one must first understand 
what this notion rejects: the dogmatic image of thought.  
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops his entire theory of difference and 
repetition in opposition to the “dogmatic image of thought.” He writes,  
According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it formally 
possesses the true and materially wants the true. It is in terms of this image that 
everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think… Thought 
remains subject to this Image which already prejudges everything… We may call 
this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox, or moral image.26  
 
The dogmatic image of thought, which has overtaken western philosophy as well as western 
attitudes in general, is the assumption that the fundamental purpose of thinking is to attain “true” 
knowledge. It presupposes that humans are naturally capable of thought, and that “everybody 
knows what it means to think and to be.”27 The dogmatic image of thought thus relies on the 
Cartesian notion of the Cogito (“I think”): the notion that identity of the self is based on the 
ability to think; to think is to exist, therefore everyone naturally thinks. Deleuze, in contrast, 
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disputes the presumption that thinking is a natural and automatic human exercise; for him, real 
thinking is forced. He argues that what is traditionally considered to be “thinking” is merely 
recognition, and he defines recognition as “the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a 
supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined, or 
conceived.”28An object is recognized when all of the faculties, “perception, memory, 
imagination, understanding,”29 work harmoniously, each agreeing that they are perceiving, 
remembering, imagining, and understanding the same object. Recognition thus presupposes that 
all thinking subjects possess common sense; that is, it presupposes that there exists a “unity of all 
the faculties” in any given subject.30 Another characteristic of the dogmatic image of thought is 
that it prevents difference from being understood as difference in itself. Rather, the image of 
thought subordinates difference to representation; it reduces difference to “an object of 
representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined 
opposition or a perceived similitude.”31 In each of these cases, identity is understood as a given, 
rather than as something that is constructed and contingent.  
In opposition to the above characteristics of the dogmatic image of thought—its 
assumption that thought is a natural process, its reliance on recognition, and its subordination of 
difference to fixed notions of identity—Deleuze constructs a differential theory of the faculties in 
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order to demonstrate how real, productive forms of thinking are made possible.32 Again, for 
Deleuze, thinking is not a natural activity: “It cannot be regarded as a fact that thinking is the 
natural exercise of a faculty.”33 Rather, “something in the world forces us to think,” and “this 
something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.”34 Significantly, the 
primary characteristic of this “fundamental encounter,” according to Deleuze, “is that it can only 
be sensed.”35 Therefore, it is possible to conceive of Deleuze’s fundamental encounter as a 
sense-event. This is because, insofar as it is incorporeal and ideal, an event is also something that 
is sensed. Deleuze defines sense as “an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity…a pure 
event.”36 It is not signified, represented, or lived in ordinary time and space. Rather, it is “that 
which is expressed… irreducible to individual states of affairs [or] particular images.”37  
In his analysis, Deleuze distinguishes between the “sensible” as it operates in recognition 
on the one hand, and the sensible as it operates in the encounter or event on the other. “In 
recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly 
upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived… It therefore 
presupposes the exercise of the senses and the exercise of the other faculties in a common 
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sense.”38 In contrast, the object of encounter “is not the given but that by which the given is 
given. It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible… It is imperceptible precisely from the 
point of view of recognition…from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the senses in 
which sensibility grasps only that which also could be grasped by other faculties.”39 What this 
means is that when an object is recognized, it is identified unanimously by all of the faculties, 
including sense. However, in the pure event, sensibility takes on a new role; it becomes the 
imperceptible expression or sensation that communicates between the subject and the object of 
encounter. Deleuze is interested in this pure event or “sensed” encounter, which eludes common 
sense—the harmonious ordering of all the faculties—and instead creates a discord among the 
faculties. 
An encounter that awakens thought from its “natural stupor” is one that inflicts violence 
upon common sense and forces thought, posing problems.40 The faculties become unhinged and 
effectively pushed to their limits, each inflicting “violence” on the other, breaking the ordered 
form of common sense.41 According to Deleuze, it is not representation or recognition that can 
create this discord of the faculties but, on the contrary, “free or untamed states of difference in 
itself…that which is at once both imperceptible for empirical sensibility… and at the same time 
that which can be perceived only from the point of view of a transcendental sensibility which 
apprehends it immediately in the encounter.”42 Significantly, then, the purpose of this encounter 
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or event is to conceive of difference in itself and thus to escape the dogmatic image of thought. 
Deleuze explains, “In an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are 
one and the same thing… In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once both the 
object of the encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.”43 In other 
words, it is pure intensity or difference that is sensed in an encounter, producing a discord among 
the faculties and thereby forcing thought; at the same time, the differences and intensities that are 
sensed are precisely what form the object of thought. Thus, “rather than a reconciliation of the 
faculties, with thought, a ‘fractured self’ is constrained to think ‘difference in itself’ in ideas.”44  
Indeed, the event fractures or destabilizes a subject because he or she is no longer capable 
of seizing an object in a recognizable way; this failure of recognition reveals that the subject is, 
in fact, not a stable and unified “whole” possessing common sense and the natural capacity for 
knowledge. In a sense-encounter, the faculties do not cohere according to ordered common 
sense, and recognition cannot take place.   
Significantly, the failure of recognition should not be taken as a negative outcome of an 
event or encounter; for, as this chapter has demonstrated, it is a means of fracturing an 
individual’s sense of stability and self, which is one of Deleuze and Guattari’s primary aims as it 
paves the way for the creation of the new. Moreover, it is only by moving beyond recognition 
that new, unconventional, and productive ways of thinking become possible. When thinking is 
subordinated to empirical recognition, one remains “imprisoned” by the doxa, or orthodox 
opinion.45 Deleuze asserts, “The form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the 
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recognizable and the recognized; form will never inspire anything but conformities.”46 
Moreover, “What is recognized is not only an object but also the values attached to an object.”47 
Thus, recognition can only perpetuate already-established values. It can only think about things 
that have already been thought, and it can only produce knowledge that has already been 
produced.  
Hence, the only way that beliefs, values, and attitudes—both personal and cultural—can 
be transformed is through some event or encounter that radicalizes thought and exposes it to 
something that is not already recognizable or established. Thus, the event is a turning point, a 
metamorphosis of one’s mode of being in the world or relating to the world. Deleuze writes, 
“The splendor and the magnificence of the event is sense. The event is not what occurs… it is 
rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us.”48 “Our” responsibility, 
then, is “to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events.”49 Simply, 
“It is a question of becoming a citizen of the world.”50 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, as a person’s faculties become unhinged during an 
encounter, the person’s entire sense of self also becomes unhinged. Thus the significance of this 
pure (ideal) event is not the physical state of affairs of what is “happening” but, rather, the 
incorporeal consequences of the encounter—the sense-event which produces a new mode of 
thinking and being, a turning point in existence. Deleuze asserts, “Personal uncertainty is…an 
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objective structure of the event itself… It fragments the subject.”51 This is precisely the goal of 
Deleuze’s entire philosophical project: “To give birth to a new kind of community, a new kind of 
relationality between beings in the world.”52 In fact, it is possible, in Deleuze’s estimation, to do 
away with the notion of “being” altogether, arguing instead for a “categorical reversal according 
to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, 
etc.”53 In other words, a person no longer “is,” but “becomes.” One’s identity and position in the 
world is in constant flux, continually becoming and transforming into something else. An event, 
then, as a turning point, is a point of becoming. One can therefore understand becoming, and 
different types of becomings, as special kinds of events.  
 As this chapter has asserted, it is possible for a work of art, such as Tanning’s post-1955 
paintings, to function as events—when considering “event” in the sense in which it has been 
outlined above. However, before the nature of art’s relationship to events can be fully grasped, it 
is necessary to define the particular type of event with which this thesis is concerned: the 
becoming-animal. The concept of “becoming” is pervasive throughout Deleuze’s work, but it is 
in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia that Deleuze and Guattari examine 
“becoming” and the specific notion of “becoming-animal” at length. The beginning of this 
chapter explained that to “become,” according to Deleuze and Guattari, “is to participate in 
movement… to cross a threshold… to find a world of pure intensities where all forms come 
undone.” To be sure, Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming is essentially a process of undoing the 
stable formation of the “self” and forging an “alliance” with an “other,” so that the self is no 
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longer a homogenous unity but a heterogeneous “threshold, a door, a becoming between two 
multiplicities.”54 Recall that for Deleuze and Guattari, all beings are not “whole” individuals but, 
rather, multiplicities, such that they are comprised of multiple intensities (“pure differences”) 
that constitute their identity at any given moment. Moreover, multiplicities are constantly 
shifting as they come into contact with other beings, other multiplicities. Thus, all beings—
people, animals, plants, and even inanimate objects—are in a constant state of flux, continually 
passing through thresholds and becoming something different.  
 It is not enough, however, to merely come into contact with another being in order for a 
becoming to take place. To reiterate, to become means to forge an alliance with something; thus, 
to become-animal means to forge an alliance with the animal. Deleuze and Guattari are quick to 
reject any association of becoming with mere imitation, resemblance, or metaphorical 
comparison.55 To become an animal does not mean to imitate or to behave like it; rather, it 
means to enter into a “zone of proximity” with the animal. A zone of proximity, also sometimes 
referred to as a “zone of indiscernibility,” is a zone of affinity and alliance. It is marked by the 
“copresence of a particle,” i.e. a shared intensity.56 According to Deleuze and Guattari, it 
indicates “‘something shared or indiscernible,’ a proximity ‘that makes it impossible to say 
where the boundary between the human and animal lies.’”57 Another way to understand the zone 
of proximity is through Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term “affect.” Following Spinoza, 
Deleuze and Guattari explain that an affect is what a body “can do,” its ability to act and to be 
                                                
54 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 249.  
 
55 Ibid., 233-237; 273 
 
56 Ibid., 273.  
 
57 Ibid.  
 78 
acted upon in a given assemblage of multiplicities.58 In a becoming, one body’s affects “enter 
into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body,” and their affects join 
forces.59  “Affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a 
power…that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel.”60 Thus, to become is to open 
oneself up to the powers and affects of another being or multiplicity; this is how an alliance is 
formed.  
Deleuze and Guattari refer to this process of becoming and forming alliances as a process 
of involution: “Becoming is involutionary, involution is creative… to involve is to form a block 
that runs its own line ‘between’ the terms in play and beneath assignable relations. [Emphasis 
added.]”61 This means that the significance of a becoming lies not in either of the two parties that 
enter into a zone of proximity, but in the “block of becoming” that is created between the two.62 
This is an important notion to grasp in order to understand the implications of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s becoming. In a becoming such as the becoming-animal, the human does not really 
become an animal, and the significance of the event is not the entity which one “becomes;” 
rather, it is the act of becoming itself. What is important is that one becomes anything at all, 
rather than remaining imprisoned by the presupposition that he or she is a static individual. 
“Becoming produces nothing other than itself… What is real is the becoming itself, the block of 
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becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.”63 Deleuze 
and Guattari continue:  
A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-
between, the border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both. If 
becoming is a block…it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and 
indiscernibility, a no-man’s-land, a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two 
distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other… The 
line or block of becoming…produces a shared deterritorialization.64 
 
As this quotation demonstrates, it is precisely the block of becoming, or zone of 
proximity and indeterminacy between two terms (multiplicities), that is the productive aspect of 
becoming, that which makes it innovative and radical. This is because, in a becoming, the focus 
is no longer on individual entities, but on their constant and shared processes of 
deterritorialization. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, deterritorialization destabilizes 
a body. It is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a process of “decoding” a subject, breaking 
down his or her established codes, customs, habits, and supposedly fixed identity.65 To be 
deterritorialized is to be “disoriented;”66 it is to become a haecceity. “Haecciety” is a term that 
Deleuze and Guattari use in a specific way to describe a being that is no longer stable and fixed 
but instead enters into a state of flux and perpetual becoming: “You will yield nothing to 
haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, and that you are nothing but that.”67 A 
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haecceity is not a fixed “person, subject, thing, or substance.”68 It is, rather, a deterritorialized 
and desubjectified multiplicity or assemblage of multiplicities (since becomings form aggregates 
and conjunctions of two or more multiplicities). The entire process of becoming deterritorialized 
and yielding haecceities has the sole purpose of entering a “molecular” state of existence.  
 Deleuze and Guattari make a very important distinction between molecular and molar 
states of existence, and this distinction is crucial in order to understand the purpose of the 
becoming-animal. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
write: “All becomings are molecular: the animal, the flower, or stone one becomes are molecular 
collectivities, haecceities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and 
recognize from experience, through science, or by habit. If this is true, then we must say the 
same of things human.”69 A molar entity is defined by its unified form, “endowed with organs 
and functions and assigned as a subject.”70 A molecular haecceity, by contrast, is a multiplicity 
of elements or intensities that “somehow cohere without entering into a regular, fixed pattern of 
organization.”71 It is a “loose aggregate of heterogeneous terms related by events and affects.”72 
Molar identities are the recognizable extensive forms and the categorical entities subsumed 
within an organized society and assigned a fixed position within that society; for example, an 
“I,” a woman, a man, a barking dog, or an oak tree. A molecular existence, on the other hand, is 
not subsumed into a stratified, organized world as a molar entity is. It is the intensive, unfixed 
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flow of perpetual becoming upon which the molar order of existence is imposed. As such, it is 
not restricted to or restrained by assignable categories such as “human” or “animal” or “oak 
tree.” Thus, all becomings share the goal of becoming “progressively more molecular” so as to 
escape rigid classifications and restrictive codifications.73  
Molecular becomings also work to undermine the “great molar powers of family, career, 
and conjugality.”74 This is because molecular qualities are those that escape the recognition of 
molar entities and established, orthodox values. Thus, becoming-molecular, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s view, is the only way to move beyond the strict and pervasive “dogmatic image of 
thought,” which perpetuates established values, beliefs, and ways of viewing and categorizing 
the molar world. The distinction between molar and molecular states of existence therefore 
provides a key clue to understanding the purpose of the becoming-animal: to move beyond the 
conventional and orthodox molar distinction between the so-called fixed categories of humans on 
the one hand versus animals on the other, as well as all of the implied values, attitudes, and 
presuppositions that accompany that distinction.75  
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 The molecular quality of becoming—that which enables it to move beyond molar 
institutions and doctrines—indicates the presence of a sort of activism underlying Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of becoming, aimed toward political and social change. Deleuze and 
Guattari claim that all becomings are not only molecular but also “minoritarian.”76 To understand 
what this means, it is necessary to define “majority” and “minority” according to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use of the terms. They argue that “majority” is not a quantitative term of measurement 
but rather the “determination of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well 
as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-man, adult-male, etc. Majority implies a 
state of domination.”77 The majority is, in other words, the molar entity or category of entities 
that holds the upper hand in relation to all other molar entities. Thus, in most western societies, it 
is the adult, white, human male that constitutes the “majority,” despite the fact that there are 
usually more women, children, and nonhuman animals in that society. This is because, as we 
have seen, the western world is largely patriarchal, anthropocentric, and Eurocentric, 
marginalizing all non-white, non-male, and non-human beings as “others.” Hence, “there is an 
entire politics of becomings-animal,” in that “they express minoritarian groups, or groups that 
are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions.”78  
Becomings are necessarily minoritarian because they are aimed at the destabilization of 
identity and being, and also at the “rupture with the central institutions that have established 
themselves.”79 Becomings cannot overthrow fixed categories, binaries, and dualisms without 
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first overthrowing their very origin, which is the established majority, or the standard to which 
all “others” are defined. For this reason, one can only become-minoritarian; that is, only a 
minority (such as a woman, animal, non-European, or child) can serve as a medium for 
becoming through which the one who “becomes” may abandon his or her molar identity and 
position in relation to the molar majority.80 Becoming is, above all, a means for stripping all 
molar beings to expose the underlying molecular multiplicities, thereby entering a state of the in-
between in which one can no longer be defined in relation to the molar standard of majority. It is 
only by doing away with fixed identities and categories that one can finally move beyond the 
restrictive dualisms and binaries of western thought.81 
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 One such dualism that becoming seeks to undo is the human/animal or culture/nature 
dualism, which is overthrown by the becoming-animal. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
becoming-animal is a necessary confrontation between nature on the one hand and “the machines 
of human beings, the roar of factories and bombers,” on the other.82 In other words, it is a 
confrontational becoming between two terms, a human and an animal, which produces a third 
term: the becoming-animal. The becoming-animal is the zone of proximity between the human 
and animal, within which an alliance is formed.  
 Deleuze and Guattari lay out a series of rules and criteria for the becoming-animal. These 
will be reviewed briefly in the following pages in order to arrive at the more important concern, 
which is the opening that the becoming-animal creates for rethinking human and nonhuman 
animal relationships. To begin with, the becoming-animal is not just a becoming or a 
transformation of the human into the animal. As this chapter has explained, the significance of 
the becoming lies not in the two terms of becoming (the becomer and that which the becomer 
becomes), but in the process of becoming itself, the in-between. However, there is a structure to 
the becoming-animal that nonetheless explains what “happens” to the two initial terms. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the becoming is characterized by a “zigzag” rather than 
linear structure.83 This means that a human does not become-animal while the animal remains 
static, nor that the human becomes-animal while the animal reciprocally becomes-human. 
Instead, the becoming is doubled: “That which one becomes becomes no less than the one that 
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becomes—[a] block is formed, essentially mobile, never in equilibrium.”84 In other words, the 
human becomes-animal while the animal becomes something else. Catapulted into a state of 
disequilibrium, the two parties enter into a state of becoming-other, constantly progressing 
toward the molecular.  
 Another important element of the becoming-animal, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
is that it always involves a “pack” animal. They write, “A becoming-animal always involves a 
pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity.”85 They distinguish between three 
different kinds of animals: “State” animals, “individuated” animals, and “demonic” pack 
animals.86 State animals are animals employed as emblems, such as an eagle used to symbolize 
freedom. Individuated animals are sentimental animals, such as family pets—which Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as Oedipalized animals, treated by humans as animals with their own individual 
identities, personalities, and desires. Lastly, demonic animals are “pack or affect animals that 
form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population.”87 Examples include wolves, lions, and other 
animals that travel in bands or herds. Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between these three 
kinds of animals will be reexamined in the next chapter; for now, however, what is important is 
that in their view, a human can only enter into a process of involution or becoming with a pack 
animal. This is because the entire purpose of a becoming-animal is for a human to enter into an 
alliance with a nonhuman, thus becoming a multiplicity rather than a unified, stable “being.” Yet 
for Deleuze and Guattari, one cannot become something else if that something else also 
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possesses a static, individual identity. Therefore, one can only become a multiplicity by entering 
into an involution with something that is itself already a non-individualized multiplicity—such as 
an animal that is part of a pack. 
 The final element of the becoming-animal is its preservation upon a plane of 
consistency.88 The plane of consistency is the plane that brings the multiplicities into coexistence 
with each other. “All becomings are written… on this plane of consistency, which is the ultimate 
Door providing a way out for them. This is the only criterion to prevent them from bogging 
down, or veering into the void.”89 The possible risk of a becoming-animal “veering into the 
void” is significant. For Deleuze and Guattari, just as all becomings progress toward the 
becoming-molecular, they are also processes of becoming-imperceptible. “The self is only a 
threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities… And at each threshold or door, a new 
pact? A fiber stretches from a human to an animal, from a human or an animal to molecules, 
from molecules to particles, and so on to the imperceptible.”90 Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
“Everything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane of 
consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is seen and heard.”91 
Indeed, all becomings are imperceptible and molecular; they are intensive becomings that go 
unnoticed in molar form. They can only be perceived on the plane of consistency, the product of 
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the becoming which records it, preserves it, and makes it known.92 Thus, in all becomings-
animal, something must be created, such as a drawing, a piece of writing, or even a concept, in 
order for the becoming to be successful and productive.  
 Outlined above are the major characteristics of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the 
becoming-animal. This theory undoubtedly provides a helpful tool for overcoming the dualistic 
“human-versus-animal-other” attitudes that pervade the western world. It describes an event in 
which a human comes into contact with an animal (this can be a real physical animal, an image, 
or a thought about an animal) and, through the force of a shared affect or immanent proximity 
with that animal, becomes deterritorialized, stripped of his or her habitual ways of relating to 
animals. In so doing, the human enters into a zone of proximity or indiscernibility in which he or 
she abandons his or her identity as a fixed, molar human in opposition to the molar animal, and 
instead considers the molecular forces conjoining the two. An alliance is thus formed between 
the two entities, and they are no longer human-versus-animal but rather two multiplicities 
belonging to one and the same dynamic, ever-changing universe.  
The purpose of the becoming-animal is the purpose of all molecular becomings: they are 
all rushing toward becoming-imperceptible. “The imperceptible is the immanent end of 
becoming.”93 Becoming-imperceptible does not mean that a person becomes-other in order to 
pass progressively into oblivion or an empty abyss of nothingness. It means, rather, to form a 
complete rupture from one’s molar self, to be just “like everybody else;” to go unnoticed, to be a 
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“stranger.”94 All becomings are a question of eliminating and abandoning “everything that roots 
each of us (everybody) in ourselves, in our molarity.”95 They all point toward an ultimate 
becoming of “everybody/everything,” giving rise to a new world of perpetual communication 
and transformation.96 It is everybody’s task to be present in this world of pure haecceities, 
becomings, and events. Deleuze and Guattari thus conceive of a perpetually shifting, unfixed, 
and borderless world peopled by wandering “nomads.” Nomads are multiplicities that relate to 
the world through constant deterritorialization.97 Nomadic existence, then, is characterized by a 
perpetual state of becoming in a “rhizomatic” world—a heterogeneous, unstable, and 
nonhierarchical universe.98 Becoming-animal is a type of becoming that brings one closer to this 
nomadic form of existence, which is precisely the type of existence in which fixed values, belief 
systems, and identities may be overthrown. It is, in short, a revolutionary way of relating to the 
universe, of “widening the gap between oneself and the norm,” and finally becoming a citizen of 
the world.99 
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Art as an Event? 
  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is an important relationship between becoming 
and the arts. It should be noted from the outset that their discussion is based on three separate 
kinds of art: music, writing, and painting (which could also be extended to other material art 
forms, such as sculpture). Each of the arts relates to becoming in its own way. This thesis focuses 
primarily on painting; but the relationship between becoming and painting could and should be 
considered relevant to the study of the other arts as well. The following pages will outline the 
connection that Deleuze and Guattari make between the becoming-animal and art, but will also 
nuance this connection in order to come to new understandings of how art can function as a 
becoming-animal.  
 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write: “Becoming-animal is only one 
becoming among others… Fibers lead us from one to the other, transform one into the other as 
they pass through doors and across thresholds. Singing or composing, painting, writing have no 
other aim: to unleash these becomings.”100 In this quotation, Deleuze and Guattari propose that 
becoming is unleashed through painting, meaning through the act of painting, not through the 
painting-object that is created. Thus, when the philosophers relate becoming to art, they are 
relating it primarily to the process of art-making. They claim, “The artist is a seer, a becomer.”101 
Artists create their work with affects as their tool, “seizing them in becomings;” in other words, 
creating art by way of their own becomings.102 Hence, when an artist paints an animal, he or she 
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does not imitate or portray the animal but, according to Deleuze and Guattari, becomes the 
animal. Deleuze and Guattari explain the process as follows:  
Suppose a painter ‘represents’ a bird; this is in fact a becoming-bird that can occur 
only to the extent that the bird itself is in the process of becoming something else, 
a pure line and pure color. Thus imitation self-destructs, since the imitator 
unknowingly enters into a becoming that conjugates with the unknowing 
becoming of that which he or she imitates. One imitates only if one fails, when 
one fails. The painter and musician do not imitate the animal, they become-animal 
at the same time as the animal becomes what they willed.103 
 
In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the artist may become-animal through 
painting an animal. The artist paints an animal and experiences an affect—an immanent power or 
force of sensation—which he or she seizes and embeds into the work of art. Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can 
reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation.”104 Thus, in their conception, the 
process of making art is a process of becoming-animal; a work of art, then, is a product of 
becoming.  
 In their theory of becoming and its relation to art-making, Deleuze and Guattari are 
primarily interested in the creation of art as the process of becoming-animal. However, the 
question remains how the becoming-animal relates to the reception of art. It should be noted that 
Deleuze and Guattari do acknowledge that a painting’s viewer may become-animal along with 
the artist. They assert, “Artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. 
They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them, 
they draw us into the compound.”105 Nevertheless, becoming-animal remains for Deleuze and 
                                                
 
103 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 304-305.  
 
104 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 173.  
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Guattari a process initiated and experienced by the artist; the viewer’s involvement in this 
process is only secondary. Becoming-animal is, for these philosophers, fundamentally a process 
of artistic creation. The question, then, is how art functions in the public realm, in relation to 
viewers, after its initial creation by the artist and without subordination to the artist’s supposed 
becoming. By the same token, is it possible to altogether abandon the notion of the “artist’s 
becoming,” and thus consider the becoming-animal not as the production of art, but as the 
production of thought and a new way of conceiving the world? The following paragraphs will 
explain how this is, in fact, possible.   
 In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari define and distinguish between the three 
forms of thought: art, science, and philosophy. These three forms of thought have a common 
goal: “confronting chaos.”106 Ronald Bogue explains,  
Chaos itself is unthinkable, immeasurable…common sense, received truth, 
orthodox opinion, good form, and so on are among the means whereby humans 
protect themselves from chaos. Philosophy, science, and art must struggle against 
chaos, concede Deleuze and Guattari, but only in order to use chaos in a common 
battle against the protective shield of doxa, the ‘already thought and perceived.’107  
 
Thus, philosophy, science, and art are all forms of radicalized thought that engage with chaos in 
order to combat the dogmatic image of thought explained in the first section of this chapter. Yet 
each of these forms of thought does so by creating a distinct type of thought. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, philosophy is the creation of pure concepts, art is the creation of embodied, 
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106 Ibid., 197.  
 
107 Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, 175. 
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materialized sensations, and science is the creation of functions or systems.108 The primary focus 
in this thesis is on the relationship between philosophy and art.   
While both philosophy and art are types of radical “thought,” Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish between thought that is accomplished through the creation of concepts versus thought 
that is accomplished through the creation of materialized sensations.109 As explained in the first 
section of this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari argue that concepts are pure events that pose 
problems for thought. Hence, they write, by “[creating] concepts, philosophy brings forth 
events.”110 Thus, philosophy is capable of creating fully immaterial thoughts or incorporeal 
events, while art creates materialized sensations that seek to restore the infinite as thought.111 
Hence, when considered from the perspective of artistic production, art does not function as a 
pure event in which new concepts are created. However, a work of art can be considered as a 
work of philosophy because it can, in confrontation with a viewer, create new ideas. That is to 
say, once a work of art is produced and offered to the viewer as a body of philosophical work, 
and once an encounter takes place between a viewer and the work, the production of new 
concepts indeed becomes possible. Hence, it is possible to move beyond the notion of the 
“artist’s becoming” so as to consider the becoming-animal not only as the production of a work 
of art but also as the creation of radicalized thought and a new way of conceiving the world.   
The encounter between a viewer and a work of art can incite a conceptual becoming in 
which ideas, concepts, or problems for thought are created. This type of conceptual becoming is 
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constitutive of the Deleuzian pure event, the event of singularities or turning points. These events 
are capable of “transforming” or deterritorializing whomever experiences them. They are ideal 
events characterized by a turning point in one’s attitudes, beliefs, values, and ways of relating to 
the world.  
The question of how a work of art may incite this “turning point” within an encounter 
remains. This thesis posits that Deleuze’s theory of the “fundamental encounter,” which disrupts 
one’s faculties and forces a person to think beyond recognition, is precisely what allows a work 
of art to function as a becoming. The fundamental encounter is one in which a subject—such as a 
viewer of a work of art—encounters something unfamiliar, something that cannot be recognized 
or readily deciphered. Because that “something,” such as a painting, is not easily decipherable, 
the viewer experiences a discord of the faculties, a destabilization of common sense and 
recognition. The viewer cannot know the painting’s meaning because he or she cannot grasp it in 
its entirety through all of his or her faculties (perception, memory, imagination, and 
understanding); rather, the viewer can only sense the painting’s meaning. Section one of this 
chapter explained that what is sensed within a work of art is its mode of expression, or, in 
Deleuze’s words, “that by which the given is given.” Thus, to sense something (rather than 
perceive it, recognize it, and “know” it) is to experience it through intuition.112 In other words, it 
is to be “affected” by the work of art and to create concepts, meanings, and thoughts about it 
without identifying the tangible origin of those meanings.113  
                                                
112 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 100. Deleuze borrows the concept of intuition, and its 
related concept of duration, from Henri Bergson. These ideas will be considered further in the 
next chapter.  
 
113 Recall that “affect” is the power to act or to be acted upon; thus, a work of art’s 
“affect” is the sensational force that it exerts upon the viewer. This notion will be discussed 
further in chapter four.  
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  In sum, a painting may function as an incorporeal event when its presence creates a 
destabilizing encounter for a viewer. That is to say, when a viewer encounters a work of art that 
is not easily decipherable or recognizable according to the common sense of the faculties, that 
encounter can force the viewer into new ways of thinking. The type of thinking that is prompted 
by this type of encounter is genuinely productive thinking that moves beyond established and 
conventional ways of understanding and relating to the world. Moreover, the new thoughts 
produced in the sense-encounter with a painting are guided by the painting’s representational 
elements. With any event there is the incorporeal, “hidden expression” of the event (its pure, 
conceptual component) and the physical “representation” or “body” in which it is 
encompassed.114 The concept is limited by its extrinsic representation. The purpose of 
representation, then, is to “limit the actualization of the event… to make the instant all the more 
intense;” in other words, to construct parameters that limit the concepts that are expressed and 
created by the event.115  
 It is finally possible to understand what it means for Tanning’s post-1955 paintings to 
function as events. The elusive, web-like paintings destabilize the viewer through their modes of 
expression; and, as in Deleuze’s encounter, they force the viewer to think, to become engaged, 
and to grapple with the material that is presented. This encounter or event poses problems and 
ideas to be contemplated by the viewer, and these ideas are limited and guided by the painting’s 
representation. Hence, in Tanning’s paintings, the animal imagery—especially the images that 
portray the intermingling of human and animal bodies—guides the viewer to contemplate human 
and animal relationships and to create new, unorthodox thoughts and ideas about those 
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relationships. This thesis proposes that the encounter with Tanning’s post-1955 paintings has the 
ability to prompt a conceptual becoming-animal in which viewers are forced, or at least incited, 
to abandon their established ways of understanding and relating to animals in order to arrive at a 
new way of coexisting and forming alliances with their nonhuman counterparts. The following 
chapter will examine a small selection of Tanning’s paintings in order to demonstrate how their 
compositions might destabilize (deterritorialize) their viewers, and to explain what the 
implications of this destabilization might be for reconfiguring the relationship between human 
and nonhuman animals in the modern western world.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Engaging with Tanning’s Post-1955 Paintings 
 
 
 
With the help of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories, chapter three argued that Tanning’s 
post-1955 paintings function as events capable of forcing thought and eliciting conceptual 
“becomings.” In such becomings, viewers may be deterritorialized—that is, decoded and broken 
of their common modes of perception and understanding—as they enter into a new way of 
thinking and relating to the world around them. This argument will be illustrated in this chapter 
through a discussion of what the painting-as-event looks like. The following pages will outline 
the major characteristics of Tanning’s paintings that enable them to function as such powerful, 
thought-provoking becomings-animal. Additionally, while Tanning’s experimentation with new 
painting methods around 1955 resulted in a newfound style that she employed well into the 
1980s, this analysis will focus on five of her paintings from the 1950s and 1960s, which 
exemplify the disruptive and radicalizing power of her work: Insomnias (1957), Kenningar 
(1961), Chiens de Cythère (Dogs of Cythera, 1963), Memoires d’un Touriste (Memories, 1964), 
and To the Rescue (1965).  
What ultimately contributes to these paintings’ disruptive capabilities is that they defy 
recognition. Recognition is defined by Deleuze as “the harmonious exercise of all the faculties 
[perception, memory, imagination, and understanding] upon a supposed same object;” it takes 
place when a subject comprehends an object according to the rationalized, “common sense” 
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ordering of the faculties.1 Chapter three explained that, according to Deleuze’s “differential 
theory of the faculties,” it is only in an encounter with something that is unfamiliar and elusive to 
common sense identification and recognition that genuine, novel thinking is possible. 
Recognition is merely the subordination of thought to common, orthodox opinion—the dogmatic 
image of thought.2 It is only capable of perpetuating conformity to already-established values, 
and of producing knowledge that has already been produced and accepted by popular opinion as 
“true” knowledge. By contrast, genuine thought, for Deleuze, must move beyond recognition. 
And the only way to move beyond recognition is by subverting the harmonious ordering of the 
faculties and throwing them into a discordant chaos. Once this is achieved, it is no longer 
possible to recognize something in its molar, extensive form, but only to experience it through 
molecular sensation, or in other words, to be affected by it.3 Thus, in order for a painting to 
prompt a viewer into new and genuine ways of thinking, it must disorient the viewer. It must 
deny him or her the ability to rationalize and codify the image. It must, ultimately, produce an 
affect that can only be sensed, but not recognized, by the viewer. 
Deleuze and Guattari consider affect as the ability for somebody or something to act and 
to be acted upon. A painting’s affect, then, is its ability to act upon a viewer; it is the force or 
power of the painting to engage the viewer and incite him or her into an active participation and 
interaction with the work of art. According to Simon O’Sullivan in “The Aesthetics of Affect: 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), 133.  
 
2 See Ibid., 130-133. 
 
3 Ibid., 139. Deleuze writes, “Something in the world forces us to think. This something 
is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered… may be 
grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its 
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition.”  
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Thinking Art Beyond Representation,” the bundles of affects—or, as Deleuze and Guattari call 
them, the blocks of sensations—that make up a work of art are its “asignifying” (or, rather, 
nonrepresentational) intensities.4 They are the molecular, intensive qualities that run “beneath, 
beyond, even parallel to signification.”5 Thus, one might think of a painting’s affects as the way 
that it communicates, rather than what it communicates. As this chapter will argue, the affects or 
blocks of sensation in Tanning’s paintings are found in her strategic treatment of line, color, 
form, and spatial composition.  
Affects are precisely what enable a painting to carry out what Deleuze declares is art’s 
basic task: to “render visible forces that are not themselves visible.”6 To make the unseen 
seeable, to make the imperceptible perceptible—according to Deleuze, this is painting’s primary 
goal. “It is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces.”7 In other 
words, the affective aspect of a painting is not merely the forms that the painting represents, but 
the asignifying forces and relations between the forms. To be sure, it seems that this “capturing” 
of forces was precisely Tanning’s goal. She once asserted, “Unknown but knowable states. I try 
to capture and paint them.”8 Elsewhere, she claimed, “I want to seduce [the viewer] by means of 
imperceptible passages from one reality to another. The viewer is caught in a net from which 
                                                
4 Simon O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art Beyond Representation,” 
Angelaki 6 (2001): 126.  
 
5 Ibid.: 126.  
 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 48. 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Alain Jouffroy and Dorothea Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” in Dorothea 
Tanning, by Sune Nordgren, John Russell, Dorothea Tanning, Alain Jouffroy, Jean-Christophe 
Bailly, and Lasse Söderberg (Malmö, Sweden: Malmö Konsthall, 1993), 57. 
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there is no escape save by going through the whole picture until he comes to the exit.”9 These 
“imperceptible passages” are precisely her paintings’ nonrepresentational affects (her 
configuration and treatment of lines, colors, and forms), and they are imperceptible only from the 
viewpoint of common sense recognition. Moreover, the alternative realities, the “unknown but 
knowable states” to which they give rise, are not to be understood as imaginative, parallel 
universes. Rather, they are the present world experienced in an alternative way that is in constant 
flux and does not conform to the doxa of the dogmatic image of thought (the subordination of 
thought to representation and recognition). Hence, the fundamental role of the “imperceptible 
passages”—the sensations and affects—in Tanning’s paintings is to not only reveal the world 
emptied of its clichés and conventions, but to also “seduce” the viewer, to draw the viewer into 
the painting, where he or she may, in theory, become entrapped and thus forced to think his or 
her way out of it.  
According to Deleuze, every artist’s mind (in fact, everyone’s mind) is plagued by 
clichés.10 For artists, clichés are already embedded in every canvas, “more or less virtually, more 
or less actually,” before the painter begins painting.11 They populate the canvas, “so that the 
painter does not have to cover a blank surface but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, 
clean it.”12 Generally speaking, clichés are “ready-made perceptions, memories, phantasms;” 
they are the habits, customs, and norms that are reproduced and spread throughout society 
                                                
9 Dorothea Tanning, Dorothea Tanning: 10 Recent Paintings and a Biography, ed. 
Dorothea Tanning (New York: Gimpel-Weitzenhoffer Gallery, 1979), n.p. 
 
10 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 71. 
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Ibid. 
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through common practice.13 Following Deleuze, Daniel Smith explains that clichés are 
“anonymous and floating images, ‘which circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate 
each of us and constitute our internal world.’”14 According to Smith, Deleuze considers clichés 
to be “precisely what prevents the genesis of [a new] image, just as opinion and convention 
prevent the genesis of thought.”15 In other words, clichés appeal to recognition, and thus 
preclude alternative and unconventional modes of seeing and thinking about the world.  
Clichés appear in art in the form of figuration, as the “illustrative and narrative 
reproductions or representations,” which are measurable and recognizable.16 They can be 
overcome, however, and indeed must be overcome in order to produce affects and sensations 
capable of summoning a viewer into the painting-event and exposing him or her to new, radical 
ideas. Deleuze’s discussion of the “diagram” in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation is helpful 
for understanding how an artist such as Tanning may successfully dismantle clichés; and, as this 
chapter will argue, it also provides significant clues for understanding the disruptive, 
deterritorializing force of Tanning’s paintings.  
A painterly diagram, which Deleuze summarizes as an “operative set” of 
“nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, and nonnarrative” zones, line-strokes, and color-patches, is a 
means for artists to introduce chaos and “catastrophe” into a work of art.17 Deleuze bases his 
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14 Daniel W. Smith, introduction to Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, by Gilles 
Deleuze, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xxiii.   
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conception of the painterly diagram on Francis Bacon’s notion of the “graph.”18 It is a set of 
accidental slips of the hand, manual traits, “irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random” 
marks on the canvas, which give rise to a frenetic composition that is independent of strict 
figuration, representation, and common sense “optical organization.”19 For Deleuze, as for 
Bacon, the diagram is capable of subverting rationalized, ordered clichés because it is created 
involuntarily, and therefore it is accidental and irrational rather than cerebral.20 It is not the 
intention here to suggest that Tanning’s paintings are composed of accidental and involuntary 
slips of the hand; any argument regarding the level of consciousness involved in the production 
of her paintings would be based purely on assumption and guesswork. However, the general 
concept of the diagram as an operative set of lines, zones, and color-patches that inject visual 
chaos into a painting and subvert ordered clichés is a profitable way of understanding Tanning’s 
paintings.  
In his book on Francis Bacon, Deleuze declares, “The diagram is indeed a chaos, a 
catastrophe.”21 According to Tom Conley in his afterword to Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation, the “compositional strategy” of the diagram is to construct a “flexible matrix in which 
                                                
18 Deleuze cites Bacon’s explanation of the “graph” (diagram) in Deleuze, Francis 
Bacon, 160 (n. 3). 
 
19 Ibid., 82.  
 
20 One might compare Deleuze’s conception of the diagram, with its involuntary and 
accidental marks, to the Surrealist technique of automatic drawing. (See chapter two of this 
thesis, footnote 23). However, whereas the Surrealists used automatism psychoanalytically, as a 
means to access the unconscious to uncover and decode irrational desires and impulses, Deleuze 
viewed the “free, random” energy of the diagram purely as a means to create visual disorder and 
confusion that defy rationalization and recognition.  
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expansions, contractions, shifts in mass, new shapes, and unforeseen torsions come forward.”22 
Deleuze, similarly, describes the diagram as a “catastrophe” in which “bodies are thrown off 
balance…the planes collide with each other; colors become confused and no longer delimit an 
object.”23 One might describe Tanning’s paintings in precisely the same way.  
In each of the five paintings in this present study, one finds a web of scrambling, tortuous 
bodily forms, bright vivid hues juxtaposed with subdued hues, indistinct masses floating in 
unfixed space, and an overall chaotic, frenzied entanglement of color-patches, line-strokes, and 
abstract shapes. These are, in short, diagrammatic paintings. Yet in addition to chaos, certain 
compositional elements remain that may guide the viewer’s interaction with the paintings; the 
turbulent interplay of expansion and contraction, revelation and concealment, also creates 
rhythm, so that the almost overwhelming chaos does not preclude the viewer’s ability to enter 
into the painting and to take something new and meaningful away from it. As Deleuze explains 
of the diagram, “It is a violent chaos in relation to the figurative givens [or clichés], but it is a 
germ of rhythm in relation to the new order of the painting.”24 Thus, the diagram creates a sort of 
rhythmic or organized chaos that is nonetheless constructive. In her autobiography Between 
Lives: An Artist and Her world, Tanning suggests that it was precisely her goal to create this type 
of organized chaos in her works. Describing her personal approach to making art, she writes, 
“You are surprised and uneasy… it was, after all, your hand, your will, your turmoil that has 
produced it all, this brand-new event in a very old world. Thus you may think: Have I brought a 
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little order out of chaos? Or have I merely added to the general confusion?”25 Indeed, as 
Tanning’s remarkably proto-Deleuzian words indicate, it requires a careful and strategic balance 
of chaos and rhythm in order to simultaneously draw in, while also disrupting and disorienting, 
her viewer’s consciousness.   
Thus far, this chapter has suggested that in order for Tanning’s paintings to function as 
thought-provoking events (conceptual becomings), they must deterritorialize their viewers. They 
must present viewers with an alternative way of looking that impedes recognition; breaking free 
of the trap of recognition is the only way to achieve a new manner of perceiving, thinking, and 
relating to the world. A painting may “reach” a viewer in such a way through its affects—its 
intensive, nonrepresentational traits that appeal to sensation rather than recognition. Affects are 
not merely the colors, lines, planes, and forms in Tanning’s paintings, but the relations between 
them. Thus, it is Tanning’s strategic configuration of these formal elements that enables her 
paintings to have a disruptive and deterritorializing impact on her viewers. The following pages 
will demonstrate how Tanning employed and manipulated color, line, space, and form in her 
paintings to this end. 
In her autobiography, Tanning recalls the moment that she began working on Insomnias. 
“Beginning, roughly, in 1955…my painted compositions began to shift and merge in an ever 
intensifying complexity of planes. Color was now a first prerogative… I was very excited and 
called it Insomnias.”26 Indeed, color assumes a much more significant role in Tanning’s 
prismatic abstract paintings than it had in her earlier figurative paintings. It no longer defines and 
illustrates individual forms. Instead, color-patches float upon the canvas, like “spreading stains,” 
                                                
25 Dorothea Tanning, Between Lives: An Artist and Her World (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 326.  
 
26 Ibid., 214.  
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as Mary Ann Caws describes them.27 In Insomnias (fig. 2), sporadic splashes of blues, oranges, 
yellows, and purples flicker across the otherwise subdued, light grey canvas. Charles Stuckey 
describes the composition as a “color storm” that engulfs the human and animal bodies and 
prevents them from “revealing themselves as full, tangible entities.”28 Bodies are indeed present 
in Insomnias—the child-like human body just below the canvas’s center, and the dog to the left 
of the child, for example—but they struggle against the turbulent hues, never fully emerging. 
Color is thus liberated from its enslavement to contour. It traverses contours, bringing the body 
masses and the background into a fluid continuity. As in Deleuze’s diagram, background and 
body-mass are “no longer in a relationship of form to ground, but a relation of coexistence or 
proximity modulated by color.”29  
The intermittent dispersion of colors across the surface of Insomnias defies logical 
explanation, and color is thus freed from its subordination to recognizable and rational modes of 
representation. The same could be said for each of the five paintings in this study, in which color 
takes on its own vitality. Particularly in To the Rescue (fig. 3), color binds figures in a 
strategically confusing manner. The light green, for example, flows energetically between body-
masses, and then dissipates into the surrounding field of variegated color. These sporadic stains 
of the same green throughout the canvas make it difficult to discern where the figures end and 
the field begins. “Parts of the figures can be clearly seen, others only felt as a merging with the 
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ground.”30 In this painting Tanning clearly employs color through relations of tonality rather than 
relations of value—that is, through the juxtaposition of pure colors and tones rather than the 
contrasting values of shadow and light. In both of these paintings, the bodies and biomorphic 
masses are rendered not so much through an illusionistic method of shading but through a 
modulated and variegated use of broken tones. Deleuze refers to this juxtaposition of tones as a 
“haptic” use of color. He explains that, “when relations of tonality tend to eliminate relations of 
value…we will speak of a haptic space and a haptic function of the eye, in which the planar 
character of the surface creates volumes only through the different colors that are arranged on 
it.”31 As Ronald Bogue explains in Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, this haptic or 
“tactile, palpable, sensual use of color…most patently reveals art’s ability to embody sensation, 
to harness forces within a material, sensate world.”32 Haptic color counters the “dominant 
conventions of classical representation… and perspectival space.”33 Hence, with its chaotic, 
kaleidoscopic amalgamation of diverse tones, Tanning’s “haptic” use of color is capable of 
subverting the common sense optical organization of depth and contour by the rational mind.  
Tanning’s strategic application of color is also capable of subverting conventional 
understandings of space and time. Deleuze argues that the rendering of polychromatic body-
masses upon a canvas “is one way of introducing time into the painting…the variation of texture 
and color on a body” might indicate “a temporal variation.”34 In other words, for Deleuze, the 
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use of fleeting, broken tones indicates the passage of time by connoting temporariness and 
variation. Alternatively, the larger, more open fields of subdued color indicate the “eternity of 
time, that is… the eternity of the passage in itself.”35 Thus, as a whole, Tanning’s treatment of 
color throughout her canvases communicates a sense of passing time that is independent of 
organized space. As Jean Cristophe Bailly observes, Tanning achieves “an art of time 
experienced rather than space simulated. The space of such experienced time is a slippage or 
slide.”36 In order to understand the kind of nonspatialized time one encounters in Tanning’s 
paintings, it is helpful to turn to French philosopher Henri Bergson’s concept of duration. 
Bergson was an important philosopher for Deleuze, and, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
his concept of duration finds many parallels in Deleuze’s understanding of events and becoming. 
It also provides an insightful way for thinking about Tanning’s compositions in relation to the 
becoming-animal. Essential to Bergson’s philosophy is the belief that reality is in a constant state 
of flux that can only be grasped through intuition within the flow of duration.37 Like becoming, 
duration is an ongoing process that connects the past, present, and future into an enduring 
continuity. In Creative Evolution, Bergson writes, “Duration is not merely one instant replacing 
another; if it were, there would never be anything but the present… Duration is the continuous 
progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”38 Bergson also 
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asserts that it is necessary to distinguish “the substantial duration of things” from the 
conventional concept of “time spread out in space.”39 In other words, duration is opposed to 
spatialized time, being itself an immeasurable flux.40 It is essentially a notion of time 
independent of space; it is a continuous experience of the world in a perpetual state of becoming.  
In Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson, Suzanne Guerlac explains that 
for Bergson, “duration becomes synonymous with existence—with life as perpetual change and 
invention of novelty.”41 She continues, “Duration ‘means invention, creation of forms, continual 
elaboration of the absolutely new.’”42 Hence, the connection between Bergson’s duration and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming is evident. For all three of these French philosophers, the real, 
pure events in life are those that yield new results: new thoughts, new perceptions, and new ways 
of existing in the world that substitute perpetual change, transformation, and flux for notions of 
fixed subjectivity.  
Presenting time as pure duration, rather than as a thread of instantaneities mapped into 
measured space, is thus an additional way that artists such as Tanning may unsettle her viewers 
and deny them the ability to rationalize and “recognize” her images. Significantly, duration—like 
                                                
38 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and  
Company, 1911), 4.  
 
39 Ibid.,, 361.  
 
40 Henri Bergson, “Concerning the Nature of Time,” in Key Writings, by Henri Bergson, 
Keith Ansell-Pearson, John Mullarkey, and Melissa McMahon (New York: Continuum, 2002), 
211.  
 
41 Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 6.  
 
42 Ibid.  
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Deleuze’s event and becoming—is experienced through sensations of “affects.”43 In other words, 
it is experienced through pure intuition. Bergson differentiates between intuition and analysis: 
intuition is the inner experience and sensation of an object, while analysis is merely an objective 
knowledge of something as it exists in ordered space.44 He asserts, “We call intuition here the 
sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what 
there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation 
which reduces the objects to elements already known.”45 Time conceived as inner duration is in a 
constant state of what Deleuze may refer to as “molecular” movement and flux; and, as a 
becoming, it may only be accessed through intuition—that is, through sensation and affect, rather 
than empirical recognition.  
In his essay, “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson describes the elements necessary for 
someone to experience an image, such as a work of art, as a duration:  
No image will replace the intuition of duration, but many different images, taken 
from quite different orders of things, will be able, through the convergence of 
their action, to direct the consciousness to the precise point where there is a 
certain intuition to seize on. By choosing images as dissimilar as possible, any 
one of them will be prevented from usurping the place of the intuition it is 
instructed to call forth, since it would then be driven out immediately by its 
rivals.46  
 
                                                
 
43 Guerlac, Thinking in Time, 5. Though this is not a direct quote from Bergson, 
Guerlac’s use of the term “affect” is helpful for understanding Bergson’s project and how it 
relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s.  
 
44 Ibid., 50.  
 
45 Henri Bergson, “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. 
Andison (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1968), 190. Bergson’s distinction between 
intuition and analysis parallels Deleuze’s distinction between sensation and recognition, which I 
have already explained in great detail in chapter three. 
 
46 Ibid.  
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The crucial point of this passage is the requirement that in order for a painting to be experienced 
and sensed as a duration, there must be a ceaseless tangle of images competing for the viewer’s 
attention, whereby no image ultimately takes over. (If one image or form were to take 
precedence over the rest, it would become an all-too-easily recognizable focal point; the 
composition would then run the risk of settling into an ordered spatialization, which would 
prevent the intuitive sensation of duration.) Tanning’s abstract paintings, particularly Insomnias 
and Dogs of Cythera (fig. 4), fulfill the requirement.  
In both paintings, swarms of human and canine bodies stagger across the canvas, 
continuously competing with each other and with other less identifiable forms and color-patches 
for the viewer’s attention. In Insomnias, there is no successive ordering of these forms that might 
indicate the chronological unfolding of spatialized time. Rather, the body parts and colors swim 
freely and disorderedly around the empty white space located near the center of the composition. 
Far from providing a focal point, this empty white space is countered by neighboring blots of 
intense colors, creating a strong visual tension. The tension is never resolved; the forms never 
settle into a logical ordering of space and time. Instead, the sporadic dispersal of bodies and 
colors in Insomnias defies organization and throws the element of time into a perpetual and 
immeasurable flux.    
Similarly, in Dogs of Cythera, the irregular distribution of bodies and body parts 
throughout the canvas thwarts spatial temporality. The continuous oscillation of forms between 
emergence and recession creates a flow of duration rather than a linear passage of time. Instead 
of marking successive instances or occurrences mapped onto the canvas, the same colors and 
biomorphic shapes are repeated in various parts throughout the composition simultaneously. In 
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other words, the colors and bodies in this and similar paintings are simultaneities rather than 
isolated, individual instants.  
In Dogs of Cythera, deep blue tones billow across the fragmented surface in an illogical 
manner, appearing inexplicably in numerous areas at once, as if driven by some unseen force or 
spasm. Similarly, a dog’s face emerges unexpectedly amidst the turbulent canvas in multiple 
locations. Catriona McAra compares this simultaneous distribution of canine bodies to the visual 
effects of a kaleidoscope: “A little dog appears in a variety of guises numerous times on this vast 
canvas as if Tanning trained her lens on Katchina or Groucho (the names of her trusty pets)… 
This is similarly the case with the distinct areas of color intensity arranged inversely and directly 
as they would be seen through a kaleidoscope.”47 As McAra suggests, the similarities between 
Tanning’s paintings and the kaleidoscope are telling.48 She asserts, “The kaleidoscope shows us 
a different view which both whimsically reassembles, and profoundly disrupts, a naïve trust of 
the visual sense’s role in the construction of knowledge.”49 The same can be said of Tanning’s 
prismatic or “kaleidoscopic” paintings, which splinter and fracture “reality” into something 
entirely disorienting and unfamiliar—something that is not constant, but is constantly fleeting 
and transforming.  
                                                
47 Catriona McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes: Cytherean Voyages in the Post-Surrealist 
Practice of Dorothea Tanning,” in Dorothea Tanning: Unknown but Knowable States (San 
Francisco: Gallery Wendi Norris, 2013), 14.  
 
48 McAra is not the only scholar to have noted the visual connection between Tanning’s 
paintings and the kaleidoscope, though she is, to my knowledge, the only one to have used this 
connection as the basis for her analysis. Other scholars who have noted the kaleidoscopic nature 
of Tanning’s post-1955 paintings include Bailly and Caws. See Bailly, “Image Redux,” 31; and 
Caws, “Person: Tanning’s Self-Portraiture,” 73.    
 
49 McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes,” 12.  
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The ability for Tanning’s paintings to disorient viewers and overturn their conventional 
values and assumptions is largely dependent on their disruption of time. Indeed, the 
“simultaneity of flow” within a pure duration—expressed in Tanning’s paintings through the 
disjointed, kaleidoscopic distribution of colors and forms—opposes the common sense spatial 
ordering of distinct and successive moments. It indicates a conception of time radically 
independent of space, demanding a new and unconventional way of looking at and experiencing 
the paintings. 
To experience a painting as pure duration is to experience it as an event. This is because 
the conception of time that constitutes inner duration is precisely the kind of free, immeasurable 
time that Deleuze attributes to the pure event (and hence to becoming).50 For Deleuze, “the time 
of the pure event or of becoming” is the “floating, nonpulsed time proper to Aeon…which 
articulates relative speeds and slownesses independently of the chronometric or chronological 
values that time assumes in the other modes.”51 Deleuze’s notion of floating time, “Aeon: the 
indefinite time of the event,” parallels Bergson’s notion of inner duration.52 Both are opposed to 
“Chronos: the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines 
a subject”—in other words, spatialized time.53 Yet, if Tanning’s paintings present a disruptive 
conception of time insubordinate to space, then they do so by also presenting unordered, 
spontaneous spatial arrangements. The disruption of time and the disruption of space go hand in 
                                                
50 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), 263.  
 
51 Ibid.  
 
52 Ibid., 262. 
 
53 Ibid. 
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hand, and the nonpulsed time in Tanning’s work finds correspondence in the paintings’ non-
metric, continually shifting spaces. 
There is no linear perspective in any of the five paintings considered here; no focal point, 
no horizon line, no ordering of foreground, middle ground, and background, all of which may be 
thought of as what Deleuze and Guattari call striation. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between striated space and smooth space. 
Striated space—when considered in terms of a work of art—is closed, sedentary, and delimited 
by horizon lines and pictorial borders.54 Its opposite is smooth space, which is “infinite, open, 
and unlimited in every direction… it does not assign fixed and mobile elements but rather 
distributes a continuous variation.”55 Striated space corresponds to ordered, chronological time. 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “Striated is that which intertwines fixed and variable elements, 
produces an order and succession of distinct forms, and organizes horizontal melodic lines and 
vertical harmonic planes.”56 In pictorial terms, it characterizes Tanning’s earlier figurative works 
of art, such as A Parisian Afternoon (Hôtel du Pavot, 1942) (fig. 5) and Self-Portrait (1944) (fig. 
6), which communicate a sense of depth and spatial organization, and which are also framed on 
either side of the canvas by the strategic placement of tall buildings (A Parisian Afternoon) and 
landmarks (Self-Portrait). In contrast, Tanning’s later paintings encompass—or, rather, are 
encompassed by—overwhelming smooth space.57 Horizon lines and framing devices disappear; 
                                                
54 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 475. 
 
55 Ibid., 475-476.  
 
56 Ibid., 478.  
 
57 Because of their oscillation between figuration and abstraction, one could possibly 
view these paintings as a combination of both smooth and striated space. However, as the 
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the spatial planes become multidimensional, scrambled, and disorderly. Rather than organizing a 
succession of distinct forms, the smooth spaces in Tanning’s later paintings present “continuous 
variation, continuous development of form.”58 Bodies come to the fore, but immediately recede 
back into the turbulent color storms. In both Kenningar (fig. 7) and Memories (fig. 8), for 
example, sporadic splashes of color fill the canvas in all directions as the picture planes fracture 
into multiple overlapping and interwoven layers. There is no distinction between foreground and 
background in either painting, as the background becomes intertwined with the various shapes 
and blocks of colors. As Anna Lundström observes, the “fragmented pictorial world” of these 
later works “emerges at the surface level of the painting.”59 She continues,  
In these peculiar abstract paintings, hyper-realist details float in a spatiality that 
seems to operate outside our customary orientation in terms of up and down, in 
front and behind, depth and surface. The paintings nevertheless remain works in 
which viewers can lose themselves. The many islands of motifs appear to overlap 
and interpenetrate one another, while their facets form folds and nooks and 
crannies which incite the viewer’s imagination. And yet it all happens on the same 
plane: at the very spot where the surface of the canvas passes into the space of the 
exhibition.60 
 
Here, Lundström points out an important characteristic of Tanning’s post-1955 paintings. 
Their disruption of customary spatial orientations and their overlapping motifs create a 
seemingly infinite number of interpenetrating layers; yet all of this takes place upon a single, 
albeit fractured, surface plane. There is no illusion of depth—at least not of the sort that viewers 
may logically follow based on conventional linear perspective. Rather, as in Kenningar, for 
                                                
following pages will demonstrate, Tanning’s use of figuration remains largely unstable, and the 
compositions, as a whole, convey smooth space.  
 
58 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 478.  
 
59 Anna Lundström, “Bodies and Spaces: On Dorothea Tanning’s Sculptures,” 
Konsthistorisk tidskrift/Journal of Art History 78 (November 2009): 122.  
 
60 Ibid.  
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example, the continuous oscillation of forms between revelation and concealment results in a 
confrontation between the viewer and a single chaotic surface. Yet this surface, as Lundström 
points out, is still one in which viewers may “lose themselves,” precisely because of its 
constantly fleeting oscillation of colors, lines, and forms. The confrontation between the viewer 
and the painting at the surface level—“at the very spot where the surface of the canvas passes 
into the space of the exhibition”—contributes to the power of this and similar paintings to 
integrate the viewer and elicit participation.  
The elimination of conventional pictorial planes in both Kenningar and Memories 
decreases the gap between the viewer and the painting. In these paintings, the viewer does not 
observe from a distance the static illustration of a spatio-temporal scene or narrative event (in the 
traditional sense of the word); rather, he or she is confronted by a dynamic explosion of forms 
that seems to be taking place right before his or her eyes. The indeterminate blocks of color, the 
biomorphic shapes, and the canine bodies “take their place” in a shallow smooth space, invading 
and disrupting the viewer’s comfortable territory.61  
The relationship between the smooth space of Tanning’s paintings and their integration of 
the viewer is significant. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “In striated space, one closes off a 
surface and ‘allocates’ it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one 
‘distributes’ oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one’s 
crossings.”62 In other words, striated space closes the painting off from the viewer. A distance is 
created between the ordered space enclosed within the painting and the viewer’s own space 
outside of the painting. Smooth space, on the other hand, is open to the viewer. The viewer may 
                                                
61 Lundström, “Bodies and Spaces,” 125. 
 
62 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 481.  
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enter into the space (albeit mentally rather than physically); this kind of integration is 
encouraged, not inhibited, by smooth space. As Lundström reminds us, it is a space in which 
viewers may lose themselves.63 Moreover, due to the disruptive and chaotic nature of smooth 
space, one perhaps cannot help but to become lost in the canvas. Once again, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ideas are useful here: “There are two kinds of voyage, distinguished by the respective 
role of the point, line, and space… What distinguishes the two kinds of voyages is neither a 
measurable quantity of movement, nor something that would be only in the mind, but the mode 
of spatialization, the manner of being in space, of being for space. Voyage smoothly or in 
striation, and think the same way [emphasis added].”64 What this passage indicates is that 
smooth space and striated space define more than certain ways of arranging forms on a canvas; 
they also define a “manner of being in space” and a corresponding way of thinking. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, smooth space encourages a nomadic way of being in space; thus it also encourages 
nomadic thinking.65  
In chapter three, I explained that nomadic existence is characterized by constant 
deterritorialization and perpetual becoming. Nomadic thinking, then, is a type of thinking that 
encourages constant revision, transformation, and renewal. This is the kind of thinking that 
smooth space promotes. Being itself a nomadic space, “the smooth always possesses a greater 
                                                
 
63 Lundström is referring to the space conveyed in Tanning’s paintings, not to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s term “smooth space.” One can nonetheless draw a connection between the two 
because, as this chapter argues, the nature of space conveyed in Tanning’s paintings is 
comparable to Deleuze and Guattari’s smooth space.  
 
64 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 482.  
 
65 Ibid., 481.  
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power of deterritorialization than the striated.”66 In other words, smooth space is open to a 
greater level of conceptual becoming and radical thinking than logic-based striated space could 
ever allow. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge as much in their assertion that, “Voyaging 
smoothly is a becoming, and a difficult, uncertain becoming at that…. all becoming occurs in 
smooth space.”67  
Indeed, smooth space is precisely the space of all pure, Deleuzian events: “Smooth space 
is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of 
affects, more than one of properties. It is haptic rather than optical perception.”68 In aesthetic 
terms, then, a painting that presents smooth space would be one that privileges affects and 
forces—the abstract relationships between colors, lines, and forms—rather than accurate 
illustration of recognizable, perceptible “things.” Non-metric smooth space in art is indeed the 
space of pure events and becomings, as was the case with nonpulsed time. The smooth spaces in 
Tanning’s paintings are therefore the open spaces for becoming.  
 Earlier, this chapter posited that Tanning evokes smooth space by fracturing her picture 
plane into seemingly infinite levels of interpenetrating motifs. She achieves this largely through 
her abstract treatment of multidirectional lines. For Deleuze and Guattari, when it comes to the 
visual arts, it is precisely the nomadic or abstract line that constitutes a smooth space: “The 
nomad line… has a multiple orientation and passes between points, figures, and contours: it is 
positively motivated by the smooth space it draws… The abstract line is the affect of smooth 
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spaces.”69 In striated space, “lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: one goes from 
one point to another. In the smooth, it is the opposite: the points are subordinated to the 
trajectory.”70 The multidirectional abstract line in smooth space follows its own unpredictable 
trajectory. Its fundamental purpose is not to outline forms, nor to serve as a horizon. “A line that 
delimits nothing, that describes no contour…that is constantly changing direction, a mutant line 
of this kind that is without…beginning or end and that is as alive as a continuous variation—such 
a line is truly an abstract line, and describes a smooth space.”71 As a mutant line, the abstract line 
is not a contour but a “line of flight without beginning or end;” in other words, it is a line of 
deterritorialization, of becoming.72  
 Abstract lines abound in each of the five paintings discussed here—indeed, in all of 
Tanning’s post-1955 paintings. In Memories, for example, inexplicable lines appear out of 
nowhere, from no apparent origin, and travel freely across the canvas to intersect and join forces 
with other abstract lines. It is virtually impossible to follow any of the lines to a definitive 
stopping point, as they blend together in some areas and turn sharply in others, eluding the 
viewer’s grasp at every point. Only one figure stands out in this painting: the sudden appearance 
                                                
 
69 Ibid., 496. Deleuze and Guattari base their abstract line on Wilhelm Worringer’s 
conception of the “Gothic or Northern Line.” See Ibid., 495-496, for their discussion of 
Worringer’s Gothic Line. See also Wilhelm Worringer, Form Problems of the Gothic (New 
York: G.E. Stechert & Co., 1920).   
 
70 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 478. The difference between the striated 
and the smooth use of lines is also explained elsewhere by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of a 
punctual system (striated; lines are subordinated to points) versus a multilinear system (smooth; 
lines pass between points, but do not logically connect and order them; points are subordinated to 
the lines). See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 295-298. 
 
71 Ibid., 498.  
 
72 Ibid., 499.  
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of a dog’s face near the bottom left-hand corner. Yet even the lines and contours that delimit the 
face soon disappear into the canvas, as seen in the abstract line traversing the right side of the 
dog’s face. Similarly, in To the Rescue, lines that delimit one figure quickly cross over into other 
figures, so that it is difficult to tell where one body ends and the other begins; this, too, is 
characteristic of the abstract line in smooth space. In fact, one of the general characteristics of 
smooth space, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is that “there are determinations that are part 
of one another.”73 In To the Rescue, the figures—the dog on the right, and the unidentifiable 
biomorphic figures in the center—share determinations with each other. Bailly describes this 
“dual purpose of the line” as one of Tanning’s “signature devices.”74 He writes, “A figure’s or an 
object’s delineation is also the drawing of its neighbor so that space as such is denied its 
breath.”75 However, in each case, the lines shared by two or more figures are not subordinated to 
the figures. For example, the dog at the far right of To the Rescue—just like the dog in Memories 
and the multiple dog-forms in Dogs of Cythera—does not emerge entirely from the background. 
It is not made manifest as a complete entity. For the lines that delimit the canine body 
immediately drift into the turbulent smooth space, at once serving as contour lines and as abstract 
lines, resisting striation. The “dual purpose” of Tanning’s lines as both contour lines and abstract 
lines creates a network in which the figures in Tanning’s paintings are inextricably bound to the 
web of lines in which they are entangled. The capturing of the figures enmeshed in the canvas is 
also extended toward the viewer, who becomes entrapped in the visual maze of ambiguous lines. 
                                                
73 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 485.  
 
74 Jean Christophe Bailly, “Image Redux,” 32.  
 
75 Ibid. 
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These are the lines of deterritorialization, leading viewers into unfamiliar spaces—the smooth 
spaces of becoming—and leaving them to their own devices to find their way out.  
 Tanning’s abstract treatment of color and line in her post-1955 paintings creates 
disorderly, unconventional experiences of time and space for the viewer. Time is no longer 
spatialized; it is a duration. And space is no longer rationalized and striated; it is smooth and 
nomadic, always shifting. The chaos introduced by Tanning’s nonillustrative color-patches and 
abstract lines is characteristic of Deleuze’s catastrophic diagram. They destroy clichés and 
conventional figuration in order to expose viewers to a new, alternative view of the world. If 
Tanning’s objective in these years was indeed to entrap her audience and “overturn values,” then 
the chaotic destruction of figurative clichés was her modus operandi. In order for her viewers to 
experience her paintings in a new, thought-provoking, revolutionary manner, it was necessary for 
her to show her viewers something different—to present ideas to them in a new, radical way. A 
new way of looking necessitates a new way of showing; Tanning’s post-1955 abstract or 
“diagrammatic” paintings fulfill that need.  
Of course, figuration did not altogether disappear from Tanning’s work after 1955. In 
fact, human and animal bodies play a vital role in the revolutionary impact of her later works and 
their ability to function as conceptual becomings.76 Chapter three explained that for every 
expression of the pure event, there is, according to Deleuze, an external representation which 
encompasses it. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze writes,  
                                                
76 Deleuze would perhaps refer to the bodies in Tanning’s paintings as “Figures.” A 
Figure is the form that figuration takes when altered by the diagram. See Deleuze, Francis 
Bacon, 71-90. This would certainly be one way to analyze the bodies in Tanning’s post-1955 
paintings, but Deleuze’s discussion of the representation and expression in The Logic of Sense is 
better suited to this thesis, particularly because it is more closely related to his conception of the 
pure event.  
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By itself, representation is given up to an extrinsic relation of resemblance or 
similitude only. But its internal character… comes from the manner in which it 
encompasses, or envelops an expression… The expression, which differs in nature 
from the representation, acts no less as that which is enveloped (or not) inside the 
representation.77  
 
Expression is the nonrepresentational affect of the event, the event’s concepts; but representation 
is the limit that envelops the expression and guides the event, setting parameters for its 
actualization. Representation sets limits for the expressive qualities—that is, the concepts—
encompassed within and created by the event.78 Extending this notion to Tanning’s post-1955 
paintings, the role of the bodily figures—or, as McAra describes them, “figurative fragments, 
like narrative ruins”79—is to provide clues for the kinds of concepts embedded in the works. 
They work in conjunction with the expressive affects (the abstract lines and colors) to guide the 
viewer’s experience of the paintings. 
The figures in Tanning’s paintings are the dogs, humans, and the unknown “in-
betweens.” Often, the most discernible figure is the dog or group of dogs, or, in Tanning’s 
words, “the emblematic dog as orchestrator of event.”80 In Kenningar, To the Rescue, and 
Memories, for example, a single dog emerges from a swirl of indiscernible, metamorphosing 
bodies, presiding over them as they struggle, enfold, and collide with one another. Significantly, 
in each of these paintings and in Dogs of Cythera, the dogs are the only figures making direct 
eye contact with the viewer. Caws says of this eye contact, “the immense and immensely 
                                                
 
77 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and ed. by Constantin V. Boundas 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 145.  
 
78 Ibid., 147.  
 
79 McAra, “Kaleidoscope Eyes,” 10. 
 
80 A statement by Tanning quoted in Roberta Waddell and Louisa Wood Ruby, eds., 
Dorothea Tanning: Hail, Delirium! (New York: New York Public Library, 1992), 102.  
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protruding eyes of the dog, not unseeing but—as the artist puts it—‘seeing in a different way’ 
guide our own to perceive what we might not have seen otherwise.”81 In other words, the dogs 
reveal new perspectives. They beckon the viewers and invite them into the composition, into the 
becoming-animal, leading them along the abstract lines, over and under the patches of 
nonillustrative colors, and into the scrambling mix of intermingled human and animal bodies.  
Tanning employs haptic color and nomadic abstract lines to create spaces that disorient 
and deterritorialize her viewers. This is what places her paintings in the domain of events and 
becoming. Her treatment and configuration of formal elements in her abstract paintings defy 
easy, rationalized recognition; instead, they constitute the nonrepresentational, expressive affects 
that are experienced and sensed by the viewer. What one encounters in these paintings is not 
merely the human and animal bodies, but the relationships between them: their abilities to bind 
with, affect, disrupt, and become one another. It is not just humans and animals that are painted, 
but also the relations, forces, and zones of indiscernibility between them, which are conveyed 
through Tanning’s chaotic or diagrammatic implementation of line, color, and composition. 
These paintings require a new mode of participation, a new way of accessing and experiencing 
the images—one that summons the viewers to look molecularly, at the intensities, the relations, 
the forces and rhythms within the painting, which take precedence over figuration.  
Thus the paintings have the ability to deterritorialize viewers, opening them up to 
transformation, because habitual modes of recognition and common sense perception are no 
longer sufficient when encountering these works of art. Viewers are forced to abandon their 
                                                
 
81 Caws, “Person: Tanning’s Self-Portraiture,” 66. Here, Caws is writing about Tanning’s 
painting Reality (1973-83), but her analysis is also relevant to the other paintings in which a 
dog’s eyes boldly stand out in contrast to the other, less noticeable figures and body parts in the 
paintings.  
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customary ways of seeing and experiencing the images. It is precisely this disorientation that 
enables the paintings to then invite new forms of thought. This is because the paintings do not 
just disrupt visual clichés (i.e. conventional figuration), but they also disrupt conceptual clichés; 
they disrupt popular, orthodox notions about how humans and animals are “supposed” to 
interact. In the paintings studied here, there is no suggestion of any hierarchy that assumes the 
superiority of humans over animals. In fact, it is difficult at times to fully isolate and distinguish 
between the human and animal bodies at all, suggesting that perhaps it is a mistake to place such 
a wide, unbridgeable gap between human and nonhuman species, as western societies have done. 
Instead, Tanning’s works provide an alternative view of human and animal relationships in 
which they are immanently connected, coexisting in one and the same chaotic universe. The 
recurrence of animal bodies and the conflation of human and animal organs in Tanning’s 
paintings fulfill the “representative” function of events and set parameters around the concepts to 
which they give rise. In other words, they give the deterritorializing encounters with Tanning’s 
paintings specificity as conceptual becomings-animal. 
 
Larger Ideas 
 
 
 
From an early age, I turned towards a deep sort of universality—I mean a 
universality that rules out ‘foreignness’ and the intrinsic superiority of some 
beings over others… Sometimes, I even want to lose more of my separateness, to 
roll with the crowd, so to speak, well, to blend into an ocean of beings like a drop 
of water. Sometimes I think that would be the very best.82 
                                                
82 Jouffroy and Tanning, “Interview with Dorothea Tanning,” 63. Although this thesis 
takes a specific approach to Tanning’s oeuvre that does not concern shamanism, it is worth 
noting that in this quotation, Tanning’s ideas seem to intersect with certain shamanistic ways of 
relating to the natural world. Shamanism has been practiced for many centuries in regions around 
the globe. It is particularly widespread in Caribbean and African countries, but it is also widely 
practiced among various tribes in North and South America, including the Hopi tribe of 
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 In the above quotation, Tanning reveals an inner belief and outlook of life that is 
remarkably congruent with Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming, which favors an 
imperceptible, nomadic existence in the world as the only way to abandon stratification and 
hierarchization among species, genders, and all other binaries. Though each of the five paintings 
considered in this present study were painted before Deleuze and Guattari wrote A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia and other texts, their theory of becoming introduces one 
method of “[ruling] out ‘foreignness’ and the intrinsic superiority of some beings over others,” as 
Tanning had hoped to do. Every becoming, including the becoming-animal, is a means for 
achieving the sort of productive, bio-egalitarian anonymity for which Tanning strove. A human 
may achieve this oneness with the world via the becoming-animal, which is a way of moving 
beyond one’s molar self and forming an alliance with an animal, thus developing new types of 
relationships (physical and/or conceptual) with animals that are no longer based on division and 
stratification. Theoretically, this becoming-animal would open the door to further types of 
becomings, until one has finally abandoned all ties to his or her molar identity and reached an 
entirely nomadic way of existing in and relating to the world.  
To be sure, the present thesis does not argue that Tanning attempted to achieve this 
anonymity by becoming-animal through making art. Rather, it argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of becoming-animal provides an insightful way for understanding how Tanning’s 
                                                
southeastern Arizona. In many cases, shamans derive their powers to heal and alleviate traumas 
and illnesses by serving as hosts or intermediaries for animal spirits—including canines. For 
more information on shamanism in the Americas, see, for example, Roland B. Dixon, “Some 
Aspects of the American Shaman,” The Journal of American Folklore, 21 (Jan. – Mar., 1908): 1-
12. Significantly, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal has also been connected to 
shamanistic practices. For a brief examination of the connections between becoming-animal and 
shamanism, see Wendy Woodward, The Animal Gaze: Animal Subjectivities in Southern African 
Narratives (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press, 2012), 4-5; 54-56. 
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paintings might affect her viewers and spread her own ideas—how her art might “overturn 
values” as she so strongly hoped that it would.  
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, “We can be thrown into a becoming by anything at 
all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of things… Anything at all can do the job.”83 
Moreover, they write that the reality of becomings-animal “resides not in an animal one imitates 
or to which one corresponds but in themselves, in that which suddenly sweeps us up and makes 
us become. [Emphasis added.]”84 Thus, Tanning’s paintings can function as becomings-animal if 
one accepts that it is possible for a work of art to deterritorialize a viewer and force him or her 
into a new way of looking, and hence a new way of thinking about animals. “We are not in the 
world, we become with the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, 
becoming.”85 Thus, the becoming-animal is not merely a process that an artist undergoes while 
painting. Rather, in the present analysis, it is a conceptual becoming that the painting creates for 
the viewer; the becoming-animal is the contemplation of a work of art and the new concepts and 
ideas to which it gives rise. It is both the expressive qualities of line and color and also the 
unstable yet very noticeably identifiable animal bodies in each of Tanning’s paintings in this 
present study that create the becoming-animal.   
There is, however, one aspect of the becoming-animal that may seem to present an 
incongruity with Tanning’s paintings: Deleuze and Guattari’s firm denial that any becoming-
animal may involve a domesticated animal or a family pet, insofar as “pet,” for them, specifies a 
particular function fulfilled by an “Oedipalized” animal. An Oedipalized animal is an animal that 
                                                
83 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 292.  
 
84 Ibid., 279.  
 
85 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press), 169.  
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has been integrated into the bourgeois familial structure. Deleuze and Guattari posit that pets are 
“sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, ‘my’ cat, ‘my’ dog. These animals 
invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of 
animal psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother 
behind them.”86 Deleuze and Guattari view pets as “commodified, oedipalized, and 
anthropomorphic projections of their owner’s bourgeois individuality.”87 Their fundamental 
problem with “pet-keeping,” as Alain Beaulieu explains, is that “pet lovers have human 
relationships with their animal companions…people talk to their dogs as they walk down the 
street as if the animal were a child.”88 They thus fail to relate to animals on animals’ terms and as 
animals themselves, and they instead project their own human “fantasies, emotions, and desires” 
onto their pets.89  
 Deleuze and Guattari’s critical objection to pet-keeping is based on their argument that it 
humanizes animals and subsumes them into the Oedipal, “daddy-mommy-me triangle, the 
familial constellation in person.”90 In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, they explain, 
“What we are calling into question is the frantic Oedipalization to which psychoanalysis devotes 
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itself.”91 In their view, psychoanalysis (specifically, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis), 
“assumes that the unconscious is a kind of theater where a self is staged and performed as the 
[O]edipal drama of mommy-daddy-child… On this view, unconscious desire is always motivated 
by lack; it is always referred to the mother the subject cannot have, the father the subject cannot 
be.”92 Hence, family “pets,” as projections of human desires, serve the Oedipalized function of 
filling some lack or emptiness (within the familial structure) of which the human may not fully 
be aware but nonetheless imposes upon the animal.  
Because Tanning has confirmed that the dogs in her paintings are manifestations of her 
own dog, “(my dog) who, over the years, shows up in many avatars, as constant as a talisman,” it 
may seem that her paintings do not meet the qualifications or criteria of a “true” becoming-
animal outlined by Deleuze and Guattari (since they argue that a human can never “become” 
with a pet). However, Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge that “every animal is 
fundamentally a band, a pack… Any animal is or can be a pack.”93 A dog is not necessarily an 
Oedipalized “pet” just because it is a dog. They explain, “There is always the possibility that a 
given animal, a louse, a cheetah, or an elephant, will be treated as a pet, my little beast. And at 
the other extreme, it is also possible for any animal to be treated in the mode of the pack or 
swarm… Even the cat, even the dog.”94 It has been suggested, however, that Katchina was 
Tanning’s substitute for a child, since she and Ernst never had any children of their own. For 
                                                
 
91 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 53.  
 
92 Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray & Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy (Ithaca: 
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example, an obituary published on The Telegraph’s website on February 3, 2012 (three days 
after Tanning’s death) claimed, “Tanning consistently refused to have children and instead 
lavished her attention on Pekinese dogs.”95 This assertion indeed imposes a very Oedipalized 
identity upon Katchina. However, for Tanning to have willingly not had children, and to have 
also firmly rejected many other bourgeois conventions as explained in chapter two (such as the 
customs of adhering to religion, going to college, settling down in a suburban home, marrying, 
taking a husband’s last name, having children, etc.) it seems unlikely that she would have felt the 
need to compensate by treating her dogs as the children she never had.  
Deleuze and Guattari argue that Oedipalized pets “invite us to regress, draw us into a 
narcissistic contemplation.” Similarly, Wendy Woodward agrees that, “Perhaps more so than in 
relationships with any other nonhuman animal, humans see themselves reflected back 
narcissistically in their pets’ eyes, who serve as mirrors for them.”96 In fact, she explains, “The 
very appellation ‘pet-keeping’, like ‘dog-owning’, is patronizing to the animal, and does not 
point to an egalitarian relationship with a resident dog.”97 However, Woodward acknowledges 
that not all “resident” animals are necessarily pets, and she believes that certain relationships 
with domestic animals can lead to a “broader understanding of the political situation of 
nonhuman animals… a bit like the clichéd ‘Think local, act global’ ecological directive.”98 In 
other words, the relationships between human and nonhuman animals that begin in the home 
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with “resident” animals may potentially lead to a more cultivated and mindful relationship 
outside of the home, on a more global scale. Similarly, Keri Weil insists on “the singularity of 
each animal and of the relationships each demands.”99 It is in these relationships, she argues, that 
“the animals we live with…challenge our views of ourselves and bring us to question the 
processes of domestication we, too, undergo in order to become the gender and species we think 
we are.”100 Thus, both Woodward and Weil assert that all animals, even domesticated ones—
when not treated as Oedipalized pets—have the ability to bring humans outside of their “selves” 
and into a new, desubjectified way of relating to the world. In other words, domesticated animals 
have the capacity for becoming.  
There is evidence that suggests Tanning’s relationship with Katchina may have been the 
type of productive, “challenging” relationship advocated by Woodward and Weil and Deleuze 
and Guattari. In an unpublished journal, Tanning once wrote, “My relationship with Katchina, 
for all anyone knows, may conceal a perfect formula for discovering our meaning, it may even 
point the way towards extraordinary experience. Certainly these things are not to be had by direct 
questioning and laboratory methods.”101 As this quotation indicates, Tanning indeed believed 
that it was possible to learn something productive about the world—to discover and experience 
something radically new—through her relationship with Katchina. Not only that, but she 
indicates that it is perhaps only through her relationship with this dog, and not through 
“laboratory methods” (i.e. human reasoning and rationality praised in the West), that new 
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meanings and experiences are possible. Thus, it does not appear that, for Tanning, Katchina was 
an Oedipalized, humanized “pet.” Rather, she was a very real animal capable of “perfectly real” 
becomings.102  
However, the nature of Tanning’s relationship with Katchina ultimately does not matter; 
rather, what is important is how the dogs in Tanning’s paintings are presented to the viewer, and 
the kinds of relationships between humans and animals that they suggest. This is because while 
Deleuze and Guattari theorize the becoming-animal as a process that an artist experiences in the 
act of painting, I have argued that the becoming-animal can also be considered from the point of 
view of reception. In this view, becomings-animal are more than processes of art-making 
experienced by a painter; instead, they are conceptual becomings-animal that the paintings create 
for the viewers. They are the new modes of relating to and thinking about animals that Tanning’s 
paintings trigger once a participating viewer becomes actively engaged with them.   
Each of the five paintings discussed here—as well as many of Tanning’s other paintings 
from 1955 onward—portray humans and animals intermingling and merging with each other in 
indeterminate, smooth spaces. These paintings possess “no horizons…rather, they maintain a 
deliberately vertiginous quality; never clear.”103 Their dimensions are shattered; planes become 
fractured and incommensurable. Colors and lines break free from their traditionally 
representational functions and instead become forces of transformation: transformation of the 
figures within the painting, which are neither purely human nor nonhuman, but always 
metamorphosing; and transformation beyond the canvas, as viewers are forced into a new way of 
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seeing, comprehending, and experiencing the world around them, beginning with the paintings in 
front of them.    
These paintings do not define the connections and relationships between human and 
nonhuman animals. They do not tell viewers what to think about animals and the position of 
animals in the human-dominated, modern western world. But they do ask questions. They reveal 
open-ended possibilities; they open up a space for new relationships to take place. They 
encourage viewers to question and perhaps revise their current perceptions of nonhuman 
animals, and to consider new ways of relating to them. These new relations would, ideally, be 
driven by what Rosi Braidotti refers to as a “deep bioegalitarianism, a recognition that we 
humans and animals are in this together. The bond between us is a vital connection…on terms 
that are no longer hierarchical or self-evident.”104  
Tanning’s paintings convey a world—our world, without binaries and presupposed 
hierarchies—in which all identities are called into question, and all of the earth’s inhabitants are 
in a constant state of flux and becoming, each reduced to “[nothing] more than an abstract line, 
or a piece in a puzzle that is itself abstract.”105 Indeed, the paintings themselves are like puzzles: 
scrambled, out of order, but nonetheless coherent if the viewer is willing to think them through. 
Tanning’s paintings encourage us to participate, to put the pieces together, to think—genuinely 
think, in Deleuzian terms—about the possible connections and linkages between the pieces (the 
human and nonhuman bodies). It is up to the viewer to work through the puzzle and put the 
pieces together in his or her own way. Tanning does not give any answers, but her questions are 
profound. As Deleuzian events, her paintings pose problems. They create new concepts, new 
                                                
 
104 Braidotti, “Animals, Anomalies, and Inorganic Others,” 528. 
 
105 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280.  
 131 
alliances between humans and animals, and offer them to participating viewers for 
contemplation. They do so, significantly, by denying viewers their comfortable dependence on 
recognition.  
Few of the motifs in Tanning’s post-1955 paintings are recognizable and conceivable 
according to logic-based western conventions of seeing and “thinking.” They communicate 
instead through their affects—their unconventional and deterritorializing configurations of 
colors, shapes, and lines. The turbulent, maze-like canvases disrupt the rationalized, stratified, 
and mechanized modern world to which the western viewer belongs—certainly contrasting with 
the neatly constructed, institutional exhibition space—and they impose unfamiliar conceptions of 
space and time. Their deterritorializing aesthetic is what ultimately enables Tanning’s paintings 
to incite her viewers into active contemplation. It is precisely this deterritorializing, 
contemplative encounter between the painting and participating viewer that this thesis has 
redefined as the conceptual becoming-animal.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The present thesis provides a fresh perspective on Tanning’s art—one that beckons for a 
new wave of scholarship on Tanning’s post-1955 paintings that will consider them in their own 
right, independent of Tanning’s earlier Surrealist paintings. This study also illuminates 
Tanning’s persistent use of animal motifs, which is largely overlooked in the scholarship on her 
works. By uncovering a new dimension of meaning buried within Tanning’s oeuvre, this 
research aims to prompt further scholarship on the incorporation of animals both in Tanning’s 
abstract paintings and in her earlier figurative paintings.  
 Most significantly, this thesis introduces a reading of Tanning’s art that contributes to 
both animal and feminist studies. As mentioned in the introduction, feminist scholars Josephine 
Donovan and Carol J. Adams advocate in their book, Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical 
Explorations, a wave of feminism that demands justice and equality for all life-forms, positing 
that “no one creature will be free until all are free…until the mentality of domination is ended in 
all its forms.”1 Thus by proposing an analysis of Tanning’s paintings that champions a greater 
awareness of the interconnectedness of life and subverts the traditional western “othering” and 
marginalization of animals, this thesis also calls upon its audience to question and reevaluate all 
socially constructed and problematic binaries. Thus, the present research offers a new 
perspective on the feminist implications of Tanning’s work. Moreover, this research provides a 
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reading of Tanning’s art that contributes to the burgeoning field of animal studies. Chapter two 
examined some of the behaviors and customs in modern western society that have resulted in the 
marginalization and exploitation of animals. With the hope of reversing or at least halting the 
increasing domination of humans over animals and the catastrophic consequences that that 
domination has wrought on the environment, animal studies scholars have come together from 
various disciplines to ask new questions and form new hypotheses about nonhuman animals and 
their place in humans’ lives. The present thesis has opened up a space for art history in this new 
multidisciplinary field of animal inquiry by demonstrating how Tanning’s paintings can function 
as bodies of thought that create new concepts and ideas about animals and—more importantly—
confront viewers and prompt them to consider these new ideas for themselves.  
Curiously ahead of her time, Tanning’s paintings ask new questions and explore new 
kinds of relationships between human and nonhuman animals that have only begun to be 
scrutinized in recent decades. By placing Tanning’s paintings within the context of animal 
studies, this thesis proposes that a radically new way of thinking about human/animal 
relationships can stem from a new way of looking at them, and Tanning’s post-1955 paintings 
indeed require a new, unconventional way of looking that does not rely on commonplace 
interpretation or familiar recognition. In each painting, the colors and lines go beyond their 
traditionally figurative and representational functions in order to convey the affects and 
relationships between the fluid bodies that they enfold. Contour lines become abstract and 
nonformal, and illustrative uses of color become haptic and energetic. Together, the nomadic 
abstract lines and haptic color-patches, distributed across continually shifting and overlapping 
planes, impose disorienting and deterritorializing configurations of time and space upon viewers; 
each composition confronts viewers with an altogether vertiginous and intentionally confounding 
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web of bodies and body parts. In this confrontation, the viewers, too, become entrapped in the 
web. It is precisely this sense of entrapment and confusion that enables Tanning’s paintings to be 
politicizing and to incite viewers to move beyond the purely visual encounter and to actually 
experience the works of art, to interact with and think through them.  
In her autobiography, Tanning explains that, in creating these abstract paintings, her wish 
was “to make a trap (picture) with no exit at all.”2 Indeed, by denying the viewer any easy or 
obvious solutions to her abstract, visual mazes, by shaking up the viewer’s comfortable ways of 
looking—of recognizing only what is familiar and sound—Tanning’s post-1955 paintings have 
the ability to stay with the viewer even after the visual encounter has taken place. Thus, they 
invite, even urge, the viewer to continue to confront and contemplate the new concepts and ideas 
about animals embedded in the paintings. In this way, Tanning’s paintings can be understood as 
incorporeal Deleuzian events: turning points, points of transformation, through which new 
thoughts and new modes of relating to the world are formed.  
This thesis has argued that Tanning’s paintings function as a special type of incorporeal 
event: the Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming-animal. Chapter three explained that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal is based on the idea that all entities are immanently and 
molecularly connected, and that all identities are neither fixed nor stable because they are 
constantly being transformed in processes of becoming. Becoming takes place when one entity 
becomes deterritorialized and enters into an alliance or zone of mutual affect with another. 
Becoming-animal does not mean that someone physically transforms into an animal body; rather, 
it is a process of locating and acknowledging immanent connections and bonds with an animal—
those zones of affect that are already molecularly present and shared by all species, despite the 
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categories and distinctions opposed upon them by the logic-driven western world. In other 
words, becoming-animal constitutes a radical shift in consciousness: it is the ongoing process of 
cultivating new ways of thinking about and existing with animals as allies rather than “others.”  
Although Deleuze and Guattari’s specific theory of becoming-animal was outlined 
decades after Tanning began painting the works included in this present study, Tanning’s 
paintings nevertheless open viewers’ eyes to a fluid world of becoming in which humans and 
animals intertwine and even, at times, become imperceptible from one another. These paintings, 
these “becomings-animal,” have politicizing and radicalizing functions, inviting viewers to take 
action, even if it is only by reconsidering and transforming their personal views about animals. 
After all, it is only by thinking about and seeing animals in a new light that any real progress can 
be made in how humans treat and interact with animals in the world.  
In an illuminating quotation from an interview with Alain Jouffroy, Tanning asserts, “In 
the first years, I was painting our side of the mirror…but I think that I’ve gone over, to a place 
where one no longer faces identities at all. One looks at them somewhat obliquely, slyly. To 
capture the moment, to accept it with all its complex identities.”3 Not only does this quotation 
demonstrate a sort of proto-Deleuzian view of identity as contingent and fluid, as something that 
constantly “becomes” rather than simply “is,” but it also confirms the need for more scholars to 
study Tanning’s later paintings independently of her earlier figurative paintings in order to 
uncover what new messages and ideas they may hold. To be sure, Tanning’s post-1955 paintings 
have the capacity to expand viewers’ imagination to new productive and innovative ideas, and to 
new modes of existing in and with the world. Tanning has indeed gone to a place “where one no 
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longer faces identities,” and her post-1955 paintings take us there with her, should we choose to 
follow.   
In his 1995 essay on Dorothea Tanning, Jean Christophe Bailly aptly writes,  
It sometimes seems impossible to view these works of the sixties without a sense 
of frustration if not of perplexity… Attention spans are notoriously fickle. But the 
viewer must decide, just as one must decide whether to read a fine if recondite 
poem or content oneself with a bit of light verse. A will to experience, if one 
prefers the former, will often bring one into a realm of momentous event and 
personal enrichment.4  
 
Indeed, participating in Tanning’s post-1955 “becomings-animal” holds rewarding possibilities 
for the viewer who allows him- or herself to be deterritorialized and opened up to the experience. 
Tanning’s enigmatic compositions, full of intertwining and interdependent human and animal 
bodies, reveal a nomadic, rhizomatic world of constant becoming that is never static nor fixed. 
They present “unknown but knowable states:” relationships and alliances between humans and 
animals that are not yet cultivated in the western world, but which can come to be by overturning 
current anthropocentric and phallocentric preconceptions.5 These preconceptions are indeed 
destroyed in the becoming-animal, which “entails the displacement of anthropocentrism and the 
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 137 
recognition of transspecies solidarity on the basis of our being in this together—environmentally 
based, embodied, embedded, and in symbiosis.”6  
 The aim of this thesis has not been to situate Tanning’s post-1955 paintings as perfect 
illustrations of Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-animal. In fact, these paintings complicate the 
two philosophers’ concept of becoming because they demonstrate the strength and significance 
of visual material—rather than purely philosophical ideas—for finding new, progressive ways of 
being in and relating to the world. Both Tanning and Deleuze and Guattari’s works are capable 
of creating becomings-animal, but they do so through different mediums. Where Deleuze and 
Guattari seek to deterritorialize their audience through their radical philosophical writings, 
Tanning’s paintings politicize viewers through their elusive, destabilizing imagery. Above all, 
her paintings necessitate a radical, challenging way of looking, which Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ideas help illuminate.  
In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari assert, 
“the only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between…never ceasing to 
become.”7 Indeed, the world of becoming is a world of bioegalitarian coexistence, of mutual 
learning and respect, that moves beyond oppressive binaries and dualisms since all forms of 
“being” become purely contingent and malleable. Tanning’s post-1955 paintings, with their 
perpetually shifting and fluid spaces, intermingling bodies, and meandering lines and colors, 
provide us with a map of that world. Moreover, her unstable figuration of approximate, 
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amorphous figures suggest the continual process of metamorphosis, a mode of being in constant 
flux and transformation. Bodies, and hence identities, exist perpetually on the cusp of 
recognizability, but never become fixed or fully stabilized. Yet, remarkably, in each of the five 
paintings upon which this study is focused, a dog—the constant usher—peers out at us from the 
labyrinthine canvases, summoning our entrance.   
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Figure 1. Dorothea Tanning. Le Mal oublié (The Ill Fogotten). 1955. 52 x 61 ! in. The Dorothea 
Tanning Collection and Archive, New York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection and 
Archive. 
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Figure 2. Dorothea Tanning. Insomnies (Insomnias). 1957. 81 ! x 57 " in. Moderna Museet, 
Stockholm. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive. 
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Figure 3. Dorothea Tanning. To the Rescue. 1965. 80 ! x 58 " in. Hood Museum of Art, 
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive. 
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Figure 4. Dorothea Tanning. Chiends de Cythère (Dogs of Cythera). 1963. 77 ! x 117 in. The 
Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive, New York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection 
and Archive. 
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Figure 5. Dorothea Tanning. A Parisian Afternoon (Hôtel du Pavot). 1942. 40 ! x 17 " in. The 
Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive, New York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection 
and Archive. 
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Figure 6. Dorothea Tanning. Self-Portrait. 1944. 24 x 30 in. The Dorothea Tanning Collection 
and Archive, New York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive.  
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Figure 7. Dorothea Tanning. Kenningar. 1961. 31 ! x 39 " in. Michael Rosenfeld Gallery, New 
York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive.  
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Figure 8. Dorothea Tanning. Memoires d’un touriste (Memories). 1964. 28 ! x 36 " in. The 
Dorothea Tanning Collection and Archive, New York, NY. © The Dorothea Tanning Collection 
and Archive.  
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